There are more parallels between
an unfinished 1950s war in Northeast Asia and an ongoing 16-year-old war in the
crossroads between Central and South Asia than meet the eye. Let’s start with
North Korea.
Once
again the US/South Korea Hunger Games plow on. It didn’t have to be this way.
Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explained how: “Russia together with China
developed a plan which proposes ‘double freezing’: Kim Jong-un should freeze
nuclear tests and stop launching any types of ballistic missiles, while US and
South Korea should freeze large-scale drills which are used as a pretext for
the North’s tests.”
Call
it sound diplomacy. There’s no conclusive evidence the Russia-China strategic
partnership floated this plan directly to the administration of US President
Donald Trump. Even if they did, the proposal was shot down. The proverbial
“military experts” lobbied hard against it, insisting on a lopsided advantage
to Pyongyang. Worse, National Security Adviser H R McMaster consistently
lobbies for preventative war – as if this is any sort of serious conflict
“resolution”.
Meanwhile,
that “plan for an enveloping fire” around Guam remains on Kim Jong-un’s table.
It is essential to remember the plan was North Korea’s response to Trump’s
“fire and fury” volley. Kim has stated that for diplomacy to work again, “it is
necessary for the US to make a proper option first”. As in canceling the
Ulchi-Freedom Guardian war games – featuring up to 30,000 US soldiers and more
than 50,000 South Korean troops.
South
Korean President Moon Jae-in dutifully repeats the Pentagon mantra that these
Hunger Games, lasting until August 31, are “defensive”. Computer simulations
gaming a – very unlikely – unilateral Pyongyang attack may qualify as defense.
But Kim and the Korean Central News Agency interpret the war games in essence
for what they are: rehearsal for a “decapitation”, a pre-emptive attack
yieding regime change.
No
wonder the KCNA insists on a possible “catastrophe”. And Beijing, crucially,
concurs. The Global Times reasonably argued that “if South Korea really wants
no war on the Korean Peninsula, it should try to stop this military exercise”.
Can’t pack up our troubles
It
would be a relief to defuse the drama by evoking that great World War I
marching song; “Pack up your troubles in your old kit bag/ And smile, smile,
smile.”
But
this is extremely serious. A China-North Korea mutual defense treaty has been
in effect since 1961. Under this framework, Beijing’s response to Trump’s “fire
and fury” was a thing of beauty. If Pyongyang attacks, China is neutral. But if
the US launches a McMaster-style pre-emptive attack, China intervenes –
militarily – on behalf of Pyongyang.
As
a clincher, Beijing even made it clear that its preference is for the current
status quo to remain. Checkmate.
Hunger
Games apart, the rhetorical war in the Korean Peninsula did decrease a
substantial notch after China made its position clear. According to a Beltway
intel source, that shows “the US and Chinese militaries, as the US and the
Russians in Syria, are coordinating to avoid a war”.
Evidence
may have been provided by a very important meeting last week between the
chairmen of the US and Chinese Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford
and General Fang Fenghui. They signed a deal that the Pentagon spun as able to
“reduce the risk of miscalculation” in Northeast Asia.
Among
the prodigious fireworks inherent to his departure as White House chief
strategist, Steve Bannon nailed it: “There’s no military solution, forget it.
Until somebody solves the part of the equation that shows me that 10 million
people in Seoul don’t die in the first 30 minutes from conventional weapons, I
don’t know what you’re talking about, there’s no military solution here, they
got us.”
And
extra evidence in the “they got us” department is that B-1B heavy bomber
“decapitation” practice runs – out of Andersen Air Force Base in Guam – have
been quietly “suspended”. This crucial, largely unreported fact in the air
supersedes rhetoric from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Pentagon head
James “Mad Dog” Mattis, who previous to Bannon’s exit were stressing “strong
military consequences if North Korea chooses wrongly”.
Once again, it’s all about BRI
Now
let’s move to Afghanistan. “Mad Dog” Mattis once famously said it was fun to shoot
Taliban fighters. “Known unknowns” Don Rumsfeld was more realistic; he moved
out of Afghanistan (toward Iraq) because there were not enough good targets to
bomb.
Anyone
who spent time working/reporting on the Afghan Hindu Kush and the southwestern
deserts knows why the proverbial “there’s no military solution” applies. There
are myriad reasons, starting with the profound, radicalized Afghan ethnic
divide (roughly, 40% are mostly rural, tribal Pashtun, many recruited by the
Taliban; almost 30% are Tajik, a great deal of them urban, literate and in
government; more than 20% are Hazara Shiites; and 10% are Uzbek).
The
bulk of Washington’s “aid” to Kabul throughout these past 16 years has been on
the bombing, not the economy, front. Government corruption is cataclysmic.
Warlords rule. The Taliban thrive because they offer local protection. Much to
Pashtun ire, most of the army is Tajik. Tajik politicians are mostly close to
India while most Pashtun favor Pakistan (after all, they have cousins on the
other side of the Durand line; enter the dream of a future, reunited
Pashtunistan).
On
the GWOT (Global War on Terror) front, al-Qaeda would not even exist if the
late Dr Zbig “Grand Chessboard” Brzezinski had not come up with the idea of a
sprawling, well-weaponized private army of demented jihadis-cum-tribal Afghans
fighting the communist government in Kabul during the 1980s. Add to this the
myth that the Pentagon needs to be on the ground in Afghanistan to prevent
jihadis from attacking America. Al-Qaeda is extinct in Afghanistan. And Daesh
does not need territory to concoct/project its DIY jihad.
=When
the myth of the US in Afghanistan as a categorical imperative is exposed, that
may unveil what this is all about: business.
And
we’re not even talking about who really profits from large-scale opium/heroin
trade.
Two
months ago the Afghan ambassador to Washington, Hamdullah Mohib, was
breathlessly spinning how “President Trump is keenly interested in
Afghanistan’s economic potential”, as in “our estimated $1 trillion in copper,
iron ore, rare-earth elements, aluminum, gold, silver, zinc, mercury and
lithium”. This led to the proverbial unnamed “US officials” telling Reuters
last month that what Trump wants is for the US to demand some of that mineral
wealth in exchange for “assisting” Kabul.
A
US Geological Survey study a decade ago did identify potential Afghan mineral
wealth – gold, silver, platinum, iron ore, uranium, zinc, tantalum, bauxite,
coal, natural gas and copper – worth as much as US$1 trillion, with much spin
dedicated to Afghanistan as “the Saudi Arabia of lithium”.
And
the competition – once again, China – is already there, facing myriad
infrastructure and red-tape problems, but concentrated on incorporating
Afghanistan, long-term, into the New Silk Roads, aka Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), along with its security cooperation arm, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
It’s
no secret the Russia-China strategic partnership wants an Afghan solution
hatched by Afghans and supervised by the SCO (of which Afghanistan is an
observer and future full member). So from the point of view of
neocon/neoliberalcon elements of the War Party in Washington, Afghanistan only
makes sense as a forward base to harass/stall/thwart BRI.
What
Russia and China want for Afghanistan – yet another node in the process of
Eurasia integration – is not much different from what Russia, China and South
Korea want for North Korea: increased connectivity as in a future Trans-Korean
Railway linked to the Trans-Siberian.
As
for Washington and the proverbially bombastic, failed futurists across the
Beltway, do they even know what is the end game of “investing” in two
never-ending wars with no visible benefits?
Reprinted with permission from The Unz Review.