A deadly accident in northern Russia earlier
this month caused the U.S. arms control community to stand up and take notice.
The Russians claim they were testing “isotopic sources of fuel on a liquid
propulsion unit,” and that only after the test was completed did the engine
explode. There was a spike in radiation levels detected in the city of
Severodvinsk, roughly 18 miles away, shortly after the accident. Seven people
were killed as a result of the explosion, including at least two who died of
acute radiation poisoning. Scores of others were exposed to radioactive materials,
and subsequently decontaminated and placed under observation. Within days, the
Russians declared that all radiation readings in and around the accident site
were at normal levels.
Many Western experts believe that the
Russians were testing a nuclear-powered cruise missile, the 9M730
“Burevestnik”—known in the West by its NATO designation, the SSC-X-9
“Skyfall”—and that a miniature nuclear reactor these experts believe was used
to power the missile exploded. Other experts, including me, question this conclusion. But
a recent report by Roshydromet,
the Russian agency responsible for sampling air quality, showed the presence of
four distinct isoptopes in the atmosphere after the accident that are uniquely
sourced to the fission of uranium 235, strongly suggesting that a reactor of
some sort was, in fact, involved (mitigating against this conclusion is the
fact that no iodine 131 was detected; iodine 131is the most prevalent isotope
produced by the fission of uranium 235, and its absence would be highly
unlikely in the event of any reactor explosion).
The
bottom line, however, is that no one outside the Russians responsible for the
failed test know exactly what system was being tested, why it was being tested,
how it was being tested, and why that test failed. The Russian government has
refused to provide any details about the test. “When it comes to activities of
a military nature,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a press conference a few days
after the accident, “there are certain restrictions on access to information.
This is work in the military field, work on promising weapons systems. We are
not hiding this,” he said, adding, “We must think of our own security.”
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Others
were thinking about their own security as well.
“Something
obviously has gone badly wrong here,” U.S. national security adviser John
Bolton said after the accident. Bolton observed that
Russia is seeking to “modernize their nuclear arsenal to build new kinds of
delivery vehicles, hypersonic glide vehicles, hypersonic cruise missiles,”
noting that “dealing with this capability … remains a real challenge for the
United States and its allies.” The U.S. and Russia are currently discussing the extension of
the New
START treaty on strategic arms reduction, scheduled to expire
in early 2021. “If there is going to be an extension of the New START,” U.S.
Defense Secretary Mark Esper said, “then we need to make sure that
we include all these new weapons that Russia is pursuing.”
But
this is problematic—the new Russian weapons under development are directly
linked to the decision by the George W. Bush
administration in 2002 to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, a 1972 agreement that
limited the number and types of ABM weapons the U.S. and then-Soviet Union
could deploy, thereby increasing the likelihood that any full-scale missile
attack would succeed in reaching its target. By creating the inevitability of
mutual nuclear annihilation (a practice referred to as “mutually assured destruction,” or MAD), both
the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces served as a deterrent against one
another.
The
deployment by the U.S. of modern ABM systems in the aftermath of its withdrawal
from the ABM treaty, Russia believes, threatens its strategic nuclear force and
thereby nullifies its deterrent potential. From the Russian perspective, only
by building a new generation of modern nuclear delivery systems specifically
designed to defeat U.S. ABM capability can Russia reassert its strategic
nuclear deterrent. “We have repeatedly told our American and European partners
who are NATO members we will make the necessary efforts to neutralize the
threats posed by the deployment of the US global missile defense system,”
Putin stated during a 2018 speech. According to him,
“Nobody really wanted to talk to us about the core of the problem, and nobody
wanted to listen to us.” Putin unveiled Russia’s new nuclear arsenal—which
included the Burevestnik missile—and stared into the camera, declaring, “So,
listen to us now!”
Complicating
matters further is the notion put forward by Esper that the weapons Putin
unveiled in 2018 would require that the New START treaty be modified prior to
any extension, impeding what otherwise would simply have been an automatic
extension, based upon mutual consent, for a five-year period. The Russians took
umbrage over this position. “If we want to really comprehend the core of the
matter,” Vladimir Yermakov, Russia’s deputy foreign minister for
nonproliferation and arms control, told the Russian pressearlier this month, “it
should be noted that the New START Treaty covers specific categories of
strategic arms, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), heavy bombers and ICBM and SLBM
launchers. The Treaty,” Yermakov emphasized, “does not cover
any other weapons systems.” Regarding the failed test of Aug. 8, Yermakov
declared: “This also concerns the relevant research and development projects.”
Yermakov categorically rejected the proposition put forward by Esper, noting
that “the question of hypothetically extending the New START Treaty with
certain weapons systems that do not fit into the aforementioned categories is
absolutely unacceptable.”
Esper’s
position, Yermakov said, did not take the Russians by surprise. “As of late,”
Yermakov said, “we have been hearing US officials express doubts more and more
often as to whether extending the New START Treaty makes sense. It is hard to
perceive this as anything other than a conscious effort to lay the required
media groundwork and to invent pretexts for declining to extend the agreement after
it expires in February 2021 and to obtain absolute freedom to build up the US
nuclear arsenal, even to the detriment of strategic stability and international
security.”
The
Russian position on the extension of the New START treaty, Yermakov said, is that
it would “be a reasonable and responsible step, making it possible to prevent a
complete breakdown in the area of strategic stability,” and “would also provide
extra time to consider joint approaches towards new weapons systems that are
currently emerging and possible new arms control treaties.” But before any
extension could be considered, the Russian side insisted that the U.S. resolve
an outstanding issue of treaty compliance that centered around 56 Trident SLBM launchers and 41 B-52H
bombers that were “converted” from their nuclear mission in a
way that does not render them incapable of accomplishing that mission. Such
conversions are permitted under the New START treaty “by rendering [the Trident
SLBM launchers and B-52H bombers] incapable of employing ICBMs, SLBMs, or
nuclear armaments.”
For the
Trident SLBM launchers, the conversion was done by removing gas
generators of the ejecting mechanism from the launch tube and bolting the tube
covers shut. The problem, for the Russians, is that this procedure is
reversible, meaning that the launcher could still be used to launch SLBMs
simply by removing the bolts and replacing the gas generators. Likewise, the
B-52H modifications involve the removal of launch equipment from the aircraft.
The aircraft still retains a socket that would allow the arming mechanism of a
nuclear weapon to be connected to the removed equipment, which means the B-52H
could be converted back to its nuclear role simply by reinstalling the
equipment. According to Yermakov, “Russian inspectors are unable to verify the results
of the re-equipping under the procedure stipulated by the Treaty.” From the
Russian perspective, the issue of the noncompliant “conversion” of the Trident
SLBM launchers and B-52H bombers is of “fundamental significance”; any
extension of the New START can only be discussed, the Russians maintain, once
the United States “fully return to complying with the spirit and the letter of
the treaty.”
The
foundation upon which U.S.-Russian cooperation regarding New START was
constructed is fragile, founded as it was on the unilateral abrogation of the
ABM Treaty in 2002, the ongoing compliance issue regarding the conversion of
treaty-accountable items under New START, and the precipitous decision on the
part of the Trump administration to withdraw from yet another landmark arms
control agreement, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which went
into effect Aug. 2. It would be the INF Treaty that would deal the fatal blow
to U.S. credibility when it came to arms control.
The
U.S. had, since 2014, accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty by testing a
ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) to prohibited ranges. According to the
U.S. narrative, Russia took advantage of the existence of two other missile
systems, the Kh-101 air-launched cruise missile and
the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, to
try and disguise the development of a new GLCM, the 9M729, which the U.S. claims was flight-tested
to ranges prohibited by the INF Treaty. “Russia probably assumed parallel
development—tested from the same site—and deployment of other cruise missiles
that are not prohibited by the INF Treaty would provide sufficient cover for
its INF violation,” then-Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats told Congress in January.
For its
part, Russia denied that the 9M729 violated the INF Treaty. From the moment the
U.S. first raised its allegations regarding the 9M729, Russia requested that
they be backed up with facts that would substantiate the claims; this the U.S.
refused to do. Finally, in an effort to forestall a precipitous U.S. withdrawal
from the INF Treaty, Russia displayed the 9M729alongside its
cousin, the 9M728, a similar GLCM that the U.S. acknowledges complies with the
range restrictions of the INF Treaty. The Russian Ministry of Defense invited
U.S. and NATO military officers stationed in Moscow to attend this
demonstration; none did. The Russians were able to demonstrate convincingly
that the 9M728 and 9M729 missiles made use of the same propulsion
components—solid-fuel rocket motors, which meant that, all things being equal,
both missiles would fly the same distance. But there was a kicker—the 9M729
missile was equipped with an improved guidance and control package, as well as
a different warhead which, in their aggregate, weighed significantly more than
their counterpart components on the treaty-compliant 9M728 missile. In short,
the Russians demonstrated that the 9M729 could not fly further than the
treaty-compliant 9M728. The U.S. ignored this demonstration.
At the
same time the U.S. was accusing Russia of violating the INF Treaty with the
9M729 missile, Russia was voicing similar concerns about the Mark 41
“Aegis Ashore” vertical launch system that the U.S. had
installed in both Poland and Romania as part of its ballistic missile defense
shield. The Mark 41 originally was designed for service on naval vessels. In
this role, its launcher system could be configured to launch either the SM-6
surface-to-air missile, or the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile. From the
Russian perspective, the Mark 41, when placed in a ground-launch configuration,
became an INF-capable system, since it could launch a GLCM of proscribed range.
The U.S. was adamant in its rejection of these claims, noting that the Aegis
Ashore systems in Poland and Romania were configured to launch SM-6
surface-to-air missiles only. The Russians, however, insisted that there was no
physical way to make this determination, noting that the INF Treaty required
that similar systems be denoted with unique visually distinctive features; the
U.S. dismissed the Russian position as a “technicality.”
On Aug.
18, the U.S. conducted a test launch of a GLCM from a Mark 41 launch cannister that
had been bolted to a flat-bed trailer, making it a de facto ground launcher.
The GLCM flew to ranges greater than those permitted by the INF Treaty.
Technically, the U.S. was not in violation of the INF treaty at the time of the
test, because it had expired on Aug. 2, some 16 days prior. But those 16 days
hold the key to understanding just how seriously Russia took this test.
According to a transcript of a meeting Putin held Friday with members of the
Russian Security Council, he declared that by conducting a missile
test a mere 16 days after the INF Treaty ended, it was “obvious that it was not
improvisation, but became the next link in a chain of events that were planned
and carried out earlier.”
From the Russian perspective,
they had been right all along—the U.S. had cheated on the INF Treaty, just as
they were cheating on the New START Treaty. With such a dismal track record of
noncompliance, it is all but certain that the New START Treaty will not be
extended and, thus liberated from any vestige of constraint, the U.S. and
Russia will embark on a new arms race that threatens all of humanity with the
all-too-real possibility of imminent destruction.