Question 78. The sin of usury
- Is it a sin to take money as a price for money
lent, which is to receive usury?
- Is it lawful to lend money for any other kind of
consideration, by way of payment for the loan?
- Is a man bound to restore just gains derived from
money taken in usury?
- Is it lawful to borrow money under a condition of
usury?
Article 1. Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?
Objection 1. It would seem
that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent. For
no man sins through
following the example of Christ.
But Our Lord said of Himself (Luke 19:23): "At My coming I might have
exacted it," i.e. the money lent, "with usury." Therefore it is
not a sin to take usury for lending money.
Objection 2. Further,
according to Psalm 18:8, "The law of
the Lord is unspotted," because, to wit, it forbids sin.
Now usury of a kind is allowed in the Divine
law, according to Deuteronomy 23:19-20: "Thou shalt not
fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the
stranger": nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the observance of
the Law, according to Deuteronomy 28:12: "Thou shalt fenerate*
to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any
one." ['Faeneraberis'—'Thou shalt lend upon usury.' The Douay
version has simply 'lend.' The objection lays stress on the
word 'faeneraberis': hence the necessity of
rendering it by 'fenerate.'] Therefore it is not a sin to
take usury.
Objection 3. Further,
in human affairs justice is
determined by civil laws. Now civil
law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful.
Objection 4. Further, the
counsels are not binding under sin.
But, among other counsels we find (Luke 6:35): "Lend, hoping for nothing
thereby." Therefore it is not a sin to
take usury.
Objection 5. Further, it
does not seem to be in itself sinful to
accept a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is
not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for
him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.
Objection 6. Further,
silver made into coins does not differ specifically from silver made into a
vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver vessel.
Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver coin.
Therefore usury is not in itself a sin.
Objection 7. Further,
anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who
accepts the loan, freely gives the usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully
take the usury.
On the contrary, It is written
(Exodus 22:25): "If thou lend money to
any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard
upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries."
I answer that, To take usury
for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to
sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality
which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident, we
must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists in their
consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat
when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing
must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the
use of the thing, is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend
things of this kin is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to
sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same
thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist,
wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice.
On like manner he commits an injustice who
lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the
thing in equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.
On the other hand,
there are things the use of which does not consist in their consumption: thus
to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things
both may be granted: for instance, one man may
hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to himself the
use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of the house, while
retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for
the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to
whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house.
Now money,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3)
was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper
and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk
in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful
to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as
usury: and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he
bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury.
Reply to Objection
1. In
this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods
which God exacts from us, for He wishes us
ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for our own
profit not for His.
Reply to Objection
2. The Jews were
forbidden to take usury from their brethren, i.e. from other Jews.
By this we are given to understand that to take usury from any man is evil simply,
because we ought to treat every man as
our neighbor and brother, especially in the state of the Gospel, whereto all
are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in Psalm 14:5: "He that hath not put out his money to usury,"
and (Ezekiel 18:8): "Who hath not taken usury
[Vulgate:
'If a man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase
. . . he is just.']." They were permitted, however, to take
usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a
greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which
they were prone according to Isaiah 56:11, they should take usury from
the Jews who were worshippers of God.
Where we find it
promised to them as a reward, "Thou shalt fenerate to many nations,"
etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for lending, as in Sirach 29:10, where we read: "Many have
refused to fenerate, not out of wickedness,"
i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly the Jews are
promised in reward an abundance of wealth,
so that they would be able to lend to others.
Reply to Objection
3. Human laws
leave certain things unpunished, on account of the condition of
those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many advantages, if
all sins were strictly forbidden and
punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has
permitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice,
but lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in civil
law [Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that "those
things according to natural reason and civil
law which are consumed by being used, do not admit of
usufruct," and that "the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a
usufruct to such things, but established a quasi-usufruct," namely by
permitting usury. Moreover the Philosopher,
led by natural reason,
says (Polit. i, 3) that "to make money by usury is exceedingly
unnatural."
Reply to Objection
4. A man is
not always bound to lend, and for this reason it is placed among the counsels.
Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek profit by lending: although it may be
called a matter of counsel in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees,
who deemed some kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one's enemies is a
matter of counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain,
but of the hope which is put in man.
For we ought not to lend or do any good deed through
hope in man, but only through hope in God.
Reply to Objection
5. He
that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for what he has done, but he
must not exact more. Now he is repaid according to equality of justice if
he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct
of a thing which has no other use but the consumption of its substance,
he exacts a price of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.
Reply to Objection
6. The
principal use of a silver vessel is not its consumption, and so one may
lawfully sell its use while retaining one's ownership of it. On the other hand
the principal use of silver money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not
lawful to sell its use and at the same time expect the restitution of the
amount lent. It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver
vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. On like
manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man
might lend coins for show, or to be used as security.
Reply to Objection
7. He
who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply,
but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow
money which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.
Article 2. Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of
consideration for money lent?
Objection 1. It would seem
that one may ask for some other kind of consideration for money lent. For
everyone may lawfully seek to indemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers
loss through lending money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact
something else besides the money lent.
Objection 2. Further, as
stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is in duty bound
by a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a
favor. Now to lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for
which he should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by
a natural debt to repay something. Now it
does not seem unlawful to bind oneself to an obligation of
the natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful, in
lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of compensation as condition of
the loan.
Objection 3. Further, just
as there is real remuneration, so is there verbal remuneration, and
remuneration by service, as a glosssays
on Isaiah 33:15, "Blessed is he that
shaketh his hands from all bribes [Vulgate:
'Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . He that
shaketh his hands from all bribes.']." Now it is lawful to accept service
or praise from one to whom one has lent money. Therefore in like manner it is
lawful to accept any other kind of remuneration.
Objection 4. Further,
seemingly the relation of gift to gift is
the same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given.
Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a loan
granted.
Objection 5. Further, the
lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum of money removes the money
further from himself than he who entrusts it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it
is lawful to receive interest for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman.
Therefore it is also lawful to receive interest for money lent.
Objection 6. Further, a
man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of which pledge he might sell
for a price: as when a man mortgages his land or the house wherein he dwells.
Therefore it is lawful to receive interest for money lent.
Objection 7. Further, it
sometimes happens that a man raises the price of his goods under guise of loan,
or buys another's goods at a low figure; or raises his price through delay in
being paid, and lowers his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these
cases there seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to be
manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or exact some
consideration for money lent.
On the contrary, Among
other conditions requisite in a just man it
is stated (Ezekiel 18:17) that he "hath not taken
usury and increase."
I answer that, According to
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing is
reckoned as money "if its value can be measured by money."
Consequently, just as it is a sin against justice,
to take money, by tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or
anything else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin,
by tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be measured
by money. Yet there would be no sin in
receiving something of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were
due on account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity: since,
even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity, nor is one in a
worse condition through lending.
On the other hand
it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in respect of such things as are
not appreciated by a measure of money, for instance, benevolence, and love for
the lender, and so forth.
Reply to Objection
1. A
lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower
for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to have, for this
is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It may also happen that
the borrower avoids a greater loss than the lender incurs, wherefore the
borrower may repay the lender with what he has gained. But the lender cannot
enter an agreement for compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit
out of his money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be
prevented in many ways from having.
Reply to Objection
2. Repayment
for a favor may be made in two ways. On one way, as a debt of justice;
and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed contract; and its amount is
measured according to the favor received. Wherefore the borrower of money or
any such thing the use of which is its consumption is not bound to repay more
than he received in loan: and consequently it is against justice if
he be obliged to pay back more. On another way
a man's obligation to repayment for favor
received is based on a debt of friendship, and the nature of
this debt depends more on the feeling with which the favor was conferred than
on the greatness of the favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a
civil obligation, involving a kind of necessitythat
would exclude the spontaneous nature of
such a repayment.
Reply to Objection
3. If
a man were, in return for money lent, as though there had been an agreement
tacit or expressed, to expect or exact repayment in the shape of some
remuneration of service or words, it would be the same as if he expected or
exacted some real remuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as
may be seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they
exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration by service
or words be given not as an obligation,
but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful
to take, exact, and expect it.
Reply to Objection
4. Money
cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount lent, which has to be paid
back: nor should the loan be made with a demand or expectation of aught else
but of a feeling of benevolence which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value,
and which can be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to
lend in return at some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because
again an obligation of this kind has its
pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the lender to borrow something
else at the same time, but it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant
him a loan at some future time.
Reply to Objection
5. He
who lends money transfers the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the
borrower holds the money at his own risk and is bound to pay it all back:
wherefore the lender must not exact more. On the other hand he that entrusts
his money to a merchant or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not
transfer the ownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his
risk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for his craft,
and consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him, part of
the profits derived from his money.
Reply to Objection
6. If
a man in return for money lent to him pledges something that can be valued at a
price, the lender must allow for the use of that thing towards the repayment of
the loan. Else if he wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to
repayment, it is the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury,
unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to one another
gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book.
Reply to Objection
7. If
a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that which is just,
so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a case of usury:
because this waiting for the payment of the price has the character of a loan,
so that whatever he demands beyond the just price in consideration of this
delay, is like a price for a loan, which pertains to usury. On like manner if a
buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is just,
for the reason that he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is
a sin of usury; because again this
anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan, the price of which is
the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man
wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money
sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of
usury.
Article 3. Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has
made out of money gotten by usury?
Objection 1. It would seem
that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten
by usury. For the Apostle says (Romans 11:16): "If the root be holy,
so are the branches." Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the
branches. But the root was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is
made therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.
Objection 2. Further, it
is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal:
'Cum tu sicut asseris'): "Property accruing from usury must be sold, and
the price repaid to the persons from
whom the usury was extorted." Therefore, likewise, whatever else is
acquired from usurious money must be restored.
Objection 3. Further, that
which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the
money he paid for it. Therefore he has no more right to the thing purchased
than to the money he paid. But he was bound to restore the money gained through
usury. Therefore he is also bound to restore what he acquired with it.
On the contrary, A man may
lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired. Now that which is acquired by the
proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully
retained.
I answer that, As stated
above (Article 1), there are certain things whose
use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, according
to law (Article 1, Response to Objection 3). Wherefore if such
like things be extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and
so forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received (since what
is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of human industry),
unless indeed the other party by losing some of his own goods be injured
through the lender retaining them: for then he is bound to make good the
loss.
On the other hand,
there are certain things whose use is not their consumption: such things admit
of usufruct, for instance house or land property and so forth. Wherefore if a
man has by usury extorted from another his house or land, he is bound to
restore not only the house or land but also the fruits accruing to him
therefrom, since they are the fruits of things owned by another man and
consequently are due to him.
Reply to Objection
1. The
root has not only the character of matter,
as money made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an
active cause, in so far as it administers
nourishment. Hence the comparison fails.
Reply to Objection
2. Further,
Property acquired from usury does not belong to the person who
paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he that paid
usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the other goods of
the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that such property should be assigned to
the persons who paid usury, since the
property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but it is
commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored, of course
according to the amount taken in usury.
Reply to Objection
3. The
proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person who
acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental cause,
but on account of his own industry as principal cause.
Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious money than to
the usurious money itself.
Article 4. Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of
usury?
Objection 1. It would seem
that it is not lawful to borrow money under a condition of
usury. For the Apostle says (Romans 1:32) that they "are worthy of
death . . . not only they that do" these sins,
"but they also that consent to them that do them." Now he that
borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of
the usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin.
Therefore he sins also.
Objection 2. Further, for
no temporal advantage ought one to give another an occasion of committing
a sin: for this pertains to active scandal,
which is always sinful, as stated above (II-II:43:2). Now he that seeks to borrow from a usurer
gives him an occasion of sin.
Therefore he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.
Objection 3. Further, it
seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one's
money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems altogether unlawful
to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it would be unlawful to deposit
one's sword with a madman, a maiden with
a libertine, or food with a glutton.
Neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a usurer.
On the contrary, He that
suffers injury does not sin,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11),
wherefore justice is not a mean between two vices,
as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by
doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under
a condition of usury. Therefore he that
accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin.
I answer that, It is by no
means lawful to induce a man to sin,
yet it is lawful to make use of another's sin for
a good end, since even God uses
all sin for some good,
since He draws some good from every evil as
stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it were
lawful to make use of an oath taken
by a man swearing by false gods (which is a manifest sin,
for he gives Divine honor to them) Augustine (Ep.
xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good purpose,
the oath of a man that swears by false gods,
is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons,
but to his good compact whereby he kept his word.
If however he were to induce him to swear by false gods,
he would sin.
Accordingly we must
also answer to the question in point that it is by no means lawful to induce a
man to lend under a condition of usury: yet it is lawful to
borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer by
profession; provided the borrower have a good end
in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is lawful
for a man who has fallen among thieves to point out his property to them (which
they sin in taking) in order to save his
life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jeremiah 41:8): "Kill us not: for we have stores in
the field."
Reply to Objection
1. He
who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer's sin but
makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance of usury that pleases him,
but his lending, which is good.
Reply to Objection
2. He
who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but
for lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion of sin in
the malice of his heart. Hence there is
passive scandal on his part, while there is no
active scandal on the part of the person who
seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a
reason why the other person should desist from borrowing if
he is in need, since this passive scandal arises
not from weakness or ignorance but from malice.
Reply to Objection
3. If
one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking other means of practising
usury; or with the intention of making a greater profit
from his money by reason of the usury, one would be giving a sinner matter for sin,
so that one would be a participator in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the
usurer to whom one entrusts one's money has other means of practising usury,
there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may
be in safer keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a goodpurpose.