Looking at the recent North Korean testing of two
intercontinental missiles, it may seem that Pyongyang wishes to increase
tensions in the region. A more careful analysis, however, shows how the
DPRK is implementing a strategy that will likely succeed in averting a
disastrous war on the peninsula.
In the last
four weeks, North Korea seems to have implemented the second phase of its
strategy against South Korea, China and the United States. The North Korean
nuclear program seems to have reached an important juncture, with two tests
carried out at the beginning and end of July. Both missiles seem capable of
hitting the American mainland, although doubts still remain over Pyongyang's ability
to miniaturize a nuclear warhead to mount it on an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM). However, the direction in which North Korea’s nuclear program
is headed ensures an important regional deterrent against Japan and South
Korea, and in some respects against the United States, which is the main reason
for North Korea’s development of ICBMs. Recent history has repeatedly
demonstrated the folly of trusting the West (the fate of Gaddafi remains fresh
in our minds) and suggests instead the building up of an arsenal that poses a
serious deterrence to US bellicosity.
It is not a
mystery that from 2009 to date, North Korea's nuclear capacity has increased in
direct proportion to the level of distrust visited on Pyongyang by the West.
Since 2009, the six-party talks concluded, Kim Jong-un has come to realize that
the continuing threats, practices, and arms sales of the United States to Japan
and South Korea needed to be thwarted in some way in the interests of defending
the sovereignty of the DPRK. Faced with infinitely lower spending capacity than
the three nations mentioned, Pyongyang chose a twofold strategy: to pursue
nuclear weapons as an explicit deterrence measure; and to strengthen its conventional forces, keeping in mind that Seoul is only a
stone’s throw away from North Korean artillery.
This twofold
strategy has, in little more than eight years, greatly strengthened the ability
of the DPRK to resist infringement of its sovereignty. In contrast to the idea
commonly promoted in the Western media, Pyongyang has promised not to use
nuclear weapons first, reserving their use only in response to aggression
against itself. In the same way, a pre-emptive attack on Seoul using
traditional artillery would be seen as intolerable aggression, dragging
Pyongyang into a devastating war. Kim Jong-un’s determination in developing
conventional and nuclear deterrence has succeeded in establishing a balance of
power that helps avoid a regional war and, in so doing, contributes to the
strengthening of overall security in the region, contrary to what many believe.
The reason
the United States continues to raise tensions with Pyongyang and threaten a
conflict is not out of a concern for the protection of her Japanese or South
Korean allies, as one may initially be led to think. The United States in the
region has a central objective that does not concern Kim Jong-un or his nuclear
weapons. Rather, it is driven by the perennial necessity to increase forces in
the region for the purposes of maintaining a balance of military force (Asian
Pivot) and ultimately trying to contain the rise of the People's Republic of
China (PRC). One might even argue that this strategy poses dangers not only to
the entire region but, in the case of a confrontation between Washington and
Beijing, the entire planet, given the nuclear arsenal possessed by the United
States and the People's Republic of China.
In this
respect, the triangular relationship between China, North Korea and South Korea
takes on another aspect. As always, every action is accompanied with a
reaction. The statement that Beijing would prefer to get rid of the DPRK
leadership is without foundation. Central in the minds of Chinese policy makers
is the threat of a US containment that could undermine the country's economic
growth. This strategic planning is well known in Pyongyang, and explains in
part why the DPRK leadership still proceeds with actions that are not viewed well
by Beijing. From the North Korean point of view, Beijing derives an advantage
from sharing a border with the DPRK, which offers a friendly leadership not
hostile to Beijing. Pyongyang is aware of the economic, political, and military
burden of this situation, but tolerates it, receiving the necessary resources
from Beijing to survive and develop the country.
This complex
relationship leads the DPRK to carry out missile tests in the hope of gaining
many benefits. First of all, it hopes to gain a regional, and possibly a
global, deterrence against any surprise attacks. Secondly, it forces South
Korea to have a symmetrical response to DPRK missile tests, and this strategy,
coming from North Korea diplomacy, is far from improvised or incongruous. In
recent years, South Korea’s response has come in the form of the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, designed to intercept missiles. As
repeatedly explained, it is useless against North Korean rockets, but poses a
serious threat to the Chinese nuclear arsenal, as its powerful radars are able
to scout much of China's territory, also being ideally positioned to intercept
(at least in theory) a responsive nuclear strike from China. In a nutshell,
THAAD is a deadly threat to China's strategic nuclear parity.
From the
point of view of the four nations involved in the region, each has different
aims. For the United States, there are many advantages in deploying the THAAD:
in increases pressure on China, as well as concludes an arms sale that is
always welcomed by the military-industrial complex; it also gives the
impression of addressing the DPRK nuclear problem adequately. South Korea,
however, finds itself in a special situation, with the former president now
under arrest for corruption. The new president, Moon Jae-in,
would prefer dialogue rather than the deployment of new THAAD batteries. In any
case, after the latest ICBM test, Moon required an additional THAAD system in the Republic of Korea, in
addition to the launchers already there. With no particular options available
to conduct a diplomatic negotiation, Seoul is following Washington in a spiral
of escalation that certainly does not benefit the peninsula's economic growth.
Ultimately, the PRC sees an increase in the number of THAAD carriers close to
the country, and the DPRK is growing in its determination to pursue a nuclear
deterrent. Indeed, the strategy of the Pyongyang is working: on the one hand,
they are developing a nuclear weapon to deter external enemies; on the other,
they are obligating the PRC to adopt a particularly hostile attitude towards
South Korea’s deployment of THAAD. In this sense, the numerous economic actions of Beijing towards Seoul can be
explained as a response to the deployment of the THAAD batteries. China is the
main economic partner of South Korea, and this trade and tourism limitation is
quite damaging to South Korea’s economy.
This tactic
has been used by North Korea for the last several years, and the results, in
addition to the recent economic crunch between the PRC and South Korea
have indirectly led to the end of the reign of the corrupt
leader Park Geun-hye, an ever-present puppet in American hands. The pressure
that the DPRK applies to bilateral relations between China and South Korea
increases with each launch of an ICBM carrier, which is the logic behind these
missile tests. Pyongyang feels justified in urging its main ally, China, to
step up actions against Seoul to force it to compromise in a diplomatic
negotiation with Pyongyang without the overbearing presence of its American
ally pushing for war.
The main
problem in the relations between South Korea, China and North Korea is
represented by American influence and the need to prevent a rapprochement
between these parties. As already stated, the United States needs the DPRK to
justify its presence in the region, aiming in reality at Chinese containment.
Pyongyang has been isolated and sanctioned for almost 50 years, yet serves to
secure China’s southern border in the form of a protected friend rather than an
enemy. This situation, more than any United Nations sanction to which the PRC
adheres, guarantees a lasting relationship between the countries. Beijing is
well aware of the weight of isolationism and economic burden on North Korea,
which is why Beijing is symmetrically increasing pressure on South Korea to
negotiate.
In this
situation, the United States tries to remain relevant in the regional dispute,
while not having the capacity to influence the Chinese decisions that clearly
rely on other tactics, specifically putting pressure on South Korea. In
military terms, as explained above, Washington can not start any military
confrontation against the DPRK. The consequences, in addition to millions of
deaths, would lead Seoul to break relations with Washington and seek an
immediate armistice, cutting off the United States from negotiations and likely
expelling US troops from its territory. Ultimately, there is no South Korean
ability to influence the political process in the North while they continue to
be flanked by the United States in terms of warfare (very aggressive joint
exercises). The influence Washington can exert on Pyongyang is zero, having
fired all cartridges with over half a century of sanctions.
Conclusion
The bottom
line is that the United States cannot afford to attack the DPRK. Pyongyang will
continue to develop its own nuclear arsenal, with Beijing's covert blessing in
spite of its officially continuing to condemn these developments. At the same
time, South Korea is likely to persevere with a hostile attitude, especially in
regard to the deployment of new THAAD batteries. Sooner or later, Seoul will
come to a breaking point as a result of further restrictions on trade between
China and South Korea. As long as Seoul is able to absorb Chinese sanctions, little will change.
What will
lead to a major change in the region will be the economic effect of these
restrictions that will eventually oblige Seoul to consider its role in the
region and its future. Seoul's leadership is aware of three situations that
will hardly change, namely: Pyongyang will never attack first; Beijing will
continue to support North Korea rather than accept the United States on its
border; and Washington is not able to bring solutions but only greater chaos
and a worsening global economic situation to the region. In the light of this
scenario, time is all on the side of Beijing and Pyongyang. Eventually the
economic situation for Seoul will become unbearable, bringing it to the
negotiating table with a weakened and certainly precarious position. Beijing
and Pyongyang have a long-term common goal, which is to break the bond of
submission between South Korea and the United States, freeing Seoul from
Washington's neo-conservative programs to contain China (on a Russia
containment model).
Indirectly
coordinated work between Beijing and Pyongyang is hardly understandable to
Western analysts, but examining every aspect, especially with regard to
cause-and-effect relationships, these decisions are not so incomprehensible and
even more rational in a broader viewing of the region and its balance of power.
On the one hand, Seoul sees the DPRK offering peace, stability and prosperity
based on a framework agreement between Seoul, Pyongyang and Beijing. This would
also particularly benefit South Korean trade with China, eventually returning
to normal relationships between countries, with important economic benefits.
The
alternative is an alliance with Washington that would completely eliminate the
economic benefits of a healthy relationship with Beijing. This could even
potentially lead to a war involving millions of deaths, fought on South Korean
soil and not in the United States. The United States does not offer any
solutions to South Korea, either in the short or long term. The only thing
Washington is offering is a fixed presence in the country, together with a
stubborn anti-Chinese policy that would have serious economic consequences for
Seoul. As paradoxical as it may seem, Kim Jong-un's rockets are much less of a
threat than is Seoul’s partnership with Washington in the region, and in fact
seem to offer Seoul the ultimate solution to the crisis in the peninsula.
