Justice
Denied - How Authority Tried to Ignore and then Bury Honest Dissent by
Responsible Scientists
At last,
the full story of what happened at the UN's Poison Gas Watchdog
NB: The text below displays without problems on Firefox and
Safari browsers, but those using Google Chrome have reported problems. I will
try to get this fixed, but for the moment recommend that readers who have
difficulties use Firefox or Safari.
The two
OPCW Inspectors, whose dissent at the OPCW's suppression of evidence is now
public, were recently subjected to a one-sided condemnation by the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which can be read here.
Because
the OPCW refused to meet the two men's reasonable conditions for attending the
hearings, they were not able to give their own version of events. So it is
missing from the OPCW report, which is therefore almost useless as a fair
summary of events. It breaks the ancient rule of any trial, a rule known
to the Romans as 'Audi alteram partem' - hear both sides. Here, in the
interests of justice, fairness and transparency, and to rebut claims that the
OPCW's report ends the controversy, is the two inspectors' detailed response,
which I am proud to publish. Emphases are mine. Note
that it begins with two clear statements, from the Technical Secretariat
report, acquitting both men of leaking on the basis of 'insufficient
evidence'.
The
report, which consists of a main document, and then of indictments from the
OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) and the Director General (DG) , often
repeats itself, so on occasion the inspectors give one response to two
attacks. Occasionally they give a combined response. Where possible, the
document is colour-coded to show who is speaking. Inspector
A's responses are in blue. Inspector
B's are in red. Where both are combined they are also in red. :
Director-General’s
Statement on the Report of the Investigation into Possible Breaches of
Confidentiality
6
February 2020
*****Para 20,
TS Note: (not mentioned in DG Statement!) ‘There is insufficient
evidential basis to find that Inspector A disseminated
his assessment to the website’.
*****Para 28.
TS Note: (not mentioned in DG Statement!) There is insufficient
evidential basis to find that Inspector B disseminated
Inspector A’s assessment to the website.
Summary:
A + B: The investigation report is a bait and switch tactic that creates
the illusion of a report about a breach of confidentiality, when in fact it is
little more than a public defence of the scientifically questioned Douma Report.
Ironically, the defence, from a highly technical and scientific body, is
not founded on science or logic, but on ad hominem attacks on two of its
former inspectors, who had raised concerns about the scientifically
indefensible manner in which the Douma investigation was conducted. It is
classic ‘if you can’t get the ball, get the man’.
In another
classic ruse, the Technical Secretariat tries to distract from the serious
concerns of A and B, by trying to portray them as “individuals who
could not accept that their views were not backed by evidence”. This is
demonstrably false and conspicuously the report never says what those
‘views’ are supposed to have been. As a technical body the TS will be aware
that inspections, verification, or investigations are never about
‘views’. Views are subjective by definition. They are not the currency
of scientists and engineers who (should) only deal in facts, evidence and
hypotheses.
It is about
the suppression and cherry-picking of these facts and evidence, and the refusal
to test alternative hypotheses, which is scientifically questionable, that
Inspectors A and B have raised concerns with senior management. These
concerns are not exclusive to A and B. Other inspectors involved in the Douma
investigation have the same, but because of their contractual relationship with
the Organisation are not free to raise them without fear of repercussion.
It is worth
comparing these events to a staff member in the Organisation reporting some
other kind of malfeasance such as sexual harassment from a supervisor or
suspected financial fraud. Surely the Director General would not dismiss the
accusations so off-handedly because the person's ‘views are not supported by
the evidence’. What he would certainly not do is launch a personal attack on
the integrity and professionalism of the individuals involved. He would
naturally instigate an immediate investigation to substantiate or refute the
claims, the individuals reporting the misdemeanours would be heard, facts would
be examined, and conclusions would be drawn. A and B have reported a very
serious allegation and therefore deserve to be heard. The difference in their
case, is that it has now become highly politicised.
The
inspectors' defence takes the OPCW documents, paragraph by paragraph, and
responds to them, beginning here:
DG
(Director General) :
Excellencies,
distinguished delegates,
1.
I have invited you to this meeting to brief States Parties to the
Chemical Weapons Convention about the findings of the independent investigation
that has been carried out over the past several months in relation to possible
breaches of confidentiality.
2.
My goal is to provide you with all the relevant information, as is
consistent with our confidentiality rules, so that you will have the necessary
elements for your analysis and conclusions.
A +
B. What does the Director General mean ‘so that you will have the
necessary elements for your analysis and conclusions’? It is not a judge or
jury being addressed so what conclusions do the delegates need to draw? Innocent
or guilty? Surely, that was the remit of the investigators?
3.
According to the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality [OPOC]adopted by
States Parties in 1997, during the first session of the Conference of the
States Parties, I will present to you a report that is referred to as
“modified”.
A + B. According
to document cited above, the individual under investigation has a right to have
a copy of the full confidential report made available to him or her (OPOC, IX,
para 1.18). This right was refused by the TS.
4.
For the sake of clarity, it is relevant to explain what this term
means. It means that the report of the investigators has been anonymised, so
that the names of persons or institutions cannot be recognised. Beyond this
required modification, the substance of the report has not been changed.
5.
The report that is the topic of this briefing contains all of the
substantive information of the original text prepared by the external
investigators. The report that will be issued to States Parties and my
statement today will be made available on the OPCW website.
A +
B. It is notable that the fundamental conclusions of the investigators’
report that there is insufficient evidential basis to
find that Inspectors A or B disseminated the engineering assessment to the
website (para 20 and 28) is conspicuously absent from the Director General’s
briefing.
Moreover,
the Director General takes advantage of the briefing to launch his own personal
attack on A and B with acerbic comments and conclusions that were not contained
in the investigator’s report.
“They are
individuals who could not accept that their views were not backed by
evidence”
“Their
behaviour is made even more egregious by the fact that they had manifestly
incomplete information on the Douma investigation”.
“As could
be expected, their conclusions are erroneous, uninformed, and wrong”.
6.
Once you have had the opportunity to read the report, you may
address in writing to the Secretariat any questions you have. The Secretariat
will then endeavour to respond in writing. For purposes of transparency and
consistent with the non-confidential nature of the briefing, any questions sent
to the Secretariat in relation to this briefing will be circulated to all
States Parties, along with the responses of the Secretariat.
A +
B: The manner in which the TS (Technical Secretariat) made the
modified’ report freely available to the States Parties and published it on its
website and on Twitter is entirely inconsistent with OPOC which states (OPOC,
IX, para 1.18) “In its modified form, the report may be
made available to any State Party upon request and it
shall be summarised in the annual report of
the Director-General to the Conference concerning confidentiality as required
under paragraph 3 of the Confidentiality Annex”. There is no mention of a
dedicated ‘show trial’ or allowance for questions and responses, and
particularly not being made public.
7.
As I start my briefing now, I acknowledge that my primary
responsibility as Director-General is to the States Parties to the Convention.
Bearing that in mind and due to the respect that I owe to all the States
Parties, throughout this process I have maintained my independence and
objectivity.
A + B. See comments
under point 5 in which the Director General ad libs on the investigator’s
report.
8.
As you know, during the past several months, the issue of a
purported document disseminated outside the Organisation has appeared online.
After a preliminary inquiry was carried out by the Secretariat, I came to the
conclusion that it was necessary to start an independent investigation into
possible breaches of confidentiality.
A +B. What is a
purported document? Was or was there not a document that was leaked?
9.
Independent, professional investigators, from outside the
Organisation, were hired last year. They followed established procedures in a
lengthy process of investigation that has resulted in an extensive report of
their findings. While the investigation was on-going, I have refrained from
engaging with the media, because I had no doubt that I had to wait for the
completion of the investigation and to come here to report to you, first of
all.
A+B. See item
15
10.
I wish to underline that everything I will say first to States
Parties in the following remarks will be based on evidence in the form of
documents, interviews, audio recordings, and forensic analyses.
A+B. The audio
recordings were almost certainly of the interviews, so it’s not an evidence
source itself but a means of recording evidence.
Excellencies,
distinguished delegates,
11.
Following a preliminary inquiry, I initiated in July 2019 an
investigation into possible breaches of confidentiality related to the
investigation by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) into allegations of the use of
chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April 2018. The breach concerned the
publication, on or about 13 May 2019, of a document entitled “Engineering
Assessment of Two Cylinders Observed at the Douma Incident – Executive
Summary”. The document in question purports to contain information and findings
regarding the Douma incident. The document was published on the website of the
so-called Working Group on Syria, Propaganda, and Media.
A+B. Again, it’s
unclear what is meant by the ‘document in question purports to
contain information and findings regarding the Douma incident’. The
confidentiality breach being investigated was supposed to relate to a document
containing Highly Protected information relating to the Douma investigation.
Investigating the leak of a ‘purported’ document that ‘purports’ to contain
confidential information is conspicuously non-committal and vague. Did the
investigators not establish with certainty whether the document contained
Highly Protected information or not? It’s as if, on the one hand, the
investigators want to consider the engineering report as a
Highly Protected document to add seriousness to the alleged breach, but on the
other hand don’t want to give the document credibility and try
to downgrade its importance by referring to it as a ‘purported’ document.
12.
According to its own website, the working group was “established
to facilitate research into the areas of organised persuasive communication
(including propaganda) ... with respect to the ... conflict in Syria”.
13.
During the course of the investigation, two OPCW inspectors were
identified as possibly being implicated in breaches of confidentiality. In the
report and in this briefing, these individuals shall be referred to as
Inspectors A and B. This is on account of the confidential nature of the
investigation and in order to safeguard their due process rights under the
OPCW’s internal legislation and general principles of international
administrative law.
A + B. The
report claims it safeguards the names of the two individuals by calling them A
and B but yet reveals not so nuanced details as to their identities —their
years of service in the Organisation, year of commencement and departure, that
they were rehired, that they went to Damascus, what they did in Damascus—
leaving no doubt to anyone within the Organisation (and States Parties, who are
notified of when staff are hired) as to the individuals’ identities. This is
information that could have no bearing on the investigation and appears to have
been included in bad faith.
14.
The investigation was conducted in strict compliance with the
detailed procedures set forth in the OPCW Policy on Confidentiality(OPOC).
The OPOC was approved and adopted by the Conference of the States Parties. It
contains mandatory provisions to protect confidential information and to
investigate potential breaches, as required under the Confidentiality Annex to
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
A + B. NOT TRUE.
According to the OPOC (Chap. IX, para 1.7) “The aim of the
investigation is to establish whether there has been a breach of
confidentiality or a violation of the handling, protection, dissemination or
release procedures for confidential information”. The scope of the
investigation, however, went far beyond this remit, breaching the subjects’
rights of due process. It expanded (without the subjects’ knowledge) into a
full defence of the conclusions of the Douma Report, by attacking the
credentials of the subjects of the investigation. What the conclusions of the
Douma report have to do with whether A or B leaked a confidential document or
not is perplexing. This creep in remit is evidenced from Director General’s
personal attacks on the inspectors such as;
“Their
behaviour is made even more egregious by the fact that they had manifestly
incomplete information on the Douma investigation” or “As could be expected,
their conclusions are erroneous, uninformed, and wrong”
But most
alarmingly, the Director General in his closing remarks inadvertently lays bare
the true purpose of the report when he stated: "Therefore I
stand by the conclusions of the final Douma report"
15.
In accordance with the OPOC, I designated the Deputy
Director-General as the Senior Investigating Officer. I also appointed
independent, professional, and highly experienced investigators—external to the
OPCW—to conduct the investigation. The hiring of external investigators is not
required under the OPOC, but I felt it was important to take additional
measures to ensure that the investigation was conducted in a transparent and
independent manner. Appropriate measures were taken in order to prevent the
tampering of evidence.
A + B. What is
perhaps telling here is that the two investigators were ****** (a UK
ex-policeman) and ****** (a US lawyer). It is difficult to see why this
deviation from the standard protocol of using highly professional in-house
investigators from the Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS) who have no
conflict of nationality is more transparent and independent. Or had the TS
insisted on using external investigators, it might have shown enough discretion
to recruit “independent” investigators from States Parties not centrally
involved in the Douma controversy? This makes a mockery of the independence of
the investigation.
16.
The investigation took place from July 2019 to February 2020. It
was conducted in full conformity with the OPOC and relevant internal
legislation. In particular, the investigation was conducted on the basis of
objectivity and due process.
A
+B. Not true. (similar to above) A key element of due process is knowing
the subject of the investigation – the OPCW employed a bait and switch
approach- i.e. an investigation that was supposed to be in relation to violation
of confidentiality policy (i.e. issues of procedures) suddenly transformed into
an investigation in relation to accuracy of different versions of the Douma
report. The fact that this objective was never disclosed clearly to
participants underscores the unfair and arbitrary nature of the investigation.
That the outcome appears tied to the credibility of the OPCW's final report
also shows that the investigation completely lacked impartiality and
independence - it was a witch hunt appointed and ordained to achieve a
particular result
A specific
example of how the investigators breached the provisions of the Directive on
Investigations (AD/ADM/26), relates to a provision that allows for the subject
to be accompanied at the interrogation by an observer, the only prerequisite
being that the observer have no connection to the investigation and be readily
available. Inspector B, however, was refused his right to attend with
his own lawyer because the investigators insisted it had to be a staff
member. In one email from the US investigator, she stated “only a currently
serving OPCW staff member who is authorised to have access to confidential
information may serve as an observer”
17.
The investigators interviewed 29 individuals. These witnesses
consisted of current and former staff members, as well as persons outside the
Organisation. All witnesses who were formally interviewed attested to the
accuracy and truthfulness of their testimony. The investigators also collected
documents and examined email records and other electronic evidence relevant to
the investigation.
A
+B. The interviewees reportedly were obliged to sign a statement to
“tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth”, which seems more
appropriate to a court-room setting than an in-house investigation. By all
accounts the interviews were conducted like a criminal interrogation, which is
not surprising given the background of one of the investigators.
The
investigators showed personal emails from Inspector B to a senior Director as
well as a personal letter from Inspector B to the DG (expressing concerns about
the final report) to interviewees as incriminating evidence, demonstrating that
Inspector B was a target from the outset.
Taken in
context, this investigation appears to be a witch-hunt, an enormous waste of
time and effort, when the matter of substance was far more serious. Talk about
fiddling while Rome burned.
18.
Inspectors A and B did not cooperate with the investigation,
despite their duty to do so.
B: This is
false. Inspector B fully cooperated with the investigators despite
the fact that there is no duty on former staff members (contrary to the DG’s
assertion) to comply with an investigation. The OPOC and relevant directives
only make it obligatory for current staff members. Inspector B, in fact, has an
email from the UK investigator dated September 4, 2019 where he states “As
an ex-staff member we appreciate your participation would be voluntary and
thank you for the consideration of the request. We look forward to
hearing from you.”
Inspector B
agreed (in email correspondence) to participate in the investigation but
requested the procedures set out in the relevant directive AD/ADM 26 be adhered
to, which they were not, as exemplified in item 16.
A: Inspector
A agreed to cooperate but set a reasonable condition. This
condition was that the DG was made aware of the memorandum from Inspector A to
the Acting Director of the Office of Internal Oversight, requesting an
investigation into the substance of the matter, i.e. a concern about apparent
improper activities related to the Douma FFM investigation. Inspector A
considered this a reasonable condition, something every staff member has a
right to request. It was not met. The email exchange between Inspector A and
the “special investigators” is available, and this shows that Inspector A was
prepared to engage willingly to assist with the investigation (without any
conditions), but his condition for taking part in a formal interview was that
the DG was at least made aware of the request for an investigation by the Office
of Internal Oversight.
19.
Additionally, I sent letters of invitation to the two of them to
come to The Hague, at the Organisation’s expense, to review the draft
investigation report prepared by the independent investigators and to provide
comments thereon. One of them acknowledged receipt, but did not respond. The
other placed conditions upon the way he would review the report, that were not
consistent with OPCW procedures.
B: This is
turning the situation on its head- the conditions were fully consistent with
OPCW procedures and have been adhered to in other cases - it was therefore the
DG's refusal to allow such conditions that departed from OPCW procedures. In
fact it was the conditions set by the investigators that made it abundantly
clear the due process being touted was nothing more than illusory. The
Draconian conditions included:
·
A requirement for A and B to leave their places of work and fly to
the Hague (one from Australia) to ‘view’ the report and write comments, if any—
when a non-classified version of the report (which the DG is obliged to prepare
in accordance with Chapter IX of the OPOC) could simply have been sent in the
post or emailed (with secure email if necessary)
·
Inspectors A or B could not be accompanied by any advisor or anyone
to ‘view’ the report
·
They were given just one working day to ‘view’ the report,
unaccompanied but closely supervised, to digest its contents and prepare
comments, despite having no knowledge of its length or complexity or what
evidence there was to review
The
conditions requested by Inspector B’s lawyer by email to the OPCW were, in line
with his right to adequate time and facilities, that
- He
receive a non-confidential (‘modified’) version of the report in advance of the
‘viewing date’ in order to prepare his comments (the same version published
subsequently on the OPCW website);
- He be
accompanied at the OPCW by his lawyer;
- He be
allowed to review the report and formulate notations and comments in private;
and
- For his
records, he be given a copy of the report that was made available to him during
this *viewing procedure.
These are
reasonable requests by any account given the gravity of the accusations and
particularly since Inspector B’s participation in the investigation was
voluntary. However, each of these basic due process requests was met with a
summary denial, accompanied by language which appears to constitute an attempt
to dissuade Inspector B from pursuing his basic rights.
There was
no attempt by the OPCW to accommodate any of the conditions, refusing even to
acknowledge or reply to Inspector B’s lawyer. It would appear, that the OPCW
did not in fact want either A or B to append their comments to the report and
by making the conditions impossible to accept, ensured neither A nor B did so.
*The OPCW
has an obligation to provide the confidential version of the
report to Inspectors A and B as stipulated in para 1.17-1.18 of Chapter IX of
the OPOC where it states"It (the confidential version of the report) should be
made available (only) to all those who are directly involved in the
investigation, including any individual staff members implicated in a
breach or alleged breach". The OPCW refused.
A: It
is true that Inspector A declined the opportunity to travel to The Hague to
review the investigation report. In addition to other considerations, he did
not wish to be ignominiously escorted by Security around the building from
which he had been ejected in May 2019, so decided to avoid the spectacle.
Having now seen the report on the confidentiality investigation, in particular
the unfortunate way it has been commandeered to provide an opportunistic
defence for the conclusions in the FFM report, he realises it would have been a
waste of his time.
20.
Moreover, Inspector A refused to identify the individuals with
whom he had shared his assessment. This will be discussed more fully in a
moment. As a result, the investigators had additional difficulties to ascertain
who disseminated Inspector A’s assessment to the website of the Working Group
on Syria, Propaganda, and Media.
A +
B. This is merely an attempt to pass on responsibility for the
investigators’ inability to conduct a proper investigation. Despite the lack of
information, the investigators had no difficulty in apportioning guilt.
21.
Allow me now to outline some elements related to applicable law.
All staff are prohibited, under their individual secrecy agreements, from
using, disclosing, or disseminating confidential information to which they had
access in the course of their employment, unless specifically authorised by the
Director-General. Before any confidential material is transferred outside the
Organisation, the sender must first ensure that the intended recipient is
authorised to receive the material.
22.
Inspectors A and B both signed secrecy agreements with OPCW. They
were therefore aware of their confidentiality obligations.
A
+B. They were, and fulfilled them.
23.
Within the Technical Secretariat, the specific functions or tasks
defined for a staff member are the principal determinant of that individual’s
need-to-know and scope of access to confidential information. Furthermore,
under the Code of Conduct for staff members of the Secretariat and the Staff
Regulations and Interim Staff Rules, staff members must exercise the utmost
discretion and confidentiality with regard to all matters of official business.
They are further obliged to ensure that their personal views and
convictions do not adversely affect their official duties. These
obligations remain in effect following separation from the Organisation.
B: This
is the point where the idea begins to germinate that Inspector A and B’s
actions were a result of conflicting personal ‘views’ with the
remainder of the FFM team. The reality is not to do with a clash of views, but
a clash of ethics and integrity with senior management.
A: This is
a key paragraph. Personal views and convictions may be the language of a lawyer
or diplomat, but this has little relevance for a scientist. As OPCW Inspectors,
we are required to always separate views and convictions from facts and
science; we report in terms of facts, calculations, logic and
analysis. It was the departure from this standard by the management,
and the control that was exercised over the post-mission activities of the
Douma FFM, that first triggered the concerns that the impartiality and
integrity of the investigation was being threatened.
Excellencies,
distinguished delegates,
24.
As you may recall, in mid-April 2018, the FFM was deployed to the
Syrian Arab Republic to gather facts and evidence regarding the alleged use of
chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April 2018. Between April 2018 and October 2018,
the FFM deployed five times to investigate the Douma incident. The FFM
investigation included conducting on-site visits, collecting biomedical and
environmental samples, and interviewing victims and witnesses.
A + B. The
FFM only deployed once to Damascus to the actual alleged sites
of chemical attack, the other four being to Country X. All the
environmental samples that had full chain of custody, the engineering data,
chemical monitoring, measurements, photos, and on-site observations were
performed or collected during this first mission. None of those who
wrote the final report were involved in or witnessed any of these activities.
25.
In late 2018, the FFM consulted three independent experts in
mechanical engineering, ballistics, and metallurgy—who utilised specialised
computer modelling techniques. These experts produced three separate,
independent reports. The FFM continued to collect and analyse facts and
evidence related to the Douma incident through February 2019. The FFM’s final
report on the Douma incident was released on 1 March 2019.
A: There
is insufficient detail in the FFM report to indicate what these
so-called external experts actually did, and what their qualifications were.
Their findings are contradicted by the findings of the engineering assessment
conducted by the qualified FFM team member who deployed to Douma to inspect the
cylinders and to perform detailed measurements and technical assessments
on-site.
B: What is the
purpose of singling out the ballistics studies? Four expert toxicologists were
also consulted on 5 June, 2018 who stated there was no consistency with the
observed symptoms and chlorine poisoning, but this is not mentioned in the
final report or in the investigators report.
INSPECTOR
A
26.
Let me first turn to the findings of the investigation with
respect to Inspector A. (i) Inspector A first worked for the OPCW from June
1997 to December 2005, eventually being promoted to Team Leader. (ii) He was rehired
at a lower level in June 2016 and worked at the OPCW until May 2019. (iii)
Inspector A was not a member of the FFM. His name is not included in the
mandates issued for FFM deployments signed by my predecessor. The
Director-General is the only person with the authority to sign this type of
document. (iv) In fact, Inspector A’s name is specifically mentioned in a
separate internal mission warning order signed by my predecessor. In this
mission warning order, Inspector A’s role is specifically defined as supporting
the FFM’s activities.
A: There
are four points that need to be addressed, numbered as above:
(i)This
“eventually being promoted to Team Leader” is misleading, and appears designed
to demean Inspector A’s status. Inspector A joined the OPCW prior to
Entry-into-Force, as part of Training Group A. He was the first P-5 Inspection
Team Leader to be appointed (along with a handful of others), seeing as during
the 6-month training and first deployments he had been clearly identified as
one of the best inspectors, with leadership potential. He was later appointed
as the lead in the Technical Secretariat for the task “Preparedness of the
Technical Secretariat for Conduct of a Challenge Inspection”, one of the
critical operational tasks for the OPCW. He was also appointed as Acting Head
of Inspectorate Management Branch for a year.
He has
many letters and references to substantiate that status during his first period
with the OPCW from 1997-2005, in particular a performance appraisal from the
Director of Inspectorate, which reads quite openly “’Inspector A’ is the “best”
ITL whose expertise and managing skills are highly appreciated by INS and VER”.
And a later “’Inspector A’ is thus selected for the most complex and sensitive
missions as ITL”. It could also be an indication of the regard in which he was
held, that after leaving the OPCW in 2005 he was invited back twice to
participate in OPCW activities as an expert. One was an academic forum and the
other a workshop on Challenge Inspection.
(ii)
This “rehired at lower level” is also misleading. Frankly it’s a bit sleazy. As
a cost-saving measure, the Inspection Team Leader post was downgraded from P-5
to P-4, sometime after Inspector A left the organisation in 2005 and prior to
him re-joining as a rehired Team Leader in 2016.
(iii)
Wrong, and misleading. When the first FFM team was assembled, Inspector A was
on a mission in Nepal. Therefore, obviously, he couldn’t have been on the
mandate for the team first deploying. When he returned to HQ, it was agreed at
the operational level that there was a need to add expertise and experience to
the FFM. He was then notified to the Syrian Arab Republic as an
additional FFM team member and he joined them in Damascus forthwith.
(iv)This
is in addition to the earlier (routine) Warning Order that had
been prepared for Inspector A to serve a rotation at the Command Post in
Damascus. The F038 Notification to the Syrian Arab Republic, advising that
Inspector A was joining the FFM team, was for the period prior to his
taking over the Command Post from another inspector who was there during the
Douma deployments. The handover was conducted on May 6, after the end of the
Douma deployments, after which Inspector A took over the Command Post.
Documents support this.
A: For
information, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) does not require the names
of the inspectors to be on the mandate. The mandate is an internal document,
for which the workflow was developed during the early days of establishing
inspection administrative documentation (Inspector A was part of this). It is
signed by the DG and addressed to the Team Leader. It became common practice to
provide a copy of this mandate to the inspected State Party at the start of
inspections, as a courtesy (the Convention states that the Team Leader shall
“inform” the inspected State Party of the mandate, only in the case of a
Challenge Inspection), and this practise continues today. Similarly, the
Warning Order is an internal workflow document to manage the administrative and
logistical preparations of any mission. The Convention, however, does require
the names of inspectors to be provided on the formal transmission, the
Notification to the State Party (which was done for Inspector A).
A: It
is important to note that there is no such role as ‘supporting inspector’. The
Convention describes Inspectors and Inspection Assistants (the latter being a
category we generally have not used in practise) but both form part of the
inspection team. If you perform inspection activities, you are part of the
inspection team (you are in or you are out, there is no in-between). Otherwise
an individual would likely forfeit their Privileges and Immunities (Part
II.B.11 of the Verification Annex). It is unthinkable that someone who
is not part of the inspection team would be conducting team activities such as
using chemical detectors, taking measurements and photographs, and sampling. A
question to the TS; if Inspector A was not part of the team, what then would
have been his status vis-a-vis his rights to Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities set out in Part II.B.11 of the Verification Annex of the CWC?
Would these rights have been violated if Inspector A was not part of the team?
27.
The OPCW’s standing support office in Damascus is referred to as
the “command post”. A Secretariat official is assigned from The Hague to the
command post in six-week rotations. This single official supports OPCW
activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, including communications and movements.
28.
The mission warning order signed by my predecessor appointed
Inspector A as team leader at the command post in Damascus. This mission
warning order also established that he was the sole OPCW team member in this
mission. As such he provided, as is customary, support to the FFM team
investigating the Douma incident.
A:
(repeated) The F038 Notification to the Syrian Arab Republic, advising that
Inspector A was joining the FFM team, was for the period prior to his taking
over the Command Post from another inspector who was there during the Douma
deployments. The handover was conducted on May 6, after the end of the Douma
deployments. Documents support this.
29.
It is customary for the inspectors serving, at the relevant
moment, in the command post in Damascus to provide assistance to missions
deployed to the Syrian Arab Republic—not only to the FFM, but also to the
Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) and the biannual missions to the Scientific
Studies Research Centre. This support is essential and composed of United
Nations Office for Project Services personnel, interpreters, and drivers.
A:Irrelevant
30.
As described by the independent investigators, Inspector A played
a minor supporting role in the investigation of the Douma incident. The
investigators specifically found that Inspector A did not have access to all of
the information gathered by the FFM team, including witness interviews,
laboratory results, and assessments by independent experts regarding the two
cylinders—all of which became known to the team only after Inspector
A had stopped working in support of the investigation.
A: The
statement “minor supporting role” is nonsense. This shall be expanded upon,
with supporting documentation.
A: An
important point. It is true that Inspector A was not allowed access to the
assessments by independent experts regarding the two cylinders. That was a
central issue. He had conducted studies that showed, transparently through
science and engineering, that it was not possible to identify conditions that
supported the allegation the cylinders were dropped from aircraft, and he
informed the FFM and management that he would be prepared to explain this to
them. They declined. He stressed that they urgently needed to get
these external experts to the TS, to compare facts, data, inputs and
methodology, to establish why there was such a difference. He alluded to some
of the evident weaknesses in the text in the FFM report on the topic, and told
them he was worried that they had got it wrong. In addition, he had received a
verbal update on one of the studies (the only reputable one where the source
was known to him at that stage), that “they said that one case is maybe
possible, but the other one very unlikely”. Inspector A, having consulted many
other independent engineers, and having spoken further with some TS staff, now
must question the credibility of the other two “experts”. Regarding the other
areas such as chemical analysis, toxicology, and witness accounts, there
appears to be a misunderstanding from the DG as to how a team works (and
remember here, when we refer to a “team” we mean the Douma FFM, the inspectors
on the ground in Douma, not the later definition of “the FFM” as the “Core
Team” or as the two individuals appointed to write the FFM report).
It may
be illuminating to discuss further this matter of teamwork, as it appears the
TS management engaged practices deliberately aimed at diminishing the
effectiveness of teamwork in the FFM. Throughout the investigation, during the
Douma deployments and afterwards in HQ, Inspector A engaged with other
inspectors to continuously build up the joint understanding of what happened in
Douma on 7 April 2018. This is how teams of inspectors work. He thus gained a
detailed impression from sharing experiences, from summaries of witness
accounts, results from the laboratories, outcome of meetings with
toxicologists; on the key developments in understanding in all those areas.
Inspector A also continued working in the FFM core team offices for some weeks
after the issuance of the Interim Report.
B: Few
inspectors in the team have access to all the information gathered in an
investigation, because each specialises in a specific area, chemical analysis,
interviews, engineering etc. Inspector A’s specialisation was the ballistics
and chemical engineering. Whether he had access or not to witness testimonies
of chemical analysis results in no way hindered his work on the engineering
studies.
Is the
finding that the “investigators specifically found that Inspector A did not
have access to all of the information gathered by the FFM team” supposed to be
a major revelation? Of course he didn’t, nobody in the team has.
The
inspector who had most access to information was Inspector B, who was in charge
of compiling the Original draft report. Because he was assigned the additional
role of Confidentiality Officer on the mission and during post-mission
activities, he had access to and knowledge of ALL confidential materials (as
well as non-confidential materials), including, progress reports from on-site,
Situation Reports, technical assessments onsite, recordings and transcripts of
witness testimonies, analytical results, inspectors’ notebooks, mission photos
and videos, measurements, detection data, toxicological assessment, Notes
Verbales to and from the SAR, records of negotiations and discussions on site.
31.
He accompanied the FFM to certain sites of interest that had been
identified by the Syrian Arab Republic. He assisted in taking environmental
samples at a hospital and in taking measurements at one location. He also
assisted the FFM in the tagging and sealing of cylinders that had been found at
two locations.
A: This
does not fully describe the activities conducted by Inspector A; the language
is contrived to achieve the intended point. It shall be ignored.
Examples:
If Inspector A’s role was limited in this way, (i) why was he involved in the
review and finalisation of the Interim Report (after the incident of the
unannounced doctoring of the original version, and interception of the doctored
version), (ii) why did he spend two months working in the 7th-floor
FFM area, progressing the strategy for analysis of the cylinders, and
(iii) why did he attend the briefing from the US delegation where they
presented their “findings”? Again, if Inspector A conducted these
activities, he was by definition part of the FFM team, in accordance with the
rules of the Chemical Weapons Convention (see discussion earlier on Privileges
and Immunities)
32.
As a follow-up to these activities—and after finishing his normal
rotation at the command post of the OPCW in Damascus and returning to The Hague
in June 2018—Inspector A was assigned to conduct an inventory of the Highly Protected
information collected on the cylinders and determine what information was
needed to carry out further studies.
A: Incorrect;
this shows a misunderstanding of who was assigned what during the post-mission
tasking. The inventory of FFM materials was assigned to two junior inspectors
in the core team. The terms of the assignment of Inspector A on the cylinders
were “To review all data available on OS (open source) or collected by the
team; To come up with a thorough analysis and assessment; To identify experts
who could contribute and fill the gaps; To determine what is the missing data
from the site”. This is clearly shown in a document by the team leader called
the “Summer Activities Plan”.
33.
Nevertheless, in July 2018, Inspector A—without authorisation—contacted
companies via email about conducting an engineering study on the cylinders
found at two locations in
Douma. When this became known, the team leader instructed Inspector A to
refrain from making contact with any external third parties. The investigation
found that Inspector A did not accept this, disregarded instructions, and
decided he was going to complete his study alone—without informing the FFM team
leader.
A: Again,
this is described in detail in the UN Security Council statement.
****PH:
See
and
****
A: Inspector
A informed the team leader what he was going to do. This needs to be seen in
the context of the Team Leader’s unannounced modification of the Interim
Report, and that team members had concerns about the Team Leader’s motivations.
Inspector A informed him that he did not accept that request, and that due to
the gravity of the situation he would no longer communicate with the Team
Leader and that he was in consultation with higher managers, i.e. he consulted
the Head of Operations, the Director of Inspectorate and the Chief of Cabinet.
The Chief of Cabinet appeared to understand the situation, and stated to
Inspector A “I don’t see why both studies can’t be done” (this
relates to the intent of the Team Leader, an analytical chemist, to take charge
of the conduct of engineering assessments). Inspector A took this as approval
to continue, as long as the results of the work were kept within the FFM. The
result of this was that Inspector A was going to complete his technical study
and submit his finding through the correct channels, to the team
leader.
34.
In August 2018, Inspector A—against the instructions received from
the FFM team leader— engaged professors at a university to assist him in
producing his assessment. He misled the professors of the university, telling
them that they were being officially engaged by the Organisation to conduct this
work.
A: Inspector
A produced a written authorisation from a Director of the Technical
Secretariat, which was also signed by the professors. The professors were made
aware of the situation, including the sensitivity of the work and the fact that
there were differing approaches within the Secretariat, and that there was the
possibility of a developing controversy. Inspector A stressed that his
initiative (and that of the senior OPCW official) was to concentrate on the
facts, science and engineering as a critical contribution to the investigation.
Inspector A mentioned that there was the possibility of political interference,
but that should have no impact on the desire to at least do the technical work
(properly) and submit it, through the correct channels, for
consideration.
Inspector
A has records of correspondence between himself and the experts that
demonstrates the integrity of this initiative. An example is an exchange after
the engineering study was suppressed, where a professor states “Very sad to
read all this. I still remember well that from the beginning you warned us that
our “truth” might not become “the” truth. I guess, we all did not expect that
the matter would turn out this way….”. The professors are, Inspector A
believes, uncomfortably aware of the political interference, and have, no
doubt, been put under some pressure recently. These professors are the real
heroes of the day, for their expertise, for their integrity, and for their
sincere efforts to perform real, truthful, work. It is a real pity they have
been dragged down into the political morass, and were subjected to a visit from
the “independent” investigators of a confidentiality breach.
35.
In September 2018, more than a month after having engaged the
professors, Inspector A— belatedly and through subterfuge—procured written
authorisation from a high-level OPCW official for him to work with the
university just mentioned in order to proceed with his unauthorised activities.
Such authorisation was therefore invalid.
A: Not
true. The institutions were only formally engaged after the appropriate
authorisation was obtained from the OPCW. Any prior discussions were informal,
in-principle discussions about scientific capabilities. And the implication he
“misled” a senior official is offensive. Inspector A approached this person
because (i) he was the most senior line manager, (ii) he was from a technical
background and thus had an appreciation of what was needed (and yes, here he is
implying there were questions about diplomatic and management interference into
areas in which they had no expertise), and (iii) he was someone who could be
trusted to do the right thing.
36.
Inspector A travelled outside the Netherlands twice to meet the
professors in person. The investigation revealed that both trips were conducted
while Inspector A was on leave. Inspector A gave the professors a USB drive. He
claimed that the drive only included open-source information; this was not the
case. The professors, in the spirit of cooperation, provided the investigators
with the USB drive. The investigators conducted a forensic analysis of the USB
drive. This analysis revealed that the USB drive contained an important amount
of OPCW confidential information classified as Highly Protected at the time it
was disclosed.
A: Not on
leave, but during informal free time granted in compensation for doing
missions. This should be seen as an indication of Inspector A’s commitment to
work.
A:
False. Inspector A has a copy of the C-16 handover certificate, where the
material is described as “Information for Research Project”. Inspector A
explained that the material was unclassified, but highly sensitive and not to
be circulated to anyone other than themselves. Inspector A explained that the
Syrian chief escort had informed that all material was to be considered
unclassified, where he (the Syrian official) had added “it’s all unclassified,
we have nothing to hide.” Inspector A acknowledges that it is the right of the
DG to classify material, regardless of the classification level advised by the
State Party. However, at this stage, none of the material used by Inspector A
had any classification level applied, nor any markings.
A:
Incidentally, many FFM inspectors at this stage were using their unclassified
desktops to work on some of the materials. The elevated classification should
perhaps be seen in the context of the subsequent lockdown by a manager, after
the controversy around the doctored Interim Report, in response to the
situation where the outcome of the FFM may have been seen to be going in the “wrong”
direction
37.
At his request, the professors communicated with Inspector A using
his personal Gmail account. The professors completed a report on the cylinder
found in one of the two locations in Douma. Inspector A shared several drafts
of his assessment with the professors—again using his personal Gmail account.
These drafts contained Highly Protected information.
A: True.
But - Using additional security protocols. This was around the time
of concerns about certain agencies attempting to hack into OPCW systems,
particularly emails, so this was considered a lower-risk means of communicating
sensitive (but unclassified) notes
38.
Inspector A used the professors’ report to complete his
assessment, a version of which eventually appeared on the website of the Working
Group on Syria, Propaganda, and Media. The investigators established that
Inspector A showed his assessment to at least seven members of the Technical
Secretariat who did not have the need to know the confidential information
contained therein. They did not have the need to know because they were not
involved in the FFM investigation into Douma.
A: Whilst
the professors’ report was a key item of information used in compiling the
Engineering Summary, it was by no means all.
A: Inspector
A showed it to more than seven TS staff members. Here he employed the “need to
know” principle, and his judgement. He appreciates there will be differing
views on “need to know” in this context. In this particular case, in addition
to peer review from Douma FFM team members, the list expanded to some (trusted)
experts in specific fields (such as ballistics), peers, and senior TS staff,
managers and directors, in that they “needed to know” that a potential mistake
was being propagated. This was in order to find a way to resolve the situation
internally, in a neutral, responsible technical and scientific manner
Surely
internal, independent, technical experts within the OPCW (who all have signed
secrecy agreements) who could support the technical aspects of the mission
could be considered in ‘the need-to-know’ category as much as unknown so-called
external experts about whose competence, independence or credentials nothing is
known.
39.
After denying it first to senior management, Inspector A then
admitted to witnesses that he distributed his assessment. But he refused to
identify the individuals with whom he shared it. Inspector A also dropped off
an envelope containing his assessment with the unit of the Secretariat
responsible for the storage of verification-related documents. This unit is
known as the Documents Registration and Archiving Section (DRA). Inspector A
did not follow the proper procedures when he dropped off the envelope with DRA,
because documents generated for non-routine missions—such as the FFM, DAT, and
Investigation and Identification Team (IIT)—are stored in specialised archives
with heightened security. This is due to the high sensitivity of the
information.
A: It
is nonsense to state that “After denying it first to senior management,
Inspector A then admitted to witnesses that he distributed his assessment”.
From the start, Inspector A made it clear that he had considered it essential
to get peer review from all FFM team members, and he had thus circulated hard
copies of the assessment. Inspector A does, however, recall an omission made by
him. During discussions with the Chief of Cabinet, Inspector A forgot that he
had handed a copy of the engineering summary to the Head of the IIT, at the
latter’s request. However, this item of information was clearly stated in the
memorandum that had been passed to the Director of Inspectorate to be handed to
the DG. The memorandum was read by the Chief of Cabinet but not passed to the
DG, so the Chief of Cabinet was aware that the engineering summary had been
handed to the IIT, and Inspector A knew this. The idea that documents for
non-routine missions such as FFM and DAT have additional security by
circumventing well established confidentiality handling procedures is absurd,
and appears to be for no other purpose than camouflaging the questionable
manner in which FFM documentation is managed (outside the security critical
network (SCN), which is especially designed to handle even the most highly
sensitive documents, including those that are classed as Highly Protected.)
40.
In this regard, I take this opportunity to recognise the efforts
of States Parties to create the special fund that has made possible the
continued financing of these heightened security archives for the FFM and other
non-routine missions of the OPCW.
41.
The Working Group on Syria, Propaganda, and Media published
Inspector A’s assessment on its website on or about 13 May 2019. Inspector A
told officials of the Technical Secretariat that he was surprised that the
document had been disclosed, but that he was also happy it
had been—because his information was finally available to the public.
A: Inspector
A did not use the term “happy”. He said he was shocked to find the report had
been released, and that he was surprised and dismayed why they (he/she) hadn’t
at least redacted his name and hand-written notes from the document. He was
perhaps a little stressed at the time, knowing what was going to develop, and
he concedes he may have said something unwise at the time along the lines of
“I’ve now got my own problems; in a way right now I couldn’t care less about
the results of the work being out there”.
A: Inspector
A said he did not want to be part of a witch-hunt that could potentially have
serious ramifications for a person who, it must be assumed, had been trying to
do what he/she thought was the right thing.
42.
The investigation found that Inspector A violated his obligations
concerning the protection of Highly Protected confidential information, due to
his unauthorised disclosure of such confidential information to individuals
both within and outside the Organisation. Furthermore, Inspector A failed to
comply with the specified procedures for the handling, protection, release, and
dissemination of confidential information, so as to create a clear risk of
unauthorised disclosure. This risk materialised, and the disclosure occurred,
with the publication of Inspector A’s assessment on the Working Group on Syria,
Propaganda, and Media’s website. Inspector A also violated the Organisation’s
Code of Conduct, in that he did not act with integrity and transparency.
A: Inspector
A would like simply to point out that after twelve years’ service to the OPCW,
everything he has ever done has been based on the principles of personal
integrity and scientific transparency.
A: The
“independent” investigators should perhaps have asked the Director-General a
serious question: Why would two of the most qualified senior Inspection
Team Leaders, with impeccable records of scientific expertise, impartiality and
judgement, arguably the best in the organisation, suddenly “go rogue”?
They both have said time and time again; “it’s not about the people, or
reputations. Take me out of it. The science and engineering, the facts, speak
for themselves. If there are any countering facts, science and engineering to
support the conclusions in the FFM report, then why can’t the OPCW at least
allude to the substance in them?”
INSPECTOR
B
43.
I now turn to the findings of the investigation on Inspector B.
Inspector B first worked for the OPCW from July 1998 to December 2011,
eventually being promoted to Team Leader. He was rehired at a lower level in
September 2015 and worked at the OPCW until August 2018.
B: For the sake of accuracy,
Inspector B departed the OPCW on 3 September 2018. It is worth noting that in
addition to the periods specified, Inspectors A and B had to undergo, before
being hired as inspectors, a six-month intensive inspector training program to
be passed before hiring, followed by on-the-job training and a six-month
probation period.
All team
leaders and rehired inspectors (who, incidentally, were rehired because of
their experience and expertise solely for the specific purpose of filling
lacuna in knowledge and skills among the pool of inspectors as a result of the
Organisations failing tenure policy), are now appointed at P4 level (the ‘lower
grade”). The P5 level team-leader category, which A and B had held previously
(unlike the team leader), was downgraded by the Organisation for cost cutting
measures, and there are currently NO team leaders who hold the P5 level. This
kind of pettiness is irrelevant to the investigation and clearly aimed at
demeaning the status of A and B for ominous purposes
Having been selected to be a member of the
FFM for the first time, Inspector B travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic in
April 2018.
B: The
reality is that this was the first time for most of the team in Syria to
conduct an FFM. In fact, it was the first on-site investigation of alleged use
of chemical weapons ever conducted by the FFM, so was in fact new to all the
team. All previous FFM’s in relation to Syria were conducted outside Syria,
where the inspection team never had to collect their own samples or conduct
engineering studies. There was never a need therefore to have organic chemists
or engineers on the team just to receive samples from third parties and conduct
interviews.
This was the very reason why
Inspectors A and B were drafted into the Douma investigation, since now the
inspectors would have to identify how, which and where samples would be
collected based on solid chemical principles. This mission also required
intricate engineering studies. For both these reasons A and B were drafted in
as the most qualified chemical engineering and ballistics expert, and foremost
OPCW expert in chemical weapons chemistry, respectively.
However, he never left the command post in
Damascus because he had not completed the training required to deploy on-site
in Douma.
B: The statement tries to smear
by implying two falsehoods. Firstly, that by not entering the buildings of
alleged attack to physically gather the samples or take measurements, Inspector
B is at a disadvantage in terms of insight and knowledge of what went on.
Secondly, there is a subtle implication that Inspector B was not interested or
had not passed the relevant safety training to do so. Both of these points are
refuted in detail:
Inspector B is in fact one of only 4
inspectors (out of 10) who was present in Damascus for the entire duration
of the investigation (14 April to 3 May). The team leader himself, who
wrote the final report, left after 3 days, before the investigation ever began,
which by an extension of the logic implied, invalidates the team leader’s
contribution to the final report.
Inspector B was the planner
and coordinator of all the scientific and technical activities on site. He was
part of the sub-team involved in the negotiations with the Syrian authorities,
participated in the interview process, was also the Confidentiality Officer,
wrote the on-site progress reports for the previous Director General, was the
chief drafter of the main report, and with Inspector A, the most experienced
inspector in the team. In fact, his experience as an inspector far outnumbers
the average for the team.
Inspector B was the only organic chemist in the
team and the recognised specialist in the OPCW when it came to chemical weapons
production. As testimony to this, in his annual performance appraisals, it is
cited by his supervisors that,
“he demonstrates a knowledge and skill
in chemistry which is not possessed by others in the TS” (PMAS 2010),
“I can say without fear of being
unfair to others that you have been the professional in the TS that has
contributed the most to the knowledge and understanding of CW chemistry applied
to inspections. You produced a lot of knowledge and unselfishly shared every
bit of what you know with others, enthusiastically” (PMAS 2017)
Because of this expertise Inspector B conducted
the technical evaluation on the warehouse and lab suspected of producing
chemical weapons.
If there is a subtle attempt to suggest
Inspector B was not interested or had not passed the relevant training to
deploy on site, the reality is quite the contrary. Inspector B in fact
wrote an email to his immediate supervisor several months prior to deploying to
Damascus requesting to participate in an upcoming training course referred to
above. The response from his supervisor was that he could not, the
reason given he “was not priority” (because he was due to leave the
Organisation the same year) Inspector B protested the decision, but it held.
This decision by management would later prove
to have consequences, when Inspector B was in Damascus for the Douma
investigation. Because Inspector B was the expert in chemical weapons synthesis
and had conducted the pre-technical evaluation of the warehouse suspected of
being a chemical weapons factory, the Deputy Team leader made a formal request
to the Chief of Cabinet and Director General for a waiver for Inspector B to
deploy. Senior management were unable to come to a decision on the waiver, and
the Deputy team leader had to forego having an organic chemist on the team to
investigate the alleged chemical weapons factory. Inspector B, nonetheless,
through constant radio communication with the team on the ground provided the
technical backup and advice to the team on matters of chemistry.
That Inspector B’s role in the FFM was anything
but marginal, is evidenced by the fact he was requested by senior
management to brief national delegates of Member States in June 2018 on the
technical aspects of how the on-site investigation in Douma went. This should
normally be done by the team leader,but given the team leader left Damascus
before the investigation commenced, Inspector B was asked to oblige as the
person with the most detailed and comprehensive insight into the activities on
site.
44. Inspector
B was involved in the drafting of the interim report on the Douma
incident.
B:Inspector B
was more than ‘involved’, he was the main drafter of the ‘Original Interim
Report’ (which was later suppressed by unknown persons). He also lead the
scientific analysis of the data collected on site, analysed all the witness
testimonies, was the only organic chemist involved in analysing the chemical
analysis results, consulted with toxicologists in June 2018, worked in close
collaboration with the Organisation’s Scientific Policy Officer, led the work
on constructing the 3D site drawings and metadata analysis, and liaised with
senior management on analysis results and exhumations. In fact, because the
team leader had very limited personal knowledge of the activities in Damascus
and was otherwise overburdened with drafting another report on an alleged
chemical incident, most of the work and coordination with the team on the Douma
report was delegated to Inspector B, who had been in Damascus for the entire
duration of the investigation and, being the assigned Confidentiality Officer
for the mission, had access to all the information collected on site.
In June
2018, Inspector B voiced some concerns about the draft interim report to the
senior management of the Organisation in place at that time.
The
concerns refer to an email of protest from Inspector B to senior management
(copied to all team members) on 22 June 2018 to protest unethical and
unscientific behaviour in relation to the Douma investigation. In the e-mail
Inspector B vigorously protests against a last-minute attempt by unknown
persons to secretly substitute the Original Team Interim Report , due for
imminent release, without knowledge of the team members, for a highly redacted
version which contained conclusions that were either false and/or unsubstantiated.
Furthermore, it deliberately omitted key data, such as expert opinions from
toxicologists that contradicted the conclusions of the redacted report.
The
evidential record shows that these concerns were taken seriously by senior
management, who asked the team to discuss their views together to reach
agreement on the draft interim report.
B: The
evidential record refers to the response email from senior management to
Inspector B’s protest. In it, senior management did not deny that the report
was ‘redacted’, only that it was not redacted by the Office of the Director
General and suggested Inspector B ‘sit with the team leader and the team to
discuss’ (not discuss their ‘views’ as the report incorrectly states). This is
the ‘seriousness’ with which senior management dealt with what was a
duplicitous attempt to publish a scientifically fabricated report on what was
probably the Organisation’s most controversial and politically sensitive
investigation ever. No internal investigation was initiated into who or how the
attempted deception was perpetrated. The response was akin to saying ‘run along
now and sort out your differences’.
Senior
management further made clear to Inspector B that this was only an interim
report and that there was a large amount of further work to be done in a number
of areas following the interim report.
B: Saying
that it was ‘only’ an interim report seems to have missed the point
of Inspector B’s timely intervention, which was to protest an underhanded
attempt to blindside the inspection team with a fake report. A senior Director
of the TS who was copied in on the email, later replied to B, saying: I
don’t think saying this is an “interim report” quite does it in defending the
selective nature of presenting the facts”
The
Director added, “My respect (Inspector B), I think your email is very
carefully drafted, without emotions, not accusing anybody but laying out the
facts and concerns very clearly. Really well done. It seems there is still
leeway to re-edit the report, together with the rest of the team?
In a follow
up email the Director wrote “Through your (Inspector B) action, you
could actually be making the first step towards having a more professional,
transparent and sound fact-finding. I hope!”
Clearly
from this, there was an awareness at the highest levels of management that
something was seriously wrong inside the FFM.
Inspector
B subsequently confirmed in writing to senior management that he and other
members of the FFM who were involved in drafting the report had met, and agreed
on the interim report—which was then released on 6 July 2018.
B: The
Interim Report issued on 6 July was a ‘truce’ report that at the time reflected
the developing divisions in the FFM team after the publication of the doctored
Redacted Report had been thwarted. Inspectors A and B (and others) agreed to
the ‘truce’ interim report in principle, on two conditions – it would not
contain the grossly inaccurate conclusions that had been deceitfully inserted
into the redacted report, and that key facts that were being left out would
find their way back into the final report.
Inspector B
(and others) did agree to the interim report, but not the same one that was
issued on 6 July. The one that Inspectors A and B and others agreed to a day or
two earlier, reported the trace levels of chlorinated chemicals that were
detected (parts per billion levels which are almost at
the limits of detection they are so small) that would have given proper context
to the results. However, at the last minute, reminiscent of the sleight of hand
with the Original Report, the team leader unilaterally decided, in the face of
fervent protests from the team, to omit critical information on the trace
levels of chemicals found. The report that was issued, therefore, was not the
same one that the inspectors agreed to.
In an
e-mail
from 5
July, 2018, the team leader, defended his unilateral removal of the levels of
chemical found with a perplexing logic “There are also other
very important facts that we (the Royal we) decided not to release in
this interim report” As history has shown, these ‘other very important
facts’ (the expert toxicology opinions from June, the trace levels of
chlorinated organic chemicals, the discrepancies in witness accounts, engineering
doubts, never made it to the Final Report despite the
promise to do so. Regardless of what new information had been gathered since
the Interim Report, it is scientifically unacceptable to exclude any facts that
could impact on the conclusions of an investigation.
This is the
central issue, and not whether A or B did or didn’t agree with the Interim
Report. The argument about Inspectors A and B agreeing to the Interim Report is
simply a red-herring meant to distract from the real concerns of the inspectors.
If the inspectors are guilty of anything, it is of being naïve to have believed
that the “other very important facts”, which the team leader fought so hard to
keep out of the interim report, would ever see the light of day again.
45.
Upon the expiration of his employment contract with the
Organisation, Inspector B departed at the end of August 2018. It is important
to note that Inspector B departed the OPCW half a year before the release of
the final FFM report on Douma.
B: Why is it important to note Inspector
B departed the OPCW at the end of August, six months before the release of the
final report? What does it have to do whether he disclosed or not confidential
information in May 2019? Is it supposed to provide some kind of motive? If so,
it is not only irrational but beyond the scope of the investigation itself,
which is to only determine if and who leaked the engineering report, not why.
46.
During the last seven months of the investigation, the FFM
undertook the bulk of its analytical work, examined a large number of witness
interviews, and received the results of sampling and analysis.
B: Untrue: The
bulk of the analytical work was in fact already done by the time the Interim
Report was released. 31 of the 44 samples
were analysed, 34 of the 39 interviews had
been conducted and analysed, and the toxicological study was already done but
the conclusions suppressed. In the almost eight months after the Interim Report
was released only 13 new samples were analysed along
with 5 additional interviews. How is this the bulk of
the analytical work? Moreover, as manifest in the Final Report the few additional
interviews and analytical results provide no evidential information over those
of the Interim Report.
It is worth
noting that even the bulk of the report writing had been done long before the
release of the Interim Report. One only need compare the 116-page Original
Interim Report that was suppressed, with the 26-page published Interim Report
and the 106-page Final Report. The Final Report is a massive cut and paste
operation from the suppressed Original Report with inconvenient
evidence removed and unsubstantiated conclusions added.
It is
correct to say however, that the bulk of the engineering studies took place
during the later months of the investigation. Inspector B was not involved in
this. Inspector A, however, took the lead in this area as the only chemical
engineer in the team. This role was documented by the team leader in what was
called the ‘Summer Activity Plan’. There were subsequent attempts to have
Inspector A removed from this role.
In any
case, regardless of what new information was gathered after the Interim Report
was released, the issue remains that ‘very important facts’ that
the team leader decided not to release in the interim report (see
e-mail from the team leader to members of the FFM team) never found their
way back into the Final Report, and excluding A and B from the investigation
process ensured this did not happen. These were the same facts that did not
support the conclusion that there were ‘reasonable grounds’ to determine that
chlorine was used as a chemical weapon.
47.
The investigation found that Inspector B, prior to the
dissemination of Inspector A’s assessment, knew of its existence. This is
despite the fact that his assessment was completed more than five months after
Inspector B had left the Organisation. The investigation also found that—a
month before Inspector A’s assessment appeared on the website of the Working
Group on Syria, Propaganda, and Media—Inspector B referred a staff member to an
article critical of the OPCW’s final report on Douma that was published on the
same website.
B:The report
becomes farcical at this point. What is being referred to is an email thread
from Inspector B to a senior management official. In a PS note,
Inspector B adds a casual remark where he says “”PS, A very interesting and
insightful article has just been published by a group of UK academics on the
Douma report. I can send you the link if you are interested?
What could this remark possibly have to do with
Inspector B leaking the Engineering Report? From an objective procedural
perspective, it is clear that the OPCW’s confidentiality investigation is
targeting the discussion of info that was in the public sphere – showing again
that the purpose of the investigation was not to investigate confidentiality
issues but to target the inspectors themselves and to penalise them for their
scientific curiosity.
What is actually very concerning is the
response of the senior management official to Inspector B’s casual comment
which said; “Yes I have seen the analysis by the UK academics.
Unfortunately, this is a discussion that is difficult to pursue out in the
open, knowing that it is already being played by parties who are decidedly not
bona fide supporters of the CWC. But I yet have to read it in detail”. For
a scientist, the political undertones of the reply are shocking.
48.
However—despite Inspector B’s separation from the Organisation
long before the Douma investigation came to an end, and despite his agreement
with the interim report (B: repeating it won’t make it true) —he
continued to approach members of the Technical Secretariat to discuss
confidential information regarding the Douma investigation that was classified
as Highly Protected at the time it was disclosed. Some of these staff members
did not have the need to know the confidential information that Inspector B
disclosed to them. see 50
49.
The investigators obtained evidence that Inspector B, many months
after his separation from the OPCW in August 2018, continued to display a
desire to have continued access to, and influence on, the Douma investigation.
This included a letter he wrote to me in March 2019. This letter criticised the
Douma report, even though he did not have access to the large body of evidence
that had been considered by the FFM during the half-year since his departure
from OPCW. B:See 50
50.
As late as August 2019, almost a year after he left the
Organisation, Inspector B contacted members of the Organisation to attempt to
convince them to join his campaign to challenge the final Douma report. The
investigation found that Inspector B violated his obligations concerning the
protection of Highly Protected confidential information, due to his
unauthorised disclosure of confidential information to individuals who did not
have the need to know such information.
B: Response to 48, 49 and 50
First and
foremost, Inspector B did not approach anyone to discuss confidential
information of any classification. After the Final Report was issued on 1 March
2019, Inspector B, who no longer lived in the Netherlands, had concerns about
the Final Report, given his extensive knowledge of and involvement in the
investigation itself. He was particularly concerned that ‘important
facts’ that were ‘decided not to be released (at the team leaders insistence)
in the Interim Report’ and were supposed to be incorporated into the Final
Report, were conspicuously and worryingly still absent from the Final Report.
These absent ‘important facts’ would have been critical to the conclusions of
the Final Report.
As the
Director General had not yet joined the Organisation at the time the Interim
Report was released he would likely not have been aware of this serious
omission. Inspector B felt Mr. Arias should know this and felt a professional
and moral obligation to inform him.
For this
reason, Inspector B tried to correspond with the Director General with a
detailed memo outlining the details of what had gone on in the FFM before the
Director General joined the Organisation. Getting the memo to the DG however
proved to be quite challenging as it was apparently being blocked by senior
persons close to him.
Inspector B
then contacted a senior Director whom he trusted, to help get his memo to the
Director General, which B eventually managed to do.
Raising
concerns with the DG does not constitute a breach of confidentiality or neither
does being critical of a public report– it shows an effort to ensure integrity
and transparency in an organisation that lacked any whistleblowing procedures
(despite recommendations that such procedures be adopted).
As one
email from senior management demonstrates, Inspector B’s attempts to
communicate were in fact welcomed and certainly not a breach of
confidentiality.
“xxxx is
perfectly OK with receiving your letter and, once he reads through, to take it
from there in terms of possible meeting with the DG”..I take it as positive
news as there clearly is interest to continue the communication”
On this
occasion Inspector B’s concerns were apparently being taken seriously. In
an email from the Director to B in relation to his letter to the Director
General, it is stated
“I am also
thinking how things could develop further and basically see just one option
that seems realistic, given that we can’t turn back the clock, and which has
been already floating around: it relates to all (emphasis from
the author of the email) your points being forwarded to the IIT for a fresh and
comprehensive assessment by people who are also newly recruited and should
therefore have a fully unbiased take on things”
There is a
clear acknowledgement from a senior manager that the FFM is indeed biased and
that all of B’s issues would be brought to the IIT. This clearly contradicts
the Director General’s portrayal in his statement of the relationship B had
with senior management at the time.
Another
email from a senior management official on 17 April 2019 states: “I suppose
we both concur that it is difficult to imagine that the DG would change his
mind and order issuing another, revised report or anything of this kind. The
report is simply out. But I would see this as a useful “lessons learned” input
from somebody that has no direct stakes in any of this anymore but who
still cares enough to want to help us do the non-routine missions the best way
possible”
There you
have it!
The other
correspondence Inspector B had with members of the TS was an email he sent to
the two colleagues who had been with him in the meeting with the toxicologists
in June 2018, to see if they had the same concerns about how information had
been suppressed and if they were interested in talking to the Director General.
This email, to which there was no reply, was clearly given to the investigators
as some kind of incriminating evidence. Notably, this email was sent three
months after the engineering report had been leaked, so
obviously cannot be considered as a contributing factor to the leak.
51.
Furthermore, Inspector B failed to comply with the specified
procedures for the handling, protection, release, and dissemination of
confidential information so as to create a clear risk of unauthorised
disclosure. This risk materialised with the publication of Inspector A’s
assessment on the Working Group on Syria, Propaganda, and Media’s
website.
B: Inspector B mailed an 8-page memo
to the Director General in March 2019 to inform him of highly irregular
procedures that had taken place before his appointment and which B understood
the DG would want to hear. That B had permission to send the memo was
sanctioned beforehand by the *Chief of Cabinet, through a senior Director, in
an email to Inspector B. As requested the letter was sent by registered post
(which incidentally cost 40 euros!). The DG answered Inspector B in a formal
memo in June 2019.
What
confidential information or procedures therefore did Inspector B fail to
properly handle or comply with?
*“xxxx
is perfectly OK with receiving your letter and, once he reads through, to take
it from there in terms of possible meeting with the DG”..I take it as positive
news as there clearly is interest to continue the communication”
52.
The investigation found that these breaches of confidentiality
were serious. ...B: The evidence provided for concluding there was some breach of
confidentiality is non-existent and demonstrates a total disregard for any kind
of due process.
53.
Inspector A’s assessment purports to be an official OPCW FFM
report on the Douma investigation. Instead, it is a personal document created
with incomplete information and without authorisation. It was created through
the misuse of incomplete confidential information by a staff member who had
ceased to provide support to the FFM six months prior to the release of the
final FFM report on Douma. It was during this six-month period that the
majority of the investigative work was conducted by the FFM. Despite this,
Inspector A’s assessment has been used to call into question the work of the
Secretariat, as well as the Secretariat’s competence and credibility.
A: All
aspects of this paragraph have been rebutted. Whilst the last part is, now,
unfortunately true (“Inspector A’s assessment has been used to call into
question the work of the Secretariat, as well as the Secretariat’s competence
and credibility”), it is important to note that the work was done as a genuine
contribution to the scientific analysis by the FFM, as was meant to have been
assessed, internally, as such. It is a great pity that it was deliberately
suppressed and then leaked.
54.
Therefore, the deliberate and premeditated breaches of
confidentiality committed by Inspectors A and B were considered by the
investigators to be serious. ...B: It is still not clear what
premeditated breaches of confidentiality Inspector B is accused of. The key
findings of the investigators report were:
*****Para
20, TS Note: ‘There is insufficient evidential basis to find that
Inspector A disseminated his assessment to the website’.
*****Para
28. TS Note: There is insufficient evidential basis to find that
Inspector B disseminated Inspector A’s assessment to the website
NOTEWORTHY: The
Director General made no mention of these exculpatory statements in his address
to delegations.
55.
In accordance with the OPOC, I shall be taking appropriate actions
in response to the findings of the investigation. Taking into account that such
actions are “staff-in-confidence” by nature, I will not communicate on them any
further.
56.
The investigation recommends remedial measures that may be taken
by the OPCW to reduce the risk of similar breaches of confidentiality in the
future. Confidentiality training for OPCW personnel will be enhanced. An additional
obligatory Organisation-wide confidentiality training programme will be
instituted for all personnel employed by the Secretariat. This training will be
accompanied by annual attestations by staff as to the requirements and
obligations arising from the Organisation’s confidentiality regime.
57.
The internal legislation is being reviewed in order to reduce the
risks of future breaches of the confidentiality regime. In this regard, the
Secretariat has already begun to analyse the OPOC and the Manual of Confidentiality
Procedure and to benchmark the results of this analysis with six other
international organisations.
58.
We are also conducting a study into whether the Code of Conduct
for Secretariat officials needs to be updated and supplemented with additional
obligations in respect to the duty to safeguard confidential information of the
Organisation.
A+B: Contrary to
what the report implies, the alleged breach of confidentiality has little to do
with shortcomings in staff members’ awareness or knowledge of the
confidentiality regime. The Office of Confidentiality and Security (OCS) has
been very effective in ensuring staff members are fully aware of their
confidentiality obligations. Incidentally, Inspector B served as a
Confidentiality Officer for one year with OCS and delivered training to
inspectors on this topic. He in fact drafted Chapter 14 of the Manual of Confidentiality
Procedures which is dedicated to confidentiality aspects of inspections.
If members of senior management would reflect
on their questionable handling of the concerns raised about the Douma
investigation, they might realise that it is they, in fact, who might be in
need of training—perhaps effective listening and conflict resolution. Had
senior management shown leadership from the outset and not stuck its head in
the sand, there would likely never have been a need for an investigation of
alleged breach of confidentiality.
Excellencies,
distinguished delegates,
59.
Now that I have presented to you the results of the investigation,
I wish to re-assert a number of crucial elements that have been confirmed
through this independent investigation process. These elements bear a
significance that goes well beyond confidentiality matters.
A+B: What did
the Director General mean when he said he wished to ‘re-assert a number
of crucial elements whose significance goes well
beyond confidentiality matters’? These are strange utterances considering
the goal of his briefing was ‘to provide [delegates] with the relevant information,
as is consistent with [OPCW] confidentiality rules’ and that
his remarks ‘[would] be based on evidence..’.
It transpires that the ‘crucial elements’ the
Director General remarks on (which he mistakenly claimed were confirmed in the
investigation process) are neither based on evidence, have relevance or are
consistent with confidentiality rules. They are simply the Director General’s
subjective and denigrating remarks of A and B’s character and integrity, in
which he accuses both of: not accepting that their views were not backed by
evidence; behaving in a most egregious manner, taking matters into their own hands
because their views didn’t gain traction, and “as could be expected”
drawing conclusions that are erroneous, uninformed, and wrong.
This groundless and subjective epilogue to the
investigation report—delivered in the manner of a judge summing up before sentencing—
is a sad attempt by the Director General to spin the meagre findings of the
investigation report into cheap fodder for the selected media outlets.
60.
Inspectors A and B are not whistle-blowers
What’s the point of this, if not to cover the
fact that the OPCW has failed to heed external auditor’s recommendations that
they implement a whistle-blowing policy? Also, in the absence of a
whistleblower policy, how can the Organisation define what a whistleblower is,
especially when the information provided is against the very DG who is making
this determination?
Though the Director General may not recognise
it, A and B are two former inspectors who are dedicated to the mission of the
OPCW. Together they have a combined service of almost 30 years, have seen three
Director Generals come and go and are among the highest regarded members of the
Organisation. Their dedication to the integrity of science and the credibility
of investigations should not be confused with lack of loyalty to the
Organisation. On the contrary, it is about doing the right thing or what one
believes is the right thing. Just two weeks before departing the Organisation
in 2018, inspector B’s Division Director would write of him:
”I want to commend you as well for
your character and strong values, which have stood firm at times when it would
have been easier to simply “let it go” without fighting for what you believed
was right. Thank you for everything, it will be difficult to replace you, now
that your tenure is about to end.”
They are
individuals who could not accept that their views were not backed by evidence.
What views?
A and B have only raised concerns about what they consider irregular behaviour
within the organisation that has led to an impartial report. As stated in one
email published by Wikileaks, “We are not insisting on being right in our
assertions, but we are demanding to be heard”.
When
their view could not gain traction, they took matters into their own hands and
committed a breach of their obligations to the Organisation.
Isn’t this
precisely the issue - why did these ‘views’ not get traction? The onus should
not have been on the inspectors to try to get traction – OPCW procedure
dictates that all data and facts should have been published – it was an
irregularity to suppress them – The CWC gives the right to inspectors
to have differing observations appended to its reports, but this was denied.
The OPCW is now trying to divert attention from its own improper conduct by
creating a diversionary investigation that appears to have the sole objective
of suppressing any legitimate discussion as concerns these irregularities
Yet despite
the Organisation’s improper conduct the inspectors made huge efforts, over a
period of nine months or so, to get management to listen and keep the issue
in-house. With no whistle-blowing policy in place and the DG, Chief of Cabinet
and the Office of Internal Oversight all refusing to engage (and even employing
intimidating tactics) there was no mechanism to have any concerns of irregular
behaviour or breach of scientific rules heard within the Organisation. How
could the inspectors concerns possibly get traction?
Both A and
B have been exonerated from leaking the engineering report. As the report says
there was no proof to say either was responsible. They have only tried to
fulfil their professional and ethical responsibilities to raise legitimate
concerns about the conduct of the Douma investigation and tried to do so
through all the proper channels within the Organisation. The OPCW simply
refused to listen. Where therefore is the breach of confidentiality?
61.
Their behaviour is made even more egregious by the fact that they
had manifestly incomplete information on the Douma investigation. This is due
to the fact that they both had no involvement in the last six months of the FFM
investigation, when most of the analytical work took place.
B: What
is truly shocking is that A and B have struggled to flag concerns about
irregular, unethical, and scientifically questionable behaviour within an
Organisation that supposedly champions professionalism and integrity, but
nobody wants to listen.
Arguing
that A and B were not involved in the final stages of the final report is
little more than a cynical ruse to hide the true concern that the final report
was created in a scientifically questionable process in an atmosphere of
exclusion, secretiveness and unprofessionalism.
A: The
problem for this statement, is that that facts, science and engineering can’t
be changed; they can’t be undone. Interpretation of these, of course, aided by
omission (in the FFM report) is the tricky part. It appears to many of us as
scientists, that the facts appear to be staring at us in the face. If, however
there are (alternative) additional(?) facts, science and engineering,
then they can be used to justify the conclusions of the FFM report. That should
be easy, and we would all be satisfied. On the other hand, had these facts been
available, then surely, they would have been alluded to in
the FFM report, and we wouldn’t have the controversy in the first place. This
is what makes a mockery of the statement that six months of additional analysis
had turned things around. If that had been the case, one imagines
these new results would have been triumphantly expounded in the FFM report. Or
at least alluded to. But they have been notably missing, actually completely
absent, other than the continued entreaties that we accept the unknownconclusions
of the unknown “three experts in engineering and ballistics”.
On the
contrary, the final report is so insipid in these areas that it appears to
confirm that nothing new was established. All it seems was
done, was to repeat the same messages from the earlier (cut-back) interim
report, add some questionable conclusions on engineering, and then by applying
some scientifically-questionable fuzzy “logic”, attempt to justify reaching an
opposite conclusion. This is not how the scientists of the Technical
Secretariat work
Footnote
from Inspector A
There
is a key issue that needs clarification. Who, or what, is “the FFM”? The DG and
many delegations, and some statements from parliamentarians have referenced
this entity called “the FFM”. As in “the Director-General has full confidence
in the impartiality and professionalism of the FFM”. And “I (the Dutch Minister
of Foreign Affairs) have full confidence in the professionalism, impartiality
and objectivity of the findings in the FFM (Fact Finding Mission) report on the
attack in Douma”. And a permanent representative to the OPCW, who said she has
admiration “for the courage of the members of the FFM”. Now here’s the rub; are
they all misguided? We, the two apparently-being disgraced senior experts,
along with other inspectors who deployed to Douma, perhaps have more right than
others to be called “the FFM”. In the case of Douma, the FFM was essentially
disbanded, and subsequently two individuals were appointed by the Chief of
Cabinet (as he explained to Inspector A), to draft the FFM report under his
direction. One of the individuals, ***** had deployed only to Country X. The
other, *****, only joined at the end of 2018 when all was done and dusted. The
rest of the core team had little involvement other than interviewing alleged
witnesses in Country X.
62.
As could be expected, their conclusions are erroneous, uninformed,
and wrong.
B:This is
offensive and certainly not to be expected from someone who used to unconditionally
defend the integrity and professionalism of his inspectors. Why would it
be expected that the conclusions of A and B would be
erroneous, uninformed and wrong In any case, what conclusions is the Director
General talking about?
Inspectors
A and B were witnesses to a scientifically questionable process during the
conduct of the Douma investigation. This included, exclusion of key members of
the investigation team who had gathered the evidence on site, suppression and
doctoring of reports, exclusion of key toxicology data, and chemical analysis
results, among others.
Inspectors
A and B, while questioning the science in (or absent from) the FFM report, are
not protesting the conclusions of the final report per se. They are protesting
how the conclusions were derived—through a scientifically questionable process.
Whether Inspector A was part of the FFM or not (he was) or if Inspector B left
the Organisation before the final report was issued, is in fact irrelevant and
merely a smokescreen to hide the real issue. If an accountant at the
Organisation believed there was fiscal fraud being perpetrated, would
management dismiss these concerns by claiming the staff member was not involved
in the preparation of the end of year balance sheets? Of course not. The
concerns would be immediately investigated and either given credence or
dismissed. Why should it be any different with A and B’s concerns about bad
scientific practice?
63.
The FFM interim report on the Douma incident was issued on 6 July
2018. It took seven months of further FFM investigations before the final
report was issued. During those seven months, the FFM undertook the majority of
its analytical work, conducted a large number of witness interviews,
and—importantly—received the results of relevant sampling and analysis.
A: The
later results of sampling and analysis did not provide anything new, and did
not change the situation from the time of the Interim Report. The final report
contains no scientific commentary that could be related to “new” specific results
from analysis, nor scientific or medical facts or opinion. The only new
information purported in the final FFM report is the statement that engineering
and ballistic studies had been done. These results however, are contradicted by
the findings of the Engineering Summary produced by the qualified FFM team
member.
64.
Arguments based on the provisional elements of the FFM
investigation contained in the interim report have been eclipsed by the final
Douma report—which was released on 1 March 2019—more than half a year after the
interim report. The conclusions of every FFM inquiry are based on an in-depth
and objective analysis of all of the evidence. These conclusions are also based
on prevailing standards of proof used by international commissions of inquiry
in the United Nations system.
A +B. Yet
another defence of the Douma Final Report, which simply has nothing to do with
the leaking of a confidential document. Why do the investigators insist that
defending the merits of the Final Report somehow incriminates A or B in the
mishandling of confidential information?
The
argument that the scientifically questionable process that resulted in the
Interim Report is somehow ‘eclipsed’ by the Final Report rings of Machiavellian
‘the end justifies the means’ mentality.
65.
In the course of any investigation, members of a team may have
views and ideas about what happened. A good investigator will use these
elements to follow specific leads. The FFM investigators are no different. They
follow leads. But they do not bend the facts to accommodate the view of
individuals. The Code of Conduct for staff members of the Secretariat
specifically requires staff members to ensure that their personal views and
convictions do not adversely affect their official duties.
It's not
about the views and ideas! That’s stuff of politicians and some on-line
investigative outfits. OPCW inspectors don’t work that way. They work with
hypotheses, facts, evidence and established and ethical scientific procedures.
66.
The Secretariat always takes into account all information
submitted and views exchanged. The Douma investigation was no exception. The
findings of the FFM final report was based on the thorough analysis of all of
the evidence collected.
The point
is, they weren’t. And rather than just repeating the same mantra, why doesn’t
the TS explain, if it analysed all the evidence collected, why some critical
evidence regarding the quantitative chemical analysis, expert opinions of
toxicologists, inconsistent witness statements, and engineering studies were
omitted from the report.
67.
Therefore, I stand by the conclusions of the final Douma report
A +
B. This affirmation says it all. This investigation was not about
investigating a breach of confidentiality at all, but about defending the Douma
Report, and defending it in a manner unbecoming of an Organisation of the
stature of the OPCW.
In
accordance with the FFM’s mandate, the report of the FFM does not draw
conclusions about possible perpetrators. In the June 2018 decision, the States
Parties mandated the Secretariat to put in place arrangements to identify the
perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The
IIT—established by the Conference of the States Parties—examines cases as
specified in the June decision. The FFM Douma report falls into this category
of cases.
In the
interest of transparency and completeness, Inspector A’s assessment has been
transmitted to the IIT and will be examined by it in due course. This is consistent
with the Conference’s call for the IIT to examine all information.
I wish to
seize this opportunity to thank all States Parties that have provided the
Secretariat with information and expertise on all aspects of the Syrian
chemical file, as mandated by the relevant decisions of the OPCW policy-making
organs. I call again upon all States Parties, in a position to do so, to extend
their assistance in this matter.
The OPCW
is, and will remain, the global institution mandated to deal with chemical weapons
in an impartial and independent manner. You can count on me, and on the staff
of the Secretariat. I would like to pay tribute to all of them, particularly
for their competence, hard work and dedication, with which we have been able to
fulfil the mandates we have received from States Parties.
Distinguished
delegates, I wish to thank you for your kind attention during this briefing.
The investigation was pursued in accordance with the core values of the
OPCW—namely independence, professionalism, and integrity. We have continued to
fulfil our core business related to verification, capacity building, chemical
safety and security, and assistance and protection.
You can
count on the unrelenting commitment of me and my team to work with you to
uphold the universal ban on chemical weapons and contribute to global peace and
security.
I thank
you for attending this briefing—which is now concluded. *****
