Confusion about the Iran nuclear deal and what President Trump
will announce today is staggering. Let’s just lay out a few facts to help
contextualize his decision.
1. Trump
is not pulling the US out of the nuclear deal at this time. He is likely to
announce that he will not certify that continuing US sanctions relief as
mandated by the deal supports US national security interests. Congress requires
him to make such a certification every 90 days. By refusing to certify, Trump
sends the matter back to Congress, which must decide whether or not to continue
the sanctions relief. All of this is US inside baseball turning largely on
whether the ball is with the president or Congress to retain the sanctions
relief promised in the nuclear deal. It is not a decision on whether to remain
in the deal or not.
2. The
president’s decision to continue suspending sanctions while sending the matter
back to Congress is a decision to remain in the deal for now. All the
legislation authorizing pre-deal sanctions remains in place — sanctions relief
is the result of President Obama’s decision to use the national security
waivers in that legislation to suspend the sanctions. Refusing to certify that suspending
sanctions remains in America’s national security interest does not violate the
nuclear deal — reimposing sanctions would.
3. Trump
could withdraw from the deal completely at his discretion without requiring any
justification or Congressional approval. The deal is an executive agreement
between the White House, Iran, and the heads of state of several European
countries. It is not a treaty, and Congress chose not to vote on whether or not
to approve it after it had been signed.
4. Presidential
certification under the law does not turn only on Iran’s compliance with the
deal. The president must also certify, independent of the question of
compliance, that “suspension of sanctions related to Iran pursuant to the
agreement is (I) appropriate and proportionate to the specific and verifiable
measures taken by Iran with respect to terminating its illicit nuclear program;
and (II) vital to the national security interests of the United States.”
5. Trump’s
announcement today, therefore, reflects a decision to remain in the deal for
now as well as an attempt to highlight its weaknesses and force Congress to
establish clearer principles and benchmarks by which to evaluate whether the
deal serves American interests or not.
There is also confusion about how the deal relates to the
Iranian missile program and to Iranian malign activities in the region and
around the world. Here are some key points:
- The
deal itself says nothing whatsoever about the Iranian missile program.
That program appears only in the United Nations Security Council
Resolution approving the deal (UNSCR 2231). But even there, the UN only
“calls on” Iran to refrain from advancing its missile program in certain
ways — it does not require Iran to do so, and specifies no penalties if
Iran continues its missile program.
- The
deal imposes no restrictions on Iranian malign activities in the region —
supporting proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a militias, or
the (sanctioned) Assad regime. UNSCR 2231 does not mention those
activities at all.
- The
deal does, however, facilitate all of those activities, including
advancing Iran’s missile program, by lifting all restrictions on providing
advanced and offensive weaponry to Iran in about three years. It also
helps Iran build its military, support its proxies, and continue its
activities against the US and its allies in the region by providing
financial relief without even nominally constraining what that relief
could be used for.
- The
deal does not in any way constrain America’s ability to impose sanctions
or take other actions against the Iranian missile program or regional
activities. It requires the US only to lift nuclear-related sanctions, not
all sanctions as the Iranians periodically suggest. Imposing sanctions on
Iranian entities for the missile program, for proxy activity, terrorism,
cyber activity, or human rights violations is not a violation of nor
withdrawal from the deal.
The nuclear deal was a deeply flawed agreement from the
beginning. It made sense only on the presumption that the Iranian regime would
voluntarily change its approach to regional activities, its missile program,
and even its nuclear program. All evidence so far suggests that the regime has
not changed its approach and does not intend to do so. It is by no means clear,
therefore, that the deal is actually in America’s national security interest,
let alone that it is valuable enough to continue making the kinds of additional
concessions the Obama Administration was willing to make to persuade the
Iranians to remain in it.
We must deal with one final myth about the deal as well — that
the choice is remaining in the deal or going to war with Iran. President Obama
and his team sold the deal largely on that basis, and deal advocates continue
to claim that the deal was the alternative to war. Not so. One alternative
would be to return to the posture of heavy sanctions and other pressures short
of war that coerced the regime to accept this deal in the first place, but this
time with the aim of addressing Iran’s other damaging behavior as well. Another
would be to put in place a real containment policy aimed at folding the regime
in upon itself, as we did with the Soviet Union, until it ultimately changes
its nature from within — hopefully peacefully.
President Trump has chosen to remain in the deal for now while
trying to focus attention and force action on some of its weaknesses. One can
question the timing and details of this decision and, of course, the
undisciplined commentary surrounding it. But the decision itself is actually
quite moderate and could advance American national security interests if the
president and Congress move forward intelligently.
