Facing defeat in the proxy war in Syria, the Israeli-Saudi
tandem is planning a new front against Hezbollah, presaged by Lebanese Prime
Minister Hariri’s sudden resignation, as ex-British diplomat Alastair Crooke
explains.
It seems that matters are coming to a head in the Middle
East. For many states, the coming period will likely prove to be the
moment in which they determine their futures — as well as that for the region
as a whole.
The immediate peg for “crunch time” is Russia’s fast-track
proposal of a conference to be held in Sochi, with the near-full kaleidoscope
of Syrian opposition invited, which, if all goes as planned, might mean 1,000
delegates arriving in Sochi as soon as Nov. 18.
The Syrian government has agreed to attend. Of course, when
one hears of attendance in these numbers, it suggests that this is not intended
as a “sleeves rolled-up” working session, but rather as a meeting in which
Russian thoughts will be mooted on the constitution, the system of government,
and the place of “minorities” – with a chaser that Russia wants fresh elections
pretty darned quick: which is to say, in six months’ time. In short, this is to
be the “last chance saloon” for opposition figures: come aboard now, or be shut
out, in the cold.
This initiative has plenty of push behind it, including
President Putin’s personal endorsement, but no guarantee of success. Both Iran
and Turkey (the co-guarantors of Astana) privately may have reservations, not
knowing precisely what Moscow might unveil. Iran is insistent on Syria
retaining a strong centralized government, and Turkey is likely to worry about
whether the Kurds might receive too much from Moscow; it will also have
reservations about sitting down with the YPD (Syrian Kurds), which it views to
be little more than a re-branded PKK, which Turkey regards as a terrorist
organization. If Turkey does pull out, it will take an important slice of
the opposition with it.
Critical moments in history, however, do have a habit of proving
to be less critical than first imagined, but this one effectively marks the
beginning of the winding up process of the Syrian war and of the 20-year “New
Middle East” project (as devised by the U.S. and Israeli governments). How
each state responds, will determine the Middle East landscape for the next
years.
Military Mop-up
Late last week, the Syrian army took the rest of Deir Ezzor
city, and with it its rear now secure, the Syrian army is free to continue the
30 or so kilometers to reach Abu Kamal (al-Bukumal) – the last ISIS urban
outpost – and the vital border crossing on the Euphrates with Iraq. It is
estimated that there may be 3,500 Da’esh (another name for the Islamic State or
ISIS) in Abu Kamal. But Abu Kamal’s “twin” (on the Iraqi side of the border),
al-Qaim, was taken by the Iraqi government’s PMU militia forces on Friday. The
Iraqi forces are now clearing the city of its estimated 1,500 Da’esh fighters.
The Syrian army, backed up by several thousand recently injected
Hezbollah forces, is poised to enter Abu Kamal in the coming
days from two directions – and from the south, a co-ordinated thrust north up
and into Abu Kamal by the Iraqi Hash’d a- Sha’abi (PMU) militia, will form a
pincer.
American-supported SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces), however, are
also trying to reach Abu Kamal from the east (the U.S., pressured by Israel,
would like to seal and close the border crossing). U.S. allied forces can move
more quickly, as U.S. officers are seeking to bribe local tribal leaders
who formerly had sworn allegiance to ISIS (with Saudi money), to switch sides,
or at least to allow the SDF forces to advance unhindered by ISIS (as happened
in the environs of Deir Ezzor).
In short, the military outcome in Syria is done (after six years
of war), and now comes the political bargaining. How this plays out will
determine the relative strengths of the forces that will shape the Middle East
in the coming years. The outcome will likely see whether Turkey can be
bullied back towards NATO (by threats such as that by General Petr
Pavel, head of NATO’s military committee, warning of “consequences” for
Turkey’s attempts to buy Russian air defenses), or whether Turkey’s
determination to limit Kurdish aspirations will see Turkey position itself
alongside Iran and Iraq (who share a common interest).
Turkey’s role in Idlib, in overseeing the de-escalation zone
there, remains opaque. Effectively, its forces are positioned more to control
the Afrin Kurdish “canton” (rather than monitor the Idlib de-escalation zone).
It is possible that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is hoping to use Turkish
troops to carve out a buffer zone along the Turkish-Syrian border – in
contravention to the Astana understandings. If so, this will place him at odds
with both Moscow and Damascus (but will not necessarily imply a return to the
NATO camp, either).
Syria’s Future
The bargaining at Sochi will also make clearer whether Syria
will be a strong centralized state (as Iran prefers), or a looser federal state
as America (and perhaps Russia) would prefer. Sochi will be something of a
litmus for the extent to which American influence can shape outcomes in today’s
Middle East. At present, it looks as if there is co-ordination between
Moscow and Washington for a speedy political settlement in Syria, a U.S. declaration
of victory over ISIS, Syrian elections, and an American exit from the Syrian theatre.
The outcome of the conference will also perhaps clarify whether
the Syrian Kurds finally will remain with the U.S. CentCom project for retaining a permanent U.S.
presence in northeast Syria (as Israel wants), or whether the Syrian Kurds will
cut a deal with Damascus (after witnessing the crushing of the Barzani Kurdish
independence project by neighboring powers).
If the latter occurs, the argument for retaining a longer-term
U.S. presence in northeast Syria would lose force. The Saudis will have
either to accept defeat in Syria, or act the party-pooper (by trying to
re-ignite the remaining proxy forces in Idlib) – but, for that, the kingdom
would need Turkey’s compliance, and that may not be forthcoming.
Iraq too, irked by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s
comments suggesting that the PMU are Iranian – and must “go home” – has already
shown signs of re-orientating towards Russia. (It has recently signed an
expansive energy and economic protocol with Russia – after having reclaimed
control of its borders and of Iraq’s energy resources – and is procuring
Russian arms). Evidence of Iraq’s close connections with Syria, Turkey and
Iran was very manifest in the quick execution of the put-down to the Kurdish
independence gambit.
But the state facing the biggest dilemma in respect to the
Syrian outcome is Israel. Alex Fishman, the doyen of Israeli defense
columnists, has written that Israel simply has failed to
adjust to strategic change, and is locked in a narrow “cold war” mentality:
“The Syrians fire rockets at open areas: Israel destroys Syrian
cannons in response; the Iranians threaten to deploy Shiite forces in
Syria: Israel announces ‘red lines’ and threatens a military conflict; Fatah
and Hamas hold futile talks on a unity government: the prime minister declares
Israel is suspending talks with the Palestinans – and everyone here applauds
the security and political echelons: – ‘there, we showed them the meaning of
deterrence’, [the Israeli leadership repeats].
“But what we are seeing here is a provincial defense policy, a
false representation of a leadership that barely sees beyond the tip of its nose,
and is busy putting out fires day and night.
“It’s a leadership that sees national security through a narrow
regional viewpoint. It’s as if everything beyond Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran
doesn’t exist. It’s as if the world around us hasn’t changed in the past
decades, and we are stuck in the era of aggressive solutions in the form of
reward and punishment as the main political-security activity. The current
political-security echelon isn’t solving problems, isn’t dealing with problems,
but simply postponing them, passing them on to the next generation”
Missing the Strategic Picture
What Fishman is pointing to is profound: Israel has gained
some tactical victories in the neighborhood (i.e. over the Palestinians
generally, and in weakening Hamas), but it has lost sight of the wider
strategic picture. In effect, Israel has lost its ability to dominate the
region. It had wanted a weakened and fragmented Syria; it had wanted a
Hezbollah mired in the Syrian mud, and an Iran circumscribed by Sunni sectarian
antipathy towards the Shi’a generally. It is unlikely to get any of these.
Map of Syria.
Rather, Israel finds itself being deterred (rather
than doing the deterring) by the knowledge that it cannot now overturn its
strategic weakness (i.e. risk a three-front war) – unless, and only if, America
will fully enter into any conflict, in support of Israel. And this is what
worries the security and intelligence echelon: Would America now contemplate a
decisive intervention on behalf of Israel – unless the latter’s very survival
was at risk?
In 2006, Israeli officials recall, the U.S. did not enter
Israel’s war against Hizbullah in Lebanon, and after 33 days, it was Israel
that sought a ceasefire.
Fishman is right too that attacking Syrian factories and radar
positions “out of old habit” solves nothing. It may be sold to the Israeli
public as “deterrence,” but rather it is playing with fire. Syria has
started to fire back with aged surface-to-air missiles (S200s) at Israeli
aircraft. These missiles may not have hit an Israeli jet yet, and maybe
were not even intended so to do. The Syrian message however, is clear:
these missiles may be old, but they have a longer range than the newer S300:
Potentially, their range is sufficient to reach Ben Gurion Airport outside Tel
Aviv.
Are the Israelis sure that Syria and Hezbollah don’t have more
modern missiles? Are they certain that Iran or Russia will not provide them
such? The Russian defense minister was very angry on his visit to Tel Aviv
to have been faced with an Israeli retaliatory air attack on a Syrian radar and
missile position – as a welcome gift on landing in
Israel. To his protests, his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister
Lieberman condescendingly said that Israel needed nobody’s advice in respect to
Israel’s security. General Sergey Shoygu reportedly was not amused.
Can Israel come to terms with its new strategic situation? It
seems not. Ibrahim Karagul, a Turkish political commentator and
an authoritative voice of President Erdogan, writing in Yeni Safak, notes that “the foundations of a new
disintegration [and] division are being laid in our region. Saudi Arabia’s ‘We
are switching to moderate Islam’ announcement contains a dangerous game. The
U.S.-Israel axis is forming a new regional front line.”
Karagul continues: “We have been watching the strange
developments in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Israel and
the U.S. for some time now. There is a new situation in the region, which
we know is [principally aimed] against Iran; but has recently taken an open
anti-Turkey state, aimed at limiting Turkey’s influence in the region … You
will see, the ‘moderate Islam’ announcement will be immediately followed by a
sudden and unexpected strengthening of Arab nationalism. This wave will not
differentiate between Shiite or Sunni Arabs, but it will isolate the Muslim
Arab world from the entire Muslim world.
“This separation will be felt most by the Shiite Arabs in Iraq.
With this new block, Iraq and Iran are going to stage a new power showdown
[i.e. will react forcefully to counter it]. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider
al-Abadi’s future in power is also most likely going to [become contingent on
the outcome to] this showdown.”
An American ‘Buy-in’
To give this project American “buy-in,” Israel and Saudi Arabia
are focusing it on Lebanese Hezbollah, which the U.S. has declared to be a
terrorist entity though the movement was part of Lebanon’s government, which
was headed by Prime Minister Saad Hariri until he ominously resigned today in an announcement made in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. (Hariri is a dual Saudi-Lebanese national.)
Saudi State Minister for Gulf Affairs Thamer al-Sabhan (in
Beirut last week) called for“toppling Hezbollah” and promised
“astonishing” developments in “the coming days. Those who believe that my
tweets are a personal stance, are delusional … the coming developments will
definitely be astonishing.”
Al-Sabhan added that the kingdom’s escalation against
Hezbollah could take several forms that would “definitely affect Lebanon.
Politically, it might target the government’s relations with the world. At the
economic and financial levels, it could target commercial exchange and funds,
and militarily it might involve the possibility of a strike on Hizbullah by the
U.S.-led coalition, which labels Hizbullah a terrorist organization.” (Comment:
this latter point probably was made more in hope, than in expectation. Europe
and the U.S. set considerable store on maintaining Lebanon as stable).
Karagul reflects further on this U.S.-Gulf-Israeli initiative:
“The moderate Islam project was tried the most in Turkey. We
always said this is ‘American Islam’ and opposed it. The February 28 military
intervention is the product of such a project. It was implemented by the
U.S./Israel extreme right-wing and their partners on the inside. The
Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) is the product of such a project, and
the Dec. 17/25 and July 15 attacks were made for this very reason. They were
all aimed at trapping Turkey within the U.S./Israel axis.
“But Turkey’s local and national resistance has overcome them
all. Now they are burdening Saudi Arabia with the same mission. That is how
they are making it appear. I do not think that it is possible for Saudi Arabia
to undertake such a mission. This is impossible both in terms of the regime’s
character and its social structure. This is impossible because of the
‘Israel/U.S. sauce’.
“The discourse of making the switch to moderate Islam will cause
serious confusion in the Saudi administration and grave social reactions. The
actual conflict is going to take place within Saudi Arabia. Also, the
Riyadh administration has no chance of exporting something to the region or
setting an example.
“Especially once it is further revealed that the project is
security-based, that a new front line has been formed, that it is all planned
by the U.S.-Israel, it will result in a fiasco. This project is suicide for
Saudi Arabia, it is a destruction plan; it is a plan that will destroy it unless
it comes to its senses.”
Karagul makes the point well: the attempt to make Islam in the
Christian “Westphalian” image has a disastrous history. The metaphysics of
Islam are not those of Christianity. And Saudi Arabia cannot be made “moderate” by Mohammad bin Salman
just ordering it. It would entail a veritable cultural revolution to shift
the basis of the kingdom, away from the rigors of Wahhabism to some secularized
Islam.
More War?
Where is this taking the Middle East: to
conflict? Maybe. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not
noted for his audacity: he his noted more for rhetoric which often has proved empty; and Israeli security
officials are being cautious, but both sides are preparing
against the possibility of what Karagul calls a “great power showdown.” It
looks, though – from this and other Turkish statements – as if Turkey will be
with Iran and Iraq, and standing against America and Saudi Arabia.
And President Trump? He is wholly (and understandably)
preoccupied with the low-intensity war being waged against him at home. He
probably tells Netanyahu whatever it is that might advance his domestic battles
(in Congress, where Netanyahu has influence). If Bibi wants a fiery speech
at the U.N. berating Iran, then, why not? Trump can then call on the
trifecta of White House generals to “fix it” (just as he did with JCPOA,
passing it to Congress “to fix”), knowing that the generals do not want a war
with Iran.
The danger is a “black swan.” What happens if Israel goes on
attacking the Syrian army and industrial premises in Syria (which is happening
almost daily) – and Syria does shoot down an Israeli jet?
Alastair Crooke is a former British diplomat who was a senior
figure in British intelligence and in European Union diplomacy. He is the
founder and director of the Conflicts Forum.
https://consortiumnews.com/2017/11/04/israeli-saudi-tandem-adjusts-to-syria-loss/
