Complex doesn’t even begin to describe the positioning of
Iran-Russia in the geopolitical chessboard. What’s clear in our current,
volatile moment is that they’re partners, as I previously reported. Although not
strategic partners, as in the Russia-China tie-up, Russia-China-Iran remain the
crucial triad in the ongoing, multi-layered, long-term Eurasia integration
process.
A few days after our
Asia Times report, an article – based on “senior sources close
to the Iranian regime” and crammed with fear-mongering, baseless accusations of
corruption and outright ignorance about key military issues – claimed that
Russia would turn the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar into forward
military bases complete with submarines, Spetsnaz special forces and Su-57
fighter jets, thus applying a “stranglehold” to the Persian Gulf.
For starters, “senior
sources close to the Iranian regime” would never reveal such sensitive
national-security details, much less to Anglo-American foreign media. In my own
case, even though I have made several visits to Iran while consistently
reporting on Iran for Asia Times, and even though authorities at myriad levels
know where I’m coming from, I have not managed to get answers from Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps generals to 16 detailed questions I sent nearly a
month ago. According to my interlocutors, these are deemed “too sensitive” and,
yes, a matter of national security.
Predictably, the report
was fully debunked. One of my top Tehran sources,
asked about its veracity, was blunt: “Absolutely not.” After all, Iran’s
constitution decisively forbids foreign troops stationed on national soil. The
Majlis – Iranian parliament – would never approve such a move barring an extreme
case, as in the follow-up to a US military attack.
As for Russia-Iran
military cooperation, the upcoming joint military exercises in the “northern
part of the Indian Ocean,” including the Strait of Hormuz, are a first-ever
such occasion, made possible only by a special agreement.
Analyst Gennady Nechaev
is closer to reality when he notes that in the event of growing Russia-Iran
cooperation, the possibility would be open for “permanent basing of the Russian
Navy in one of the Iranian ports with the provision of an airfield nearby – the
same type of arrangement as Tartus and Hmeimim on the Mediterranean coast of
Syria.” To get there, though, would be a long and winding road.
And that brings us to
Chabahar, which poses an interesting question. Chabahar is a deep sea port, on
the Gulf of Oman and the key plank in India’s mini-Silk Road vision. India
invested a lot in Chabahar, to have it connected by highway to Afghanistan and
Central Asia and in the future by rail to the Caucasus. All that so India may bypass
Pakistan as far as trade routes are concerned.
Chabahar, though, may
also become an important node of the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road
Initiative. India and China – as well as Russia – are members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. Iran, sooner or later, will also become a full SCO
member. Only then the possibility “might” – and the emphasis is on “might” –
open for the Russian or Chinese navy occasionally to dock at Chabahar, but
still not to use it as a forward military base.
Got oil, will travel
On Iran, the
Russia-China strategic partnership is working in parallel. China’s priority is
energy supplies – and Beijing works the chessboard accordingly. The Chinese
ambassador to the United Arab Emirates just issued a trial balloon, mentioning
that Beijing might consider escorting oil tankers across the Persian Gulf and
the Strait of Hormuz. That could happen independently or – the dangling carrot
– as part of Washington’s Operation Sentinel, which for the moment has managed
to find only one “coalition of the willing” member: the UK.
What’s actually happening
right now in the Persian Gulf is way more entertaining. As I confirmed with
energy traders in Doha late last month, demand for oil right now is higher than
in 2018. And in consequence Iran continues to sell most of its oil.
A tanker leaves Iran
with transponder off; the oil is transferred to another tanker on the high
seas; and then it is relabeled. According to a trader, “If you take two to
three million barrels a day off the market by sanctions on Venezuela and Iran,
plus the OPEC cutbacks, you would have to see a higher price.”
There is no higher
price. Brent crude remains near a seven-month low, around US$60 a barrel. This
means that Iran continues to sell, mostly to China. That trial balloon floated
in the UAE might well be China camouflaging its continued purchase of Iranian
oil.
Iranian Foreign Minister
Javad Zarif has been proving again and again his diplomatic mastery, running
rings around the Donald Trump administration. But all major decisions in Iran
come from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. That also applies to Tehran’s
position in relation to multi-level forms of support from the Russia-China
strategic partnership.
What the past few months have made crystal clear is how
Russia-China’s magnetic pull is attracting key Eurasia players Iran, Turkey and
Pakistan. And make no mistake: As much as Tehran may be extremely proud of its
political independence, it is reassuring to know that Iran is, and will
continue to be, a definitive red line for Russia-China.
