Powerful bipartisan opponents of any cooperation with ‘Putin’s
Russia’ virtually monopolize the American political-media establishment and
seem unrelenting. This means that pro-détente leadership both in Washington and
Moscow sides is crucial, as suggested by the past.
Détente had a long 20th-century history. This history teaches
that at least four prerequisites are required: a determined American president
who is willing to fight for détente against fierce mainstream political
opposition, including in his own party; one who can rally at least some public
support by prominent American figures who did not support his candidacy for the
presidency; who has a few like-minded appointees and aides at his side; and who
has a pro-détente partner in the Kremlin, as Reagan had with Soviet leader
Mikhail Gorbachev.
Trump seems determined. During his primary and presidential
campaigns, he alone repeatedly called for cooperation with Russia for the sake
of US national security and he alone refused to indulge in the rampant
fact-free vilification of Russian President Putin. Trump also seems little
impressed by the bipartisan foreign-policy establishment, even contemptuous of
its policies and record during the preceding two decades. Its continuing
opposition may not deter him.
Less clear is whether or not many of his previous opponents in
either party will support détente under Trump or whether or not he will find in
his inner circle—particularly a secretary of state and ambassador to Moscow—who
will wisely advise and assist him in this vital pursuit, as Reagan did. As for
a partner in the Kremlin, Putin is certainly ready for détente, as he has said
and demonstrated many times, contrary to what is said about him as an
inveterate “aggressor” in the mainstream American media.
In many respects, the new Cold War is more dangerous than was
the preceding 40-year Cold War. Three of its current fronts—Ukraine, the Baltic
region, and Syria—are fraught with the possibility of hot war. Détente succeeds
when mutual national interests are agreed upon and negotiated. The Ukrainian
civil and proxy war has become a disaster for Washington, Moscow, and the
Ukrainian people themselves. Ending it is, therefore, a common interest, but
perhaps the most difficult to negotiate. NATO’s ongoing buildup up in the Baltic
region and in Poland, and Russia’s counter-buildup on its Western borders is
fraught with accidental or intentional war.
Avoiding war, as Reagan and Gorbachev resolved, is an
existential common interest. If Trump is determined, he will have the power to end
the buildup and even undo it, though the new eastern-most members of NATO will
loudly protest. On the other hand, despite claims to the contrary, Putin’s
Russia represents no threat whatsoever to these countries, as wise Trump
advisers will assure him. Agreement on Syria should be the easiest. Both Trump
and Putin have insisted that the real threat there is not Syrian President
Assad but the Islamic State and other terrorists. The first major step of a new
détente may well be the US-Russian military alliance against terrorist forces
in Syria that even President Obama once proposed and abandoned.
There are, of course, many other new Cold War conflicts, large
and smaller ones, but some could be easily and quickly negotiated in order to
build elite and popular support for détente in the US. This could begin with
the “banomania” both sides have enacted since 2014. Putin, for example, could
end the ban on American adoptions of Russian orphans, which wrecked the hopes
of scores of U.S. families and Russian children. This would humanize détente
and soften American opposition.
The largest example of bans is, of course, Western economic
sanctions on Russia, which Putin wants ended. A more complex issue, this is
likely to come to the fore only if or when détente progresses. On the other
hand, a number of European countries, which have suffered from Russia’s
counter-sanctions, also want them ended, so Trump will not be without allies if
he moves in this direction.
Whether or not Trump vigorously pursues détente with Russia may
tell us much about his presidency more generally if only because an American
president has more freedom of action and fewer constraints on him in foreign
policy than in any other policy realm. And no issue is now more important than
the state of US-Russian relations.
https://www.lewrockwell.com/2016/12/no_author/detente-russia/
