In 2006, an inebriated Mel
Gibson allegedly said this: “The Jews are responsible for all the wars in the
world.” There followed the predicable storm of anti-anti-Semitism, ad hominem
attacks, and various other slanders against Gibson’s character. But virtually
no one asked the question: Is he right? Or rather this: To what degree could he
be right?
Clearly Jews can’t be
responsible for all the world’s wars, but might they have had a hand in many
wars—at least amongst those countries in which they lived or interacted? Given
their undeniable influence in those nations where they exceed even a fraction
of a percent of the population, Jews must be responsible, to some degree, for
at least some of what government does, both good and bad. Jews are often
praised as brilliant managers, economists, and strategists, and have been
granted seemingly endless awards and honors. But those given credit for their
successes must also receive blame for their failures. And there are few greater
failures in the lives of nations than war.
To begin to evaluate Gibson’s
charge, I will look at the role Jews played in the two major wars of world
history, World Wars I and II. But first I need to recap some relevant history
in order to better understand the context of Jewish policy and actions during
those calamitous events.
Historical Context
Have Jews played a
disproportionate role in war and social conflict—a role typically not of
peacemakers and reconcilers, but of instigators and profiteers? Let us very
briefly review some historical evidence to answer this charge; it provides
relevant insight into Jewish influences during both world wars.
As far back as the Book of
Genesis, we find stories such as that of Joseph, son of Jacob, sold into
slavery in Egypt. Joseph earns the favor of the Pharaoh and is elevated to a
position of power. When a famine strikes, Joseph develops and implements a
brutal policy of exploitation, leading Egyptian farmers to sell their land,
animals, and ultimately themselves in exchange for food. Joseph himself
survives unscathed, living out his days in “the land of Goshen,” with a life of
luxury and ease—evidently as repayment for a job well done.[1]
Over time, Jews continued to
build a reputation as rabble-rousers and exploiters. In 41 AD, Roman Emperor
Claudius issued his Third Edict, condemning the Jews of Alexandria for abuse of
privilege and sowing discord; he charged them with “fomenting a general plague
which infests the whole world.” Eight years later he expelled them from Rome.
As a result, the Jews revolted in Jerusalem in the years 66-70, and again in
115 and 132. Of that final uprising, Cassius Dio made the following
observation—the first clear indication of Jews causing a major war:
Jews everywhere were showing
signs of hostility to the Romans, partly by secret and partly overt acts…
[M]any other nations, too, were joining them through eagerness for gain, and
the whole earth, one might almost say, was being stirred up over the matter.[2]
Thus it was not without reason
that notable Romans denounced the Jews—among these Seneca (“an accursed race”),
Quintilian (“a race which is a curse to others”), and Tacitus (a “disease,” a
“pernicious superstition,” and “the basest of peoples”).[3]Prominent
German historian Theodor Mommsen reaffirmed this view, noting that the Jews of
Rome were indeed agents of social disruption and decay: “Also in the ancient
world, Judaism was an effective ferment of cosmopolitanism and of national
decomposition.”[4]
Throughout the Middle Ages and
into the Renaissance, their negative reputation persisted. John Chrysostom,
Thomas Aquinas, and Martin Luther all condemned Jewish usury—a lending practice
often trading on distress, and a frequent cause of social unrest. In the 1770s,
Baron d’Holbach declared that “the Jewish people distinguished themselves only
by massacres, unjust wars, cruelties, usurpations, and infamies.” He added that
they “lived continually in the midst of calamities, and were, more than all
other nations, the sport of frightful revolutions.”[5] Voltaire
was struck by the danger posed to humanity by the Hebrew tribe; “I would not be
in the least bit surprised if these people would not some day become deadly to the
human race.”[6]Kant
called them a “nation of deceivers,” and Hegel remarked that “the only act
Moses reserved for the Israelites was…to borrow with deceit and repay
confidence with theft.”[7]
Thus both empirical evidence
and learned opinion suggest that Jews have, for centuries, had a hand in war,
social strife, and economic distress, and have managed to profit thereby.[8] Being
a small and formally disempowered minority everywhere, it is striking that they
should merit even a mention in such events—or if they did, it should have been
as the exploited, and not the exploiters. And yet they seem to have
demonstrated a consistent ability to turn social unrest to their advantage.
Thus it is not an unreasonable claim that they might even instigate such
unrest, anticipating that they could achieve desired ends.
Jewish Advance in America and
Elsewhere
The long history of Jewish
involvement in social conflict has a direct bearing on both world wars.
Consider their progressive influence in American government. Beginning in the
mid-1800s, we find a number of important milestones. In 1845, the first Jews
were elected to both houses of Congress: Lewis Levin (Pa.) to the House and
David Yulee (Fla.) to the Senate. By 1887 they had their first elected
governor, Washington Bartlett in California. And in 1889, Solomon Hirsch became
the first Jewish minister, nominated by President Harrison as ambassador to the
Ottoman Empire—which at that time controlled Palestine.
Overseas, trouble was brewing
for the Jews in Russia. A gang of anarchists, one or two of whom were Jewish,
succeeded in killing Czar Alexander II in 1881. This unleashed a multi-decade
series of periodic pogroms, most minor but some killing multiple hundreds of Jews.
Further difficulties for them came with the so-called May Laws of 1882, which
placed restrictions on Jewish business practice and areas of residency within
the “Pale of Settlement” in the western portion of the Russian empire.[9] Many
Jews fled the Pale; of those heading west, Germany was their first stop.[10]
Even prior to the 1880s, Jewish
influence in Germany was considerable. In the 1840s, both Bruno Bauer and Karl
Marx wrote influential essays on Die Judenfrage (The Jewish Question). In 1850, composer Richard Wagner complained that Germans found
themselves “in the position of fighting for emancipation from the Jews. The Jew
is, in fact…more than emancipated. He rules…”[11] By
1878, Wagner declared that Jewish control of German newspapers was nearly
total. A year later Wilhelm Marr decried “the victory of Jewry over Germandom”;
he believed it self-evident that “without striking a blow…Jewry today has
become the socio-political dictator of Germany.”[12]
The facts support these views.
And with the influx of Russian and Polish Jews in the late 1800s and early
1900s, the situation got demonstrably worse. Sarah Gordon (1984: 10-14) cites
the following impressive statistics:
Before the First World War, for
example, Jews occupied 13 percent of the directorships of joint-stock
corporations and 24 percent of the supervisory positions within these
corporations. … [D]uring 1904 they comprised 27 percent of all lawyers, 10
percent of all apprenticed lawyers, 5 percent of court clerks, 4 percent of
magistrates, and up to 30 percent of all higher ranks of the judiciary. … Jews
were [also] overrepresented among university professors and students between
1870 and 1933. For example, in 1909-1910…almost 12 percent of instructors at
German universities were Jewish… [I]n 1905-1906 Jewish students comprised 25
percent of the law and medical students… The percentage of Jewish doctors was
also quite high, especially in large cities, where they sometimes were a
majority. … [I]n Berlin around 1890, 25 percent of all children attending
grammar school were Jewish…
For all this, Jews never
exceeded 2% of the German population. The public accepted the foreigners with a
remarkable degree of tolerance, and more or less allowed them to dominate
certain sectors of German society. There were no legal constraints, and violent
attacks were rare. But the Germans would come to regret such liberal policies.
The other important factor at
that time was the emergence of Zionism. Formally established by Theodor Herzl
in 1897, its basic principles were laid out in his book Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State). He argued that the Jews
would never be free from persecution as long as they were foreigners
everywhere, and thus they needed their own state. A number of locations were
discussed, but by the time of the first meeting of the World Zionist
Organization in 1897, the movement had settled on Palestine. This, however, was
problematic because the region at that time was under control of the Ottoman
Empire, and was populated primarily by Muslim and Christian Arabs. Somehow, the
Zionist Jews would have to wrest control of Palestine away from the Ottoman
Turks and then drive out the Arabs. It was a seemingly impossible task.
They immediately understood
that this could only be done by force. It would take a condition of global
distress—something approaching a world war—in order for the Zionists to
manipulate things to their advantage. Their guiding principle of ‘profit
through distress’ could work here, but it would require both internal and
external pressure. In states where the Jews had significant population but
little official power, they would foment unrest from within. In states where
they had influence, they would use the power of their accumulated wealth to
dictate national policy. And in states where they had neither population nor
influence, they would apply external pressure to secure support for their
purposes.
That the Zionists seriously
contemplated this two-pronged, internal/external strategy is no mere
speculation; we have the word of Herzl himself. He wrote:
When we sink, we become a
revolutionary proletariat, the subordinate officers of the revolutionary party;
when we rise, there rises also our terrible power of the purse. (1896/1967: 26)
In fact, Herzl apparently predicted the outbreak of global
war. One of the original Zionists, Litman Rosenthal, wrote in his diary of 15
December 1914 his recollection of a conversation with Herzl from 1897. Herzl
allegedly said,
It may be that Turkey will
refuse or be unable to understand us. This will not discourage us. We will seek
other means to accomplish our end. The Orient question is now the question of
the day. Sooner or later it will bring about a conflict among the nations. A
European war is imminent… The great European war must come. With my watch in
hand do I await this terrible moment. After the great European war is ended the
Peace Conference will assemble. We must be ready for that time. We will
assuredly be called to this great conference of the nations and we must prove
to them the urgent importance of a Zionist solution to the Jewish Question.
This was Herzl’s so-called
“great war prophecy.” Now, he does not say that the Zionists will cause this war, only that they
will “be ready” when it comes, and “will seek other means” than diplomacy to
accomplish their end. A striking prediction, if true.[13]
In any case, there was clearly
a larger plan at work here. The Jews would pursue a policy of revolution in
states like Russia in order to bring down hated governments. To the degree
possible, they would seek to undermine the Ottoman Turks as well. And in
Germany, the UK, and America, they would use “the terrible power of the purse”
to dictate an aggressive war-policy in order to realign the global power
structure to their favor. This would have a triple benefit: curtailing rampant
anti-Semitism; enhancing Jewish wealth; and ultimately establishing a Jewish
state in Palestine, one that could serve as the global center of world Jewry.
Revolution and war thus became a top priority.[14]
Turkey was in fact an early
success for the movement. The Sultan’s system of autocratic rule generated some
dissatisfaction, and a group of Turkish Jews exploited this to their
advantage—resulting in the Turkish Revolution of 1908. As Stein explains,
the revolution had been
organized from Salonica [present-day Thessaloniki], where the Jews, together
with the crypto-Jews known as Dönmeh, formed a majority of the population.
Salonica Jews and the Dönmeh had taken an important part in the events
associated with the revolution and had provided the Committee of Union and
Progress with several of its ablest members. (1961: 35)[15]
This group of revolutionaries,
today known as the Young Turks, was able to overthrow the Sultan and exert
substantial influence on the succeeding ruler. But in the end they were unable
to steer the declining empire in a pro-Zionist direction.
Back in the USA, Jewish
population was rising even faster than in Germany. In 1880 it had roughly
250,000 Jews (0.5%), but by 1900—just 20 years later—the figure was around 1.5
million (1.9%). A census of 1918 showed this number increasing to an astonishing
figure of 3 million (2.9%). Their political influence grew commensurately.
For present purposes,
significant American influence began with the assassination of President
William McKinley in 1901. He was shot by a Polish radical named Leon Czolgosz,
who had been heavily influenced by two Jewish anarchists, Emma Goldman and
Alexander Berkman. The presidency immediately fell to the vice president,
Theodore Roosevelt—who, at age 42, was (and remains) the youngest president in
history. His role as an army colonel in the 1898 victory in Cuba over the
Spaniards had led to widespread publicity, and with the backing of the Jewish
community, he won the New York governorship later that same year. Thus he was
well situated to earn the vice presidential nomination in 1900.
A question of interest: Was
Roosevelt Jewish? I will examine this issue in detail later with respect to FDR
(as to whom there is more to say), but in brief, there is considerable
circumstantial evidence that all of the Roosevelts were, at least in part,
Jewish. In Theodore’s case, the only explicit indication is a claim by former
Michigan governor Chase Osborn. In a letter dated 21 March 1935, Osborn said,
“President [Franklin] Roosevelt knows well enough that his ancestors were
Jewish. I heard Theodore Roosevelt state twice that his ancestors were Jewish.”[16] But
Osborn offers no specifics, and I am not aware of any further claims regarding
Theodore himself.
However, there are two other
relevant items regarding his Jewish connections. Having acceded to the office
in 1901, he subsequently won the 1904 election. In late 1906 he appointed the
first Jew to the presidential cabinet: Oscar Straus, a wealthy New York lawyer
and former ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. As Secretary of Labor and
Commerce, Straus was in charge of the Bureau of Immigration—at the critical
time of accelerating Jewish immigration. We can be sure that his office was
particularly amenable to incoming Jews.
The second event occurred in
1912. Roosevelt had declined to run again in 1908, preferring to nominate his
Secretary of War, William Taft—who proceeded to win handily. Taft, however,
disappointed many Republicans, and there was a call to bring Roosevelt back.
But the party would not oust a sitting president, and so Roosevelt decided to
run on a third-party ticket. Hence the peculiar status of the 1912 election: it
featured Taft running for reelection, Roosevelt running as a third-party
candidate, and Woodrow Wilson running as a first-term Democrat. As the history
books like to say, we had a former president and a sitting president running
against a future president. Wilson, as we know, would win this race, and go on
to serve two consecutive terms—covering the lead-up, duration, and aftermath of
World War I.
But less well known is this
fact: For perhaps the first time in US history, all three major candidates had
substantial Jewish financial backing. Henry Ford’s Dearborn Independentreported on a 1914 Congressional
testimony by Paul Warburg, best known as the Jewish “father of the Federal
Reserve.” Warburg was the prototypical Jewish banker, long-time partner at
Kuhn, Loeb, and Co., and later head of Wells Fargo in New York. At some point
during Taft’s presidency, Warburg decided to get financially involved in
politics. By the time of the 1912 election, he and his partners at Kuhn, Loeb
were funding all three candidates. Warburg’s testimony, before Senator Joseph
Bristow (R-Kan.), is revealing:
JB: “It has been variously
reported in the newspapers that you and your partners directly and indirectly
contributed very largely to Mr. Wilson’s campaign funds.” PW: “Well, my
partners—there is a very peculiar condition—no; I do not think any one of them
contributed largely at all; there may have been moderate contributions. My
brother, for instance, contributed to Mr. Taft’s campaign.” …
JB: “I understood you to say
that you contributed to Mr. Wilson’s campaign.” PW: “No; my letter says that I
offered to contribute; but it was too late. I came back to this country only a
few days before the campaign closed.” JB: “So that you did not make any
contribution?” PW: “I did not make any contribution; no.” JB: “Did any members
of your firm make contributions to Mr. Wilson’s campaign?” PW: “I think that is
a matter of record. Mr. [Jacob] Schiff contributed. I would not otherwise
discuss the contributions of my partners, if it was not a matter of record. I
think Mr. Schiff was the only one who contributed in our firm.” JB: “And you stated
that your brother had contributed to Mr. Taft’s campaign, as I understand it?”
PW: “I did. But again, I do not want to go into a discussion of my partners’
affairs, and I shall stick to that pretty strictly, or we will never get
through.” JB: “I understood you also to say that no members of your firm
contributed to Mr. Roosevelt’s campaign.” PW: “I did not say that.” JB: “Oh!
Did any members of the firm do that?” PW: “My answer would please you probably;
but I shall not answer that, but will repeat that I will not discuss my
partners’ affairs.” JB: “Yes. I understood you to say Saturday that you were a
Republican, but when Mr. Roosevelt became a candidate, you then became a
sympathizer with Mr. Wilson and supported him?” PW: “Yes.” JB: “While your brother
was supporting Mr. Taft?” PW: “Yes.” JB: “And I was interested to know whether
any member of your firm supported Mr. Roosevelt.” PW: “It is a matter of record
that there are.” JB: “That there are some of them who did?” PW: “Oh, yes.”[17]
In sum: some unknown members of
Kuhn, Loeb donated to Roosevelt; Paul’s brother (Felix) gave to Taft; and
Schiff donated to Wilson. Cleverly, Paul Warburg himself admitted to no
funding, but we can hardly take him at his word here. In any case, there was a
Jewish hand in all three contestants, and the Jews were guaranteed influence
with the winner, no matter the outcome. We don’t know the extent of this
influence, nor how long it had gone on. To date I have not uncovered evidence
of Jewish involvement with Roosevelt’s 1904 election, although his appointment
of Straus to the cabinet is typical of the kind of political patronage that
follows financial support. And the same with Taft: We don’t know the degree of
Jewish support for his initial run in 1908, but support in 1912 suggests that
they were reasonably satisfied with his performance.
But Taft turned out to be a
mixed bag for the Jews. On the one hand, Jewish immigration continued apace.
And he did appoint Oscar Straus to the ambassadorship to the Ottoman Empire .
However, he was less inclined to act on the international stage than the Jews
had wished. Of particular concern was the growing problem in Russia, and steady
reports of Jewish pogroms. For example, there was the “Kishinev massacre” of
April 1903; the New York Times reported that “Jews were slaughtered like sheep. The dead
number 120… The scenes of horror attending this massacre are beyond
description. Babes were literally torn to pieces by the frenzied and
blood-thirsty mob” (April 28; p. 6). A slight exaggeration—the actual death
toll was 47. A second attack in Kishinev in 1905 left 19 dead; regrettable, but
hardly a catastrophe. In early 1910 the NYT ran an article, “Russian Jews in Sad Plight.” Their source
said, “The condition of Russian [Jews] is worse today than at any time since
the barbarous massacres and pogroms of 1905 and 1906.”[18] Then
on 18 September 1911, the Russian Prime Minister, Pyotr Stolypin, was shot and
killed—by a Jewish assassin, Mordekhai Gershkovich, aka Dmitri Bogrov. (The
reader will recall Herzl’s demand for revolutionary action.) This of course
brought even harsher recriminations.
But the last straw, for the
American Zionists, was the restriction on American Jews from entering into
Russia. There had been obstacles in place since the turn of the century, but
they became much more stringent during Taft’s presidency. The Zionists wanted
the US government to take action, but this was forestalled by a long-standing
treaty of 1832, one that guaranteed “reciprocal liberty of commerce and
navigation” and allowed mutual freedom of entry of citizens on both sides. The
Zionists thus took it upon themselves to initiate the abrogation of this treaty
as a means of putting external pressure on the Czarist regime. And, despite the
wishes of President Taft and the best interests of America at large, they
succeeded. This whole incident, thoroughly documented by Cohen (1963), is an
astounding and watershed event in Jewish influence. As she says,
Credit for this act belongs to
a small group which had campaigned publicly during 1911 for the abrogation of
the treaty. How a mere handful of men succeeded in arousing American public
opinion on a relatively obscure issue to a near “wave of hysteria,” how they
forced the hand of an antagonistic administration, and what principal aim lay
behind their fight for abrogation constitute an absorbing story of pressure
politics. (p. 3)
The “mere handful of men”
consisted primarily of Jewish lawyer Louis Marshall, the banker Jacob Schiff,
and their colleagues at the American Jewish Committee—the ‘AIPAC’ of its day,
and still a potent force a century later. They had raised the topic of
abrogation as early as 1908, but it did not become a top priority until early
1910. They then approached Taft, knowing that he was preparing to run for
reelection the following year. As Cohen (p. 9) says, “The quid pro quo was
obvious; the Jewish leaders would try to deliver the Jewish vote to Taft.” But
he was unsympathetic. Taft knew that, for several reasons, it was not in
America’s favor: Our commercial interests, our Far East foreign policy, Russian
good will, and our international integrity would all be harmed by abrogation.
But the Jews were pressing; in February 1910 they met with Taft, to “give him
one last chance” to support their cause. When he again declined, they decided
to go around the president, to Congress and to the American people. They knew
how to work Congress. As Cohen (p. 13) explains, “the pattern of Jewish
petitions to the government…was generally that of secret diplomacy. Wealthy or
politically prominent individuals asked favors…but always in the form of
discreet pressure and behind-the-scenes bargaining.” But mounting a public
campaign was something new.
In January 1911, Marshall
“officially opened the public campaign for abrogation.” He immediately appealed
not to Jewish interest—though that was the sole motive—but rather to allegedly
American interests. “It is not the Jew who is insulted; it is the American
people,” he said. As Shogan (2010: 22) puts it, “a key to the [Jewish] strategy
was to frame its demand as a plea to protect American interests in general, not
just the rights of Jews.” The AJC then embarked on a massive propaganda effort.
They enlisted Jewish support in the media; Samuel Strauss and Adolph Ochs (of
the New
York Times)
helped coordinate a series of articles and op-eds in several major cities. They
made the case “in popular emotional terms,” organized petitions and
letter-writing programs, and held dedicated, pro-abrogation rallies—one of
which included such luminaries as William Hearst and future president Woodrow
Wilson.[19] Everything
was designed to put maximum pressure on Congress to act.
All the while, Taft remained
firm in his opposition. In a private letter he wrote, “I am the President of
the whole United States, and the vote of the Jews, important as it is, cannot
frighten me in this matter” (Cohen, p. 21). Secretary of State Philander Knox,
and Ambassador to Russia William Rockhill, both strongly supported him.
Rockhill was particularly galled; expressing his thoughts, Cohen asks, “were
national interests to be subservient to a small group of individuals?” After
all, the actual harm was near microscopic: “Only 28 American Jews resided in
Russia, and the State Dept knew of only four cases in five years where American
Jews were denied admission” (p. 16). And yet this “small group of men” was
turning the tide in their favor.
By November of 1911, just 11
months after launching their public campaign, the AJC was confident of victory.
Schiff was able to predict easy passage for the resolution. That same month an
“unofficial delegation” of Jews met with Taft regarding his pending annual
message, and they convinced him that Congressional action was inevitable, and
veto-proof. Taft relented, agreeing to sign the resolution when it reached his
desk. Wanting no further delay, the AJC pressed for a vote before the end of
year. On December 13 the House approved the measure—by the astounding tally of
301 to 1. A slightly modified version came up for Senate vote on December 19,
which was passed unanimously. A reconciled bill was approved the next day, and Taft signed it.
So it came to be that, on 20 December 1911, the US government sold its soul to
the Jewish Lobby.
The importance of this event
can scarcely be overestimated. The interests of “a mere handful of men,” acting
on behalf of a small American minority, were able to dictate governmental
foreign policy, against the express wishes of the president and his staff, and
contrary to the larger interests of the nation.
The Russians, incidentally,
were stunned at this decision. They knew of the Jewish hand behind it, but
could hardly believe that it had the power to carry through on its threat.
The NYT again gives a useful
report:
In parliamentary circles here
[in Russia] the prevailing comment is characterized by astonishment that the
American government has responded so readily to the Jewish outcry. The opinion
is expressed by members of the Duma that in all probability the Jews will now
attempt to force matters further. (20 Dec 1911; p. 2)
Indeed—the Jewish-led Bolshevik
revolution was just six years away.
Such was the state of things in
America and globally at that time. International Jewry had sufficient wealth
and influence to steer events at the highest levels, and American Jews (Zionist
and otherwise) had come to permeate the government—and American culture
generally. The situation so impressed German economist Werner Sombart that in
1911 he made this observation: “For what we call Americanism is nothing else
than the Jewish spirit distilled.”[20]From
the perspective of a century later, this would seem truer than ever.
Wilson and the “Great War”
All this, then, serves as the
context and backdrop for the emergence of Woodrow Wilson, beginning with the
election of 1912. If Franklin Roosevelt was “the first great hero of American
Jews,”[21] then
Wilson was the first great understudy. As Henry Ford saw it, “Mr. Wilson, while
President, was very close to the Jews. His administration, as everyone knows,
was predominantly Jewish.”[22] Wilson
seems to have been the first president to have the full backing of the Jewish
Lobby, including multiple major financial donors. And he was the first to fully
reward their support.
It’s worthwhile summarizing the
main figures in the Jewish power structure, as of 1912. Herzl died young in
1904, so he was out of the picture. But a “mere handful” of others came to
dominate the movement, and the American scene:
·
Oscar Straus (age 62), German-born, first Jewish cabinet member under
T. Roosevelt, and later ambassador to the Ottoman Empire under Taft.
·
Jacob Schiff (65), head of the Kuhn, Loeb banking firm.
·
Louis Marshall (56), borderline Zionist, founder of the AJC.
·
The Warburg brothers: Paul (44) and Felix (41), German-born bankers. A third brother, Max, stayed in
Germany (until 1938).
·
Henry Morgenthau, Sr. (56), German-born lawyer, father of the even more influential
Henry, Jr.
·
Louis Brandeis (56), lawyer, strongly Zionist.
·
Samuel Untermyer (54), lawyer.
·
Bernard Baruch (42), Wall Street financier.
·
Stephen Wise (40), Austrian-born rabbi and fervent Zionist.
·
Richard Gottheil (50), British-born rabbi and Zionist.
These, to emphasize, were all
Americans. On the European side there was a different structure, one centered
on such figures as Chaim Weizmann and Herbert Samuel in Britain, and Max Nordau
in France.
Let me begin with financial
backing—which of course has long been the trump card of Jewry. Many of the
above individuals were prime supporters of Wilson. Cooper (2009: 172) remarks
that his “big contributors” included the likes of “Henry Morgenthau, Jacob
Schiff, and Samuel Untermyer, as well as a newcomer to their ranks, Bernard
Baruch.” Such assistance continued throughout Wilson’s tenure; for his 1916
reelection bid, “financiers such as Henry Morgenthau and Bernard Baruch gave
generously” (ibid: 350). As we saw, Schiff’s support was admitted by Warburg in
his congressional testimony.
Warburg himself was very
evasive, allowing only that his “sympathies went with Mr. Wilson.” Yet we can
hardly believe that no money followed. Warburg’s most profound impact was his
leading role in the creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, the year Wilson
took office. Seligman (1914: 387) remarks that “it may be stated without fear
of contradiction that in its fundamental features the Federal Reserve is the
work of Mr. Warburg more than of any other man in the country.” Its basic principles,
he said, “were the creation of Mr. Warburg and of Mr. Warburg alone.” In due
recognition, Wilson appointed him to the Fed’s first Board of Governors in
August 1914.
Morgenthau’s influence began in
1911, when Wilson was still governor of New Jersey. Balakian (2003: 220) notes
that it was at this time that the two “bonded,” and that “Morgenthau offered
Wilson his ‘unreserved moral and financial support’.” In the run-up to the 1912
Democratic convention, “Morgenthau was giving $5,000 a month to the campaign,
and continued to give generously throughout the fall” (ibid.: 221). In fact,
says Balakian, only a few of his wealthy Princeton classmates gave more. Ward
(1989: 252) confirms this, noting that Morgenthau “had been an important backer
of Woodrow Wilson in 1912.” Morgenthau duly received his reward: ambassadorship
to Ottoman Turkey, again overseeing Palestine.
Of special importance was
Wilson’s association with Louis Brandeis. The two first met back in 1910;
Shogan (2010: 64) describes Brandeis’s “friendship with Woodrow Wilson,” noting
that he had “worked mightily” for him in the 1912 campaign. In a telling
statement, Wilson wrote to his friend after the election, “You were yourself a
great part of the victory.”[23] Brandeis
would be rewarded by a successful nomination to the Supreme Court in June
1916—the first Jew on the court. He would serve a full 23 years, well beyond
Wilson’s lifetime, and, despite his formal ‘neutrality’ as a justice, would
play a vital role in both world wars.
But perhaps the most
significant of all was Bernard Baruch. A millionaire before he was 30, Baruch
catapulted out of nowhere, under obscure conditions, to become a leading
influence in the Wilson administration. Already in 1915, in the early years of
the European war, he was convinced that America would be involved. In
Congressional testimony of February 1920, Baruch stated that, in 1915, he “had
been very much disturbed by the unprepared condition of this country.” “I had
been thinking about it very seriously, and I thought we would be drawn into the
war. … I thought a war was coming long before it did.” Through some
still-mysterious process, Baruch was named to the Council of National Defense
in early 1916. He then came to control a particular subcommittee, the War
Industries Board (WIB), which had extraordinary wartime powers. Baruch
single-handedly ran it throughout the war years. His testimony before Sen.
Albert Jefferis (R-Neb.) summarizes his role:
AJ: “In what lines did this
board of 10 have the powers that you mention? BB: “We had the power of
priority, which was the greatest power in the war.” AJ: “In other words, you
determined what everybody could have?” BB: “Exactly; there is no question about
that. I assumed that responsibility, sir, and that final determination rested
within me.” AJ: “What?” BB: “That final determination, as the President said,
rested within me; the determination of whether the Army or Navy should have it
rested with me; the determination of whether the Railroad Administration could
have it, or the Allies, or whether General Allenby should have locomotives, or
whether they should be used in Russia, or used in France.” AJ: “You had
considerable power?” BB: “Indeed I did, sir.” …
AJ: “And all those different
lines, really, ultimately, centered in you, so far as power was concerned?” BB:
“Yes, sir, it did. I probably had more power than perhaps any other man did in
the war; doubtless that is true.”[24]
An astonishing fact: a young,
unelected Jew with no political experience becomes, in time of crisis, the most
powerful man in the US government, after the president himself. And yet all
this was just a rehearsal. Baruch would play a similar role in the Second World
War under FDR, in his Office of War Mobilization. He was also a friend and
confidant of Winston Churchill. No doubt “Barney” Baruch had lots of advice for
all parties involved.
World War I began in earnest in
August of 1914, when the German army crossed into officially neutral Belgium on
its way to France. A series of alliances and treaties triggered a chain
reaction in which 10 nations entered the war by the end of that year.
Ultimately another 18 would be engaged—though in the case of the US, it would
be nearly two and half years later. It’s difficult today, with our present
eagerness to engage in warfare around the world, to understand the degree to
which Americans then were so strongly anti-interventionist. Neither the public
nor the government had any real inclination to get involved in a European war.
Publicly, at least, Wilson himself was a pacifist and an isolationist. In a
speech of 19 August 1914, just after the outbreak of war, he proclaimed that
“every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of
neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness
to all concerned.” We have a duty to be “the one great nation at peace,” and
thus “we must be impartial in thought as well as in action.”[25]
And yet, American governmental
policy did not fully adhere to these lofty words. Under international law, the
United States, as a neutral party, had the right to conduct commerce with all
sides. But of course both Britain and Germany sought to restrict trade with the
other. A British naval blockade interrupted or seized a substantial portion of
our intended shipments to Germany, reducing trade by more than 90%. And yet
Wilson hardly objected. On the other hand, when German submarines attacked or
threatened our shipments to England, he reacted in the strongest manner. The
end result was a near quadrupling of trade with the Allies between 1914 and
1916. In practical terms, we were supporting the Allied war effort, even as we
remained officially neutral. Wilson’s government—if not he himself—was
decidedly biased against the Germans. Not coincidentally, Wilson’s Jewish
advisors were, to a man, anti-German.
By the time of the 1916
election, war was churning throughout Europe. Still, Wilson promised to remain
unengaged; he ran and won on the slogan, “He kept us out of war.” The American
people too had little appetite for armed conflict; as Cooper (2009: 381)
writes, “Clearly, the president was not feeling a push for war from Congress or
the public.” But like so many campaign promises, this one would be discarded
soon afterward—in fact, barely one month after his second inauguration.
So: Why did he do it? Why did
Wilson change his mind and, on 2 April 1917, issue his famous call to Congress
to declare war on Germany? His official answer: German submarines were relentlessly
targeting US military, passenger, and cargo ships, and thus we simply had no
choice. But this explanation does not withstand scrutiny. Early in the war the
Germans were sinking a number of ships that were trafficking with the Allies,
but in September 1915, after urgent demands from Wilson, they suspended
submarine attacks. This suspension held for an exceptionally long time—through
February 1917. And all throughout that time, we, and other “neutral” nations,
were trading with Germany’s enemies, supplying them with material goods, and
assisting in a naval blockade. Thus it is unsurprising that the Germans
eventually resumed their attacks, on all ships in the war zone.
In his famous speech to
Congress, Wilson said of the lifting of the suspension, “the Imperial German
Government…put aside all restraints of law or of humanity, and uses its
submarines to sink every vessel [in the war zone].” Sparing no hyperbole, he
added, “The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare
against mankind. It is a war against all nations.”
But what are the facts?
Specifically, how big a threat did Germany pose to the US? In reality, it was
not much of a threat at all. From the time of the outbreak of war (August 1914)
until Wilson’s declaration in April 1917, a total of three small military ships
were lost—one submarine in 1915, one armored cruiser in 1916, and one protected
cruiser in early 1917. Additionally, a total of 12 American merchant steamers
(freight ships) were sunk in the same period, but with the loss of only 38
individual lives.[26] So
the US had lost a grand total of 15 ships to that point. Putting this in
perspective: Over the course of the entire war, German U-boats sank roughly
6,600 ships in total. Hence the threat to the US was all but inconsequential.
Clearly Wilson was thinking in internationalist terms, and someone or something
convinced him that realigning the global order was more important than American
public opinion; thus his famous and much-derided phrase: “The world must be
made safe for democracy.” Yes—but whose democracy?
A few powerful voices opposed
Wilson, including Senators Robert La Follette (R-Wisc.) and George Norris
(R-Neb.). Both spoke on April 4, just two days after Wilson’s plea for war. La
Follette was outraged at the unilateral action taken by the Wilson
administration. In a scathing speech, he said:
I am speaking of a profession
of democracy that is linked in action with the most brutal and domineering use
of autocratic power. Are the people of this country being so well-represented
in this war movement that we need to go abroad to give other people control of
their governments? Will the President and the supporters of this war bill
submit it to a vote of the people before the declaration of war goes into
effect? … Who has registered the knowledge or approval of the American people of
the course this Congress is called upon to take in declaring war upon Germany?
Submit the question to the people, you who support it. You who support it dare
not do it, for you know that by a vote of more than ten to one the American
people as a body would register their declaration against it.[27]
Norris had some ideas about the
driving forces behind the call to war. He believed that many Americans had been
“misled as to the real history and the true facts, by the almost unanimous
demand of the great combination of wealth that has a direct financial interest
in our participation in the war.”[28] Wall
Street bankers loaned millions to the Allies, and naturally wanted it repaid.
And then there were the profits to be made from military hardware and
ammunition. These same forces also held sway in the media:
[A] large number of the
great newspapers and news agencies of the country have been controlled and
enlisted in the greatest propaganda that the world has ever known, to
manufacture sentiment in favor of war. … [And now] Congress, urged by the
President and backed by the artificial sentiment, is about to declare war and
engulf our country in the greatest holocaust that the world has ever known…
Indeed—every war is a
‘holocaust.’ Norris then encapsulated his view with a most striking line: “We
are going into war upon the command of gold.” And everyone knew who held the
gold.
Norris and La Follette both
realized they had no chance to change the outcome. Any force that could compel
abrogation of the Russian treaty and monopolize a presidential election could
manufacture Congressional consent for war. Later that same day, the Senate
confirmed it, by a vote of 82 to 6. Two days thereafter, the House concurred,
373 to 50. And so we were at war. American troops would be on the ground in
Europe within three months.
Balfour
Political power is a strange
thing; it is one of those rare cases where appearance is reality. If you say you have power,
and others say you have power, and
if all parties act as if you have power—then you have power. Such is the case with the Jewish Lobby. Simply because, at that
time, they had no army, had internal disagreements, and in no country exceeded
one or two percent of the population, we cannot conclude that they were mere
helpless pawns, manipulated at will by the great powers. And yet today, modern
commentators continue to refer to the ‘illusory’ or ‘misperceived’ power of the
Jews at that time.[29] This
can now be exposed as a weak attempt to whitewash the Jewish power play. When a
small minority can dictate foreign policy, promote global war, and steer the
outcome in their favor, then they have substantial power—no matter what anyone
says. It was true in 1911; it was true in the 1912 election; and it would be
clearly demonstrated once again in the case of the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
To recap: During Wilson’s first
term, Jewish Americans achieved major political gains. Paul Warburg’s Federal
Reserve Act was passed, and he was named to the Board. Henry Morgenthau, Sr.
was nominated ambassador to Turkey, watching over Palestine. Brandeis was named
to the Supreme Court. And Baruch became the second most powerful man in the
land.
Jews also made important
strides elsewhere in America during those four years. Two more Jewish governors
were elected—Alexander in Idaho, and Bamburger in Utah. The motion-picture
business witnessed the beginning of Jewish domination, with Universal Pictures
(Carl Laemmle), Paramount (Zukor, Lasky, Frohmans, and Goldwyn), Fox Films
(William Fox), and the early formation of “Warner” Bros. Pictures—in reality,
the four Wonskolaser brothers: Hirsz, Aaron, Szmul, and Itzhak.[30] This
development would prove useful for wartime propaganda. And the Jewish
population grew by some 500,000 people.
1917 was the first year of
Wilson’s second term. The European war was into its third year, and looking
increasingly like a stalemate. With the German resumption of U-boat attacks on
shipping to the UK and the American declaration, a true world war was in hand.
And it was also a time of revolution in Russia. In fact, two revolutions: the worker’s
uprising in February that overthrew Czar Nicholas II, and the Bolshevik
revolution in October that put the Jewish revolutionaries in power.
The role of Jews in the Russian
revolution(s) is a complicated and interesting story. There isn’t space here to
elaborate, but in brief, the communist movement had a heavy Jewish hand from
its inception. Marx, of course, was a German Jew, and his writings inspired an
18-year-old Vladimir Lenin in 1888. Lenin was himself one-quarter Jewish
(maternal grandfather: Alexandr Blank). In 1898, Lenin formed a revolutionary
group, the Russian Social Democratic Worker’s Party (RSDWP), which was the
early precursor to the Soviet Communist Party. Four years later, Lenin was
joined by a full-blooded Jew, Leon Trotsky—born Lev Bronstein. Internal
dissension led to a schism in 1903, at which time the RSDWP split into
Bolshevik (‘majority’) and Menshevik (‘minority’) factions. Both factions were
disproportionately Jewish. In addition to Lenin and Trotsky, leading Bolshevik
Jews included Grigory Zinoviev, Yakov Sverdlov, Lev Kamenev (aka Rozenfeld),
Karl Radek, Leonid Krassin, Alexander Litvinov, and Lazar Kaganovich.
Ben-Sasson (1976: 943) observes that these men, and “others of Jewish
origin…were prominent among the leaders of the Russian Bolshevik revolution.”
This was public knowledge, even at the time. As the London Times reported in 1919,
One of the most curious
features of the Bolshevist movement is the high percentage of non-Russian
elements amongst its leaders. Of the 20 or 30 leaders who provide the central
machinery of the Bolshevist movement, not less than 75 percent are Jews. …
[T]he Jews provide the executive officers. (March 29, p. 10)
The article proceeds to list
Trotsky and some 17 other individuals by name. Levin (1988: 13) notes that, at
the 1907 RSDWP Congress, there were nearly 100 Jewish delegates, comprising
about one third of the total. About 20% of the Mensheviks were Jews, but by
1917 they comprised eight of 17 (47%) of its Central Committee members.[31]
Thus it was that, in the years
leading up to the 1917 revolutions, Jews were working internally and externally
to overthrow the Czar. Stein (1961: 98) quotes a Zionist memo of 1914,
promoting “relations with the Jews in Eastern Europe and in America, so as to
contribute to the overthrow of Czarist Russia and to secure the national
autonomy of the Jews.” Temperley (1924: 173) noted that, “by 1917, [Russian
Jews] had done much in preparation for that general disintegration of Russian
national life, later recognized as the revolution.” Ziff (1938: 56) stated the
common view of the time that “Jewish influence in Russia was supposed to be
considerable. Jews were playing a prominent part in the revolution…”
Surprisingly, even Winston
Churchill acknowledged this fact. In 1920 he wrote an infamous essay explaining
the difference between the “good” (Zionist) Jews and the “bad” Bolsheviks. This
dichotomy, which was nothing less than a “struggle for the soul of the Jewish
people,” made it appear almost “as if the gospel of Christ and the gospel of
Antichrist were destined to originate among the same people” (1920/2002: 24).
The Zionists were “national” Jews who sought only a homeland for their
beleaguered people. The evil “international Jews,” the Bolsheviks, sought revolution,
chaos, and even world domination. It was, said Churchill, a “sinister
conspiracy.” He continued:
This movement among the Jews is
not new. From the days of Spartacus-Weishaupt to those of Karl Marx, and down
to Trotsky (Russia), Bela Kun (Hungary), Rosa Luxemburg (Germany), and Emma
Goldman (United States), this world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of
civilization and for the reconstitution of society on the basis of arrested
development, of envious malevolence, and impossible equality, has been steadily
growing. … It has been the mainspring of every subversive movement during the
Nineteenth Century; and now at last this band of extraordinary personalities
from the underworld of the great cities of Europe and America have gripped the
Russian people by the hair of their heads and have become practically the
undisputed masters of that enormous empire. (p. 25)
“There is no need to
exaggerate” the Jewish role in the Russian revolution; “It is certainly a very
great one. … [T]he majority of the leading figures are Jews.” In the Soviet
institutions, “the predominance of Jews is even more astonishing.” But perhaps
the worst aspect was the dominant role of Judeo-terrorism. Churchill was clear
and explicit:
[T]he prominent, if not
indeed the principal, part in the system of terrorism applied by the
Extraordinary Commissions for Combating Counter-Revolution has been taken by
Jews, and in some notable cases by Jewesses. The same evil prominence was
obtained by Jews in the brief period of terror during which Bela Kun ruled in
Hungary. The same phenomenon has been presented in Germany (especially in
Bavaria), so far as this madness has been allowed to prey upon the temporary
prostration of the German people. … [T]he part played by the [Jews] in
proportion to their numbers in the population is astonishing. (p. 26)
By this time, Churchill had
been working on behalf of Zionist Jews for some 15 years. He had long counted
on Jewish political support, and was rumored to be in the pay of wealthy
Zionists.[32]
The Russian revolutions were
significant, but the premier event of 1917 was surely the Balfour Declaration
of November 2. This short letter from the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary
Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild was remarkable: it promised to a “mere
handful” of British subjects (and indirectly their coreligionists worldwide) a
land that the United Kingdom did not possess, and that was part of some other
empire. It is enlightening to examine the orthodox account of this event.
According to the standard view, it was at this time that Britain was not only
mired in the war on the Continent, but also that “British forces were fighting
to win Palestine from the Ottoman Empire.”[33] The
Brits wanted it “because of its location near the Suez Canal.” (In fact, of
course, Palestine is more than 200 km from the Canal, separated by the whole of
the Sinai Peninsula.) “The British believed the Balfour Declaration would help
gain support of this goal from Jewish leaders in the UK, the United States, and
other countries.”
So, here are a few relevant
questions: Was control of the Canal really the primary objective? Or did the
British think that the Jews would help them in their broader war aims? The Jews?—a beleaguered minority
everywhere, with no nation, no army, no “real power”? Could they really
help the
British Empire? And did they in fact help them? And if so, how?
Nothing in the documentation of
the time suggests that the canal was anything more than an incidental concern.
But there was clearly a larger goal—to enlist the aid of Jews everywhere, in
order to help Britain win the war. Schneer (2010: 152) notes that, beginning in
early 1916, the British sought to “explore seriously some kind of arrangement
with ‘world Jewry’ or ‘Great Jewry’.” A diplomatic communiqué of March 13 is
explicit:
[T]he most influential
part of Jewry in all the countries would very much appreciate an offer of
agreement concerning Palestine… [I]t is clear that by utilizing the Zionist
idea, important political results can be achieved. Among them will be the
conversion, in favour of the Allies, of Jewish elements in the Orient, in the
United States, and in other places… The only purpose of [His Majesty’s]
Government is to find some arrangement…which might facilitate the conclusion of
an agreement ensuring the Jewish support. (in Ziff 1938: 56)
Later that year, an advisor to
the British government, James Malcolm, pressed this very point: that, by
promising Palestine to the Zionists, they would use their influence around the
world—and especially in America—to help bring about overall victory. On the
face of it, this was a preposterous suggestion: that the downtrodden Jewish
minority, and in particular the even smaller minority of Zionist Jews, could do anything
to alter events in a world war.
And yet that quickly became the
official view of the British government—particularly so when David Lloyd George
became prime minister in December 1916. Lloyd George was, from the Zionist
perspective, a nearly ideal leader. He had been working with them since 1903.[34] He
strongly believed in their near-mythic influence. And he was a devout Christian
Zionist, making him an ideological compatriot. Immediately upon assuming
office, Lloyd George directed his staff—in particular, Mark Sykes and Lord
Arthur Balfour—to negotiate Jewish support. MacMillan explains:
From [early] 1917, with Lloyd
George’s encouragement, Sykes met privately with Weizmann and other Zionists.
The final, and perhaps most important, factor in swinging British support
behind the Zionists was to make propaganda among Jews, particularly in the
United States, which had not yet come into the war, and in Russia… (2003: 416; my italics)
And as if the stalled war
wasn’t motivation enough, rumors were soon flying that the Zionists were also
soliciting German support; the Jews, it seems, were willing to sell their
services to the highest bidder.[35] When
these rumors reached London, “the British government moved with speed” (ibid).
And with speed they did. With Brandeis’s input, a first draft of the brief
statement was completed in July. A second draft appeared in mid-October, and by
the end of that month Balfour was ready to make public his Government’s stance:
“from a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that
some declaration favourable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists
should now be made. … If we could make a declaration favourable to such an
ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia
and America.”[36] Three
days later, they did.
But most striking was the
implication that the “mere handful” of Zionist Jews in England could actually
be a decisive factor in bringing a reluctant US into the global war. If
successful, this would dramatically swing the military balance of power. And via
Wilson’s Jewish advisors—most notably Baruch and Brandeis—they had the ear of
the president. But could they do it?
Unquestionably, the Brits
thought they could—and that they did. This is such an astonishing manifestation of Jewish power that
it is worth reviewing the opinions of several commentators. Speaking after the
war, on 4 July 1922, Churchill argued for full implementation of the famous
Declaration:
Pledges and promises were made
during the War… They were made because it was considered they would be of value
to us in our struggle to win the War. It was considered that the support which
the Jews could give us all over the world, and particularly in the United
States, and also in Russia, would be a definite palpable advantage. (in Gilbert
2007: 78-79)
In his monumental six-volume
study of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, British historian Howard Temperley
(1924) made this observation:
It was believed that if Great
Britain declared for the fulfillment of Zionist aspirations in Palestine under
her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the
Entente [Allies]. It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a
potent influence upon world Jewry in the same way, and secure for the Entente
the aid of Jewish financial interests. It was believed, further, that it would
greatly influence American opinion in favour of the Allies. Such were the chief
considerations which, during the later part of 1916 and the next ten months of
1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry.
(1924, vol. 6: 173)
We must bear in mind that the
Declaration was issued seven months after US entry into the war. But Temperley is unequivocal: the
deal was concluded “during the later part of 1916,” well before Wilson’s decision to go
to war. Apparently the deal was this: bring the US into the war, and we will
promise you your Jewish homeland. Such was the “contract with Jewry.”
Sensing the importance,
Temperley reiterates the point, to drive it home: “That it is in purpose a definite
contract with Jewry is beyond question. … In spirit it is a pledge that, in
return for services to be rendered by Jewry, the British Government would ‘use
their best endeavours’ to secure… Palestine.” And in fact, it was a good deal
all around. “The Declaration certainly rallied world Jewry, as a whole, to the
side of the Entente… [T]he services of Jewry were not expected in vain, and
were…well worth the price which had to be paid” (p. 174). Britain’s price was
low: a spit of land far from the home country. True, there would be Arab
resistance, but the Brits were used to that. A much higher price would be paid
by Germany and the Central Powers, and by America—who would expend hundreds of
millions of dollars, and suffer 116,000 war dead.
A Zionist insider, Samuel
Landman, wrote a detailed and explicit account of these events in 1936. After
noting some preliminary attempts in 1916, he remarks on the significance of
Malcolm’s involvement. Malcolm knew that Wilson “always attached the greatest
possible importance to the advice of a very prominent Zionist, Mr. Justice
Brandeis…” (p. 4). Malcolm was able to convince Sykes and French ambassador
Georges Picot that
the best and perhaps the only
way…to induce the American President to come into the war was to secure the
cooperation of Zionist Jews by promising them Palestine, and thus enlist and
mobilize the hitherto unsuspectedly powerful forces of the Zionist Jews in
America and elsewhere in favour of the Allies on a quid pro quo basis.
Granted, Landman was not an
unbiased observer, and had good reason to exaggerate Zionist influence. But
that was not the case with the British Royal Palestine Commission, which issued
a report in 1937. At the critical stage of the war, “it was believed that
Jewish sympathy or the reverse would make a substantial difference one way or
the other to the Allied cause. In particular, Jewish sympathy would confirm the
support of American Jewry…” (p. 23). The report then quotes Lloyd George:
The Zionist leaders gave us a
definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to…a national home
for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment
and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. They kept their word.
Two years after this report, in
1939, the British contemplated starting a war with Germany. Churchill wrote a
memo for his War Cabinet, reminding them that
it was not for light or
sentimental reasons that Lord Balfour and the Government of 1917 made the
promises to the Zionists which have been the cause of so much subsequent
discussion. The influence of American Jewry was rated then as a factor of the
highest importance, and we did not feel ourselves in such a strong position as
to be able to treat it with indifference. (in Gilbert 2007: 165)
The implication, of course, was
that the British might once again need Jewish help to defeat the Germans.
Having been goaded into war in 1939 by Roosevelt and his Jewish advisors,[37] the
British were becoming desperate once again to draw in the Americans. As David
Irving reports, it was in late 1941 that Weizmann and his fellow British
Zionists began “promising to use their influence in Washington to bring the United
States into the war” (2001: 73). Irving quotes from an amazingly blunt letter
from Weizmann to Churchill, promising to do again in this war what they did in
the last:
There is only one big ethnic
group [in America] which is willing to stand, to a man, for Great Britain, and
a policy of ‘all-out aid’ for her: the five million Jews. From [Treasury]
Secretary Morgenthau [Henry, Jr.], Governor [Herbert] Lehman, Justice
Frankfurter, down to the simplest Jewish workman or trader… It has been
repeatedly acknowledged by British Statesmen that it was the Jews who, in the
last war, effectively helped to tip the scales in America in favour of Great
Britain. They are keen to do it—and may do it—again. (p. 77)
So here we have Weizmann
explicitly naming the influential Jews with the power to bring Roosevelt and
the United States into a war in which it, once again, had no compelling
interest. The letter was dated September 10, 1941. Churchill did not have to
wait long. Within 90 days, America would be at war.
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Notes
[1] It
is clear that Joseph was Jewish: His father, Jacob, was renamed by God as
“Israel” (Gen 35:10), and Joseph himself is repeatedly referred to as a
“Hebrew” (e.g. Gen 39:14, 41:12).
[3] For
Seneca’s and Quintilian’s comments, see Stern (1974), pages 431 and 513. For
Tacitus, see his Annals (XV, 44), and Histories (5.8).
[6] Cited
in Hertzberg (1968: 300).
[7] For
Kant, see his Conflict of the Faculties (1798/1979: 101). Hegel’s quotation is from his Early Theological Writings (1975: 190).
[8] This
is just a fraction of the negative observations of Jews over the centuries. For
a more complete study, see my series Dalton (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, and 2012).
[9] A
large area, comprising much of present-day Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, and
Belarus.
[10] In
1891 the New
York Times ran
the headline: “Russia’s Fierce Assault: Europe amazed at her treatment of
Jews.” As the article explained, “Berlin…is overwhelmed by the advance wave of
the flying Jews, driven on a day’s notice from their homes and swarming
westward…” (May 31; p. 1).
[11] Cited
in Rather (1990: 163).
[12] Cited
in Levy (1991: 83-84).
[13] There
are a few problems, however. First, the diary is dated some five months after
the war actually started; it’s easy to recall a prediction after the fact.
Second, Rosenthal’s book My Siberian Diary is nowhere to be found. The entry is recounted in an obscure
periodical, The Jewish Era, dated January 1919 (p. 128); this was not only after the war was
over, but after the Peace Conference had already begun.
[14] This
was true of both Zionist and non-Zionist Jews. It’s worth noting that Zionism
was a minority view among American Jews, at least for the first two decades of
its existence. Many Jews, being ‘internationalists,’ did not feel the need for
a Jewish homeland. And many realized that, should this come to pass, they would
be charged with dual loyalty. But with the Zionists’ relentless pressure and
record of success, they became the dominant view.
[16] Cited
in Slomovitz (1981: 6-7).
[18] April
11, p. 18. The same article goes on to decry “the systematic, relentless quiet
grinding down of a people of more than 6,000,000 souls.” This figure surely
strikes a chord—but that’s another story.
[19] Indeed—a
“special effort” was made to get the support of Wilson, “whose influence was
rising within the Democratic ranks” (p. 32).
[21] Shogan
(2010: xi).
[22] Dearborn Independent, 11 June 1921. The entire
‘international Jew’ series ran without a byline, and so for the sake of
convenience I attribute them to Ford—even though it is virtually certain that
he did not write the pieces himself.
[23] Cooper
(1983: 194).
[25] Cited
in Chalberg (1995: 46-47).
[26] Other
Americans died on foreign-flagged ships—most notoriously, 128 on the Lusitania.
But this still pales in comparison to the thousands who would die in a war.
[27] Online
at: www.historymatters.gmu.edu. I am not aware
of any polling data supporting his claim that 90% of Americans were opposed to
entering the war, but it seems to have been a reasonable estimate.
[28] Cited
in Chalberg (1995: 71-73).
[29] Schneer
(2010: 153) is typical: there was “no such thing” as a powerful Jewish force in
world affairs. Any thoughts to the contrary are “based upon a misconception.”
Hodgson (2006: 154-155) is another example: “the influence of Zionism [was]
considerably exaggerated” by the British government, who believed the
international Jews to be “more influential and more Zionist than in fact they
were.”
[30] Jews
had nearly a total monopoly on the film business. The only significant
non-Jewish movie mogul was Darryl Zanuck, who was a studio head at 20th Century
Fox for many years.
[31] Among
the leading figures, Ben-Sasson (p. 944) mentions Julius Martov, Fyodor Dan,
and Raphael Abramowitz.
[32] Churchill’s
close connection to British Jews dated back at least to 1904. Gilbert (2007: 9)
explains that “this was the first but not the last time that Churchill was to
be accused by his political opponents…of being in the pocket, and even in the
pay, of wealthy Jews.” Makovsky (2007) describes Churchill’s father’s longtime
association with “Jewish financial titans,” and notes that Churchill himself
“came to count many of [his father’s] wealthy Jewish friends as his own” (p.
46).
[33] Encyclopedias
are usually good sources for conventional views. Quotations here come from
the World
Book,
2003 edition, entry on ‘Balfour Declaration.’
[34] See
Stein (1961: 28).
[35] See
Lloyd George (1939: 725), Ziff (1938: 55), Stein (1961: 528), and Liebreich
(2005: 12).
[36] Minutes
of the War Cabinet for October 31; see Ingrams (1972: 16).
[37] As
I will explain in Part II, there is ample evidence that this was true. For a
review of some of the relevant sources, see Weber (1983). In brief, it seems
that Roosevelt wanted England and France to do the early ‘dirty work’ of the
war, and then the US would intervene as needed to conclude the issue.
