Sen. Rand Paul has the right idea about
entertaining diplomatic talks with Russian officials. His colleagues should
take note.
Even in today’s hyper-partisan political environment, most can
agree that relations between the United States and Russia have been better.
Washington and Moscow have found themselves on the opposite side of several
disputes, from the not-so-frozen conflict in Ukraine, to the mutual allegations
of interference in one another’s internal affairs.
This week,
President Trump added another difference to the list by stating his intention
to withdraw the United States from
the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty—a landmark Cold War-era arms control agreement
that prohibited the production, stockpile, and deployment of ground-launched
missiles between the ranges of 500 and 5,500 kilometers.
President Trump and Vladimir Putin will meet in Paris on November
11. Hopefully, the world leaders will walk away from the meeting with clearly
defined interests that serve both nations. Until then, one U.S. lawmaker is
trying to use his power as a senator (and his influence with the White House)
to thaw what has been a deep freeze in the U.S.-Russia relationship since 2012.
Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) has spent the past several months
explaining to Trump administration officials, Russian politicians, and his
colleagues why it is necessary to begin addressing an adversarial competition
between two states that hold approximately 90 percent of the world’s nuclear
weapons. Over the summer, Paul traveled to Moscow to meet with Russian
parliamentarians, including former Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak and
Foreign Relations Chairman Konstantin Kosachev. The next day, Paul discussed
the importance of strategic nuclear stability with Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald
Reagan’s former partner in the closing stages of the Cold War.
Over the
course of his meetings, Paul invited his
Russian colleagues to Washington to meet with U.S. lawmakers. He introduced an amendment that
would lift travel restrictions on members of the Russian Duma (similar to our
Senate) if Moscow did the same for members of Congress. Paul has talked with
U.S. Ambassador Jon Huntsman, encouraging the State Department to brief
senators on the value of renewed dialogue between the two Cold War foes.
Paul’s Enthusiasm Is
Unmatched In Congress
Despite Paul’s attempts at solidifying a small detente to address
critical nuclear security issues between the United States and Russia,
lawmakers on Capitol Hill remain wary of approaching the Kremlin in any
capacity. Members of Congress—particularly in an election year—view outreach to
the Kremlin as political kryptonite. While it may be a wholly reasonable course
of action, it is also seen as a treacherous political move, particularly when
Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential campaign is continually
prominent in the media.
The politics of getting tough on Russia continue to outweigh the strategic
benefits of maintaining open channels of communication and exploiting
opportunities for diplomacy. Indeed, when Paul’s modest Russia amendment was
tabled, the entire Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to kill it. This is
regrettable, for while politics is an inevitable fact of life in Washington, it
hurts the business of statecraft far too often.
In a world increasingly transitioning into multipolarity and
visceral competition among nation-states, the United States does not have the
luxury of permanently ignoring governments it disagrees with or relying on the
stick of economic sanctions alone. Foreclosing opportunities for mutual
accommodation in order to demonstrate “toughness” and “resoluteness”—two of the
foreign policy establishment’s favorite buzzwords—is the geopolitical
equivalent of tying one’s hands. Russia is there, whether the United States
likes it or not.
In a way, Paul is simply following Reagan’s playbook. While it is
true that Reagan had no love for the Soviet Union, was a passionate
anti-communist, and coined the phrase “evil empire” to describe Russia under
Soviet domination, he was also open to working with Moscow when our national
security interests required it.
Seizing The Opportunity
When Gorbachev rose to the top of Russia’s political system, it
would have been very easy for Reagan to dismiss him as just another despot from
the Soviet Politburo. However, Reagan and his national security advisers did
just the opposite. They kept their options open, assessed Gorbachev in his
first year, and saw a man who could be reasoned with, especially on missile
reductions. Sometimes successful diplomacy in pursuit of America’s national
interest is the product of knowing when to seize the opportunity.
If a detente in the U.S.-Russia relationship is to be realized, it
will occur sometime next year, when the politics of the midterm elections
dissipate. No one should be naive enough to believe that a full rapprochement
is likely or that the Russians will one day wake up and choose to accede to
Washington’s demands on any number of problems currently roiling the
relationship.
Putin is a wily, smart individual, not to mention a proud Russian
nationalist with a big chip on his shoulder. There will continue to be times
Moscow undermines the United States and directly challenges Washington as a
peer competitor—a challenge that, in many cases, will require a strong but
prudent response in return.
Just because the United States and Russia are bound for some
degree of state rivalry does not mean shutting the door to communication or
punting exploratory diplomacy aside. Doing so may make us feel morally superior
to the other side and satisfy our emotional desires to punch Putin in the nose,
but it does next to nothing to contribute to America’s security.
Washington should work with Russia when we can and challenge
Russia when we must. Promoting personal exchanges between lawmakers in
Washington and Moscow—as Paul proposes—seems like a small, but potentially
worthwhile step in the right direction.
Daniel DePetris
is a fellow at Defense Priorities.
