The best-case scenario has come about,
which is to say the end of a world facing the specter of a mushroom
cloud. With Hillary Clinton’s defeat, we avoided a nuclear denouement
stemming from a direct clash with Russia in Syria and an escalation of the
conflict in Ukraine. Unfortunately, the good news ends here. The chaos that
originated in the United States following the election of Donald Trump does not
augur well. The economic crisis has persisted for ten years, with no
solutions in sight. Ignored and underestimated by the elite, it has become
the engine of dissatisfaction with politicians, generating a wave of protest
votes in the United States and Europe. The positive outcome, a break with
the past, has degenerated into a period of apparent chaos and disorder, caused
mainly by internal clashes between the leaders of the ruling classes.
No one can doubt that Trump was not the
preferred candidate of the intelligence agencies (CIA and NSA especially), the
media, and the Washington political consensus. This really needs no proof. But
to say, on the other hand, that Trump is the man of some generals, many
bankers, and corporations, is to engage in an oversimplification that fuels further
confusion surrounding the new administration.
The sabotage attempts against the new
administration are quite apparent, directed mainly by the fringes of both the
Democratic and Republican parties that are politically opposed to Trump, with
help from the intelligence agencies and the media. This triumvirate of the
intelligence agencies, the media, and the political establishment has already
inflicted serious damage: the sabotage in Yemen; Flynn’s early exit from the
role of the National Security Advisor; the antagonistic relationship between
the press and the administration; and an endless series of controversies over
the role of NATO and trade treaties (such as TPP). This triad, directed by
leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties, seems to be working at full
speed to reach an unthinkable outcome after only one month, namely the
impeachment of Trump and the appointment of President Pence to provide
continuity for the policies of Bush and Obama in line with the American project
for global hegemony.
Donald Trump, while not a fool, is
attempting to repair the sabotage with errors and decisions that often worsen
the situation. The decision to fire Flynn seems wrong and excessive, distancing
him from his desire for detente in international relations, one of the Trump’s
most important promises.
To try and accurately hypothesize about the
internal decisions and mechanisms made in the Trump administration would
require excessive confidence in the authenticity of the information available.
Certainly, Bannon and Flynn appeared to be the core of Washington’s
anti-establishment element and the major advocates of a rapprochement with
Moscow. Following this line of speculation, Pence, McMaster (appointed to
succeed Flynn), Mattis and Priebus seem to represent the neoconservative
faction, the heart of the bipartisan establishment of Washington. The fact that
they were appointed directly by Trump leaves us with two conclusions: an
excessive confidence in Trump’s own ability to tame the beast or an imposition
from above which presupposes a lack of Trump’s control over his administration
and over big decisions.
Figures like Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo
arouse further confusion. While apparently confirming the policy of America
First, and not necessarily giving a nod to the neoconservatives, they are
certainly more digestible than anti-establishment figures like Bannon and
Flynn.
The essential problem, especially for those
who write analysis, is to find a rational and logical thread running through
presidential decisions to be able to understand and anticipate the future
direction of the new administration. To date, over just one month, we have
witnessed some events that indicate a draining of the swamp, and others that
indicated a full continuation of the Obama and Bush era.
Any hypothesis needs objective data and
assessments confirmed by events. In my previous articles, I have emphasized the
clear distinction that must be made between words, actions (or lack thereof)
with respect to the new administration. In Syria and Ukraine, the factions
traditionally supported by the neocons (who are openly opposed to Trump) are
experiencing a hard time. Poroshenko is becoming increasingly nervous and
provocative (Putin, rightfully trusting no-one in Washington, has started the process
of the Russian Federation recognizing the passports of the Donbass), attempting
to involve Russia in the Ukrainian conflict. In Syria, the situation improves
every day thanks to the liberation of Aleppo and squabbling between Assad’s
opponents, which has resulted in a series of clashes between different takfiri
factions concentrated in Idlib.
In both of these scenarios, European and
American politicians, the intelligence agencies (guided by the CIA), and the
media have joined in efforts to attack the new administration for not being
friendly enough towards Kiev and also possibly opposing the arming and training
moderate rebels in Syria. Pence’s recent words in Monaco have served to
reassure European allies on the future role of NATO and the United States in
the world. Yet some changes already seem to be taking place in Syria, where it
appears that the CIA has had to give in and end the terrorists’ funding
program. One of the deep state’s emissaries and links with Islamic terrorism,
John McCain, made a trip to Syria and Turkey to mediate and renew ties with the
most extremist Wahhabis present in Syria. McCain’s objective is to sabotage
Trump’s attempts to end support for moderate rebels in Syria (AKA Al Qaeda).
McCain’s efforts also aim for a reapprochement with Erdogan, to push him back
towards the deep state’s cause and again sabotage the diplomatic efforts
between Turkey and Iran and with Russia in Syria. The same effort was made in
Ukraine by McCain and Graham a couple of months ago, inciting the army and
political elites in Ukraine to ramp up their operation in Donbass. These are
two clear indications of the intention to create problems for the new
administration.
The bottom line is the chaos surrounding
the new administration.
Trump lives on a dangerous
misunderstanding: Is the President in control of events, or is he at the mercy
of decisions made at higher levels and against his express will? Observing
Syria and Ukraine, it would appear that the intended rapprochement with Moscow
is still on course. The toning down of harsh words against Iran, coinciding
with the ouster of Flynn, further offers promise. Detente and the resumption of
dialogue with Beijing seem to suggest that an escalation in the South China Sea
and East China Sea will be avoided. The same is the case regarding the
abolition of the TTP.
Yet the overall impression that we seem to
get from the first thirty days is an administration in chaos. Flynn’s ouster is
a blow to the rapprochement with Moscow. Having replaced Flynn with McMaster, a
disciple of Petraeus who is a strong supporter of the 4 + 1 approach (Russia,
Iran, China, North Korea + ISIS) as the main focus of foreign policy, seems to
minimize the hope of an administration free from warmongering. The 4 + 1
approach is at the heart of the attempt at global hegemony so dear to the
promoters of American exceptionalism. The possible entry of Bolton with an
undefined role, the appointment of Pence as vice president, and the roles
played by Priebus and Mattis suggest a return of the neoconservatives to the
driving seat. But is it really so?
The impressions we can glean come from the
previous experiences of Trump appointees, media publications, drafts from the
CIA, and possible leaks from those betraying the administration. The perception
that we can obtain as outsiders cannot be precise, possibly being the result of
constant manipulation from the news media. What credibility left have
newspapers, politicians and anonymous intelligence sources that over the past
two decades have cynically molded the public’s perception of major wars and
conflicts around the globe?
The question is how to be free from such
conditioning in order to develop an accurate idea about Trump. Is Trump at war
with the deep state? Is Trump a parallel product of the deep state? Is he an
acceptable alternative for some of the deep-state factions?
Whatever the answer, we are facing an
unprecedented clash between different mixes of establishment power. Certainly,
there are factions aligned with the thinking of the neoconservatives; factions
linked to the new Secretary of State, the powerful former CEO of Exxon Mobil;
factions with nationalist intentions pushing for an isolationist policy that
seeks to abide by the principle of America First. If there is any certainty, it
is precise that we do not have any logical thread to divine Donald Trump’s
intentions. There are too many uncertainties with respect to the intentions
expressed by Trump, with the influence of the warmongers in his administration,
and with the ability of his loyal collaborators (Bannon above all) to stem
internal erosion.
Basically, there is a major lack of
information. This results in excessive consideration and importance being
placed on the words expressed by Trump, which are often at odds with each other
and often in conflict with other ideas within the administration. At the same
time we should especially observe actions (or non-actions) of the new
administration, and following this logic, we can line up some important events.
Trump has already had two telephone conversations with Putin, one of which was
particularly positive, according to White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer.
There have been exchanges between Beijing and Washington, including a letter
especially popular with the Chinese leadership; and Iran seems to have
momentarily disappeared from the radar following Flynn’s ouster. On the other
hand, the additional sanctions on Iran are there to remind how the Republican
administration will guarantee a negative stance towards Tehran. In this sense,
it is not surprising that the red carpet was laid out for Netanyahu on his
visit to Washington.
Surely the absence of Trump at the Monaco
conference is another important signal. The current president intends to
continue to give priority to domestic over international politics.
For now, we have to settle for a few crumbs
of insight. In Syria the situation is improving thanks to the inaction of
Washington, and In Ukraine, Poroshenko has not found in the new administration
the type of support he had been expecting to receive from Hillary Clinton had
she won the election (a disappointment shared by the Banderists in Kiev and the
Takfiri Wahhabis in Syria). The good news seems to end here, with a series of
potentially explosive situations already in place. Western troops remain on
Russia’s border (the withdrawal of such a deployment would have demonstrated to
Moscow Trump’s genuine intention to dialogue, a concession, though that would
have infuriated many members of the EU). The Saudis continue to receive
important support for their campaign in Yemen. Constant threats against the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continue unabated. And Trump’s executive
orders on the home front have inspired a strong domestic reaction.
These are disappointing policies adopted in
the first thirty days by an administration that seemed so inclined to break
with the past. As the days go by, and more people get appointed to the
administration and others drove out, the picture that appears to be emerging is
that of a grueling battle with the deep state, leading to significant
concessions by Trump. McMaster, Mattis, Priebus and Bolton seem to reflect
this. Or maybe not. Bolton will find himself in a much lesser role than had
been potentially considered (Secretary of State), and McMaster could spell the
way to rebuild the military and strengthen deterrence without having to resort
to brutal force, which would remain a final choice for the POTUS.
The risk for Trump lies in being
overwhelmed by the war machine that has directed US policy for more than 70
years. He will then have given up without even having had the opportunity to
try and change the course of events if this had been his real intention in the
first place. The problem with this new administration is trying to understand
what is imposed and what is the result of strategic thinking. It should not be
excluded that the Trump strategy to hold together the base with respect to
election promises by creating a smoke screen in which he is portrayed as a
fighter against the deep state who must occasionally yield in order to maintain
peaceful coexistence. It is important not to discard this hypothesis for a
deeper reason: Trump has to demonstrate to his voters that he is altogether
outside of the establishment, and the best way to demonstrate this is to be the
target of the MSM, thus attracting the sympathy of all who have long lost faith
in the authenticity of the disseminators of news and information. It is a fine
tactic, but not exceedingly so. Will he continue to act like a victim during the
presidency, continuing to put up an effective shield against criticism about
unfulfilled election promises, particularly in foreign policy? Will his voters
continue to buy it? We will see.
If the administration’s actions in the
future head in a direction similar to that of Obama or Bush, Trump cannot act
like a victim, since it was he picked the closest people in his administration.
This again reminds us of the lack of
information available to form an objective view, compounded by the fluctuations
of the new administration.
There is a positive and important aspect to
this situation. Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow have increasing incentives to
strengthen their alliance and not to question friendships; to forge ahead with
projects that advance Eurasian integration. The election of Trump was
accompanied by the grand strategic objective of splitting the alliance between
China and Russia. But fortunately, Trump has offered little hope of a dialogue
with Moscow in this respect. The most important thing is that an escalation of
confrontation that may have led to a nuclear exchange has been averted.
Paradoxically, we could be facing an
extremely advantageous situation for the Eurasian continent, allowing for
further integration, with Washington’s continued adversarial stance (especially
Iran and China in terms of trade sanctions and war) ensuring that valuable time
will not be lost in excessive talks with the new American president. If Trump
will maintain two key promises, namely to avoid a conflict and think about domestic
interests (internal and economic security), then this will mean that the
multipolar world in which we live will certainly have a better chance of
stability and economic prosperity, which is the main desire of many countries,
primarily China, Russia, and Iran.
Trump’s contradictions, when observing the intentions
expressed during the election campaign and comparing them with appointments
made to key posts, have alarmed and continue to cause concern, leaving Iran,
China and Russia with little hope for future cooperation with Washington. The
possibility of a joint dialogue without excessive demands seems to be fading,
advancing the hope of an acceleration of Eurasian integration, giving little
regard for the indecipherable intentions of the new administration.
A world order with responsibility shared
between the US, Russia, and China seems out of the question. Yet on the horizon,
there seem to be no signs of an imminent conflict for the purposes of imposing
the old unipolar world order on the multipolar world. The possibility that
Trump will fall back on a neocon posture is difficult but not impossible to
imagine (after all, this is the United States, a nation that has for seventy
years tried to impose its own way of life on the rest of world), but why
exclude the possibility that even Trump could be converted to the religion of
exceptionalism? After all, how much confidence can we place in politics? You
already know the answer to that one.
Federico Pieraccini is an Independent freelance writer
specialized in international affairs, conflicts, politics and strategies.
