It seems that Saudi Arabia’s rulers murdered an opponent. The U.S.
media and political class is shocked,
shocked,to find that murder is going on in
such precincts. Who did they imagine the Muslim world’s leaders are?
our chattering class demands that President Trump do whatever it takes to make
sure that they do nothing like that again. Do what? Does anyone really think
that swapping sheik A for sheik B would improve their kind’s moral standards?
Do they have any idea of what keeps A on top of B, what it would take to switch
them, or what the repercussions would be in foreign policy? Are they naifs,
idiots, or are they just playing with foreign policy to make life a little
harder for Trump?
follows is politically incorrect information on what Saudi Arabia is, what role
it plays in American politics, and what it means for our foreign policy. Then,
I will suggest how American foreign policy from the Founding to around 1910
would deal with today’s Middle East.
Arabia’s rulers are a subspecies of the desert rats endemic in the region. The
ones on the cheese now are of the clan of seven sons out of old king Saud’s
favorite wife, Suda, and hence are known as Sudaris. The previous ruler,
Abdullah was the only son of another wife. When Abdullah’s birth-order turn
came, in 2005, he took the throne thanks only to having mobilized the national
guard of Bedouins for war against the national army (and everything else)
controlled by the Sudaris. Today, when you read about Mohammed bin Salman’s
“anti-corruption reforms,” you should know that they target primarily
Abdullah’s son and other relatives. In other words, what is going on, including
murder, is a purely dynastic power play. But that is Saudi Arabia’s nice side.
fundamental reality is that this is a slave society, (the Arabic word for black
man is the word for slave) which considers work something that inferiors do for
superiors, prizes idleness, and practices cruelty as a means of asserting
superiority. Everyone knows that women, treated as property, end up
disproportionately in the harems of the wealthy. But few stop to think that
this custom dooms the majority of Saudi men to lives without legitimate sex,
never mind families.
for who gets what, that comes strictly either from birth or from connections
with the powerful. Nor are the young clamoring for the kind of useful work that
would lift them up. They compete, all right, but for favor. Saudi students in
U.S. colleges—and even in military training programs—just don’t do their work.
A degree is a passport to a job which somebody else performs.
The ultra-puritanical Wahhabi sect, which authorized the House of Saud to take
power by murdering non-Wahhabis, is inexorably interwoven with the Saudi power
structure. No doubt, many believe its teachings. And yes, Wahhabis pay for
radical mosques throughout the world, America very much included. But
hypocritical corruption is at its core. Fly first class from Riyadh to Paris or
London. Watch the women with Burqas step onto the plane. Off comes the
headgear. On take-off, they doff the Burqas, revealing Dior fashions with
plunging necklines. And the booze flows.
Arabia is marvelously well-connected in America—and especially in Washington
D.C.—thanks to countless millions of dollars spread in all manner of ways to
any and all who might be useful to the Kingdom over decades. Between 1983 and
2005, as Saudi ambassador to the United States, and then as secretary general
of the Saudi National Security Council (where he managed the kingdom’s American
affairs), Prince Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud did not let pass any occasion to get
to know and to invite and to gift. But vacations in Aspen or on the Riviera,
and fellowships and connections, are small stuff compared to the billion-dollar
bonds built with scores of American contractors and close friends of the very
powerful. The Saudis have been able to get away with whatever they wanted.
the aftermath of 9/11, not only did the U.S. government fly Osama bin Laden’s
family out of the country forthwith, it also flew out the Saudi consular
officials who had helped the hijackers. Sections of the 9/11 commission report
dealing with Saudi Arabia remain classified. Since the security camera photos
of the 19 Saudi hijackers do not match the names on their passports, to this
day, we still do not know their real identities. Nor has anyone investigated
whence came the money for the operation.
foreign policy has been far from U.S.-friendly. Until around 1990, it might
well have been described in one word: “pay.” Who? Anybody, to keep them from
making trouble for the Kingdom. Thus the Saudis were the Syrian Assad regime’s
main financiers. The money went to buy Soviet weapons. The same was true for
Egypt prior to 1979, after which the money went to buy U.S. weapons. The Saudis
paid most of the bill for Saddam Hussein’s war on Iran. And yes, they financed
the PLO until, in 1990, both the PLO and Saddam turned against them—which led
to firming up connections with the United States.
those connections did not prevent the Saudis from playing a double game during
the Iraq war—entirely understandable from the Saudi standpoint, but the
acceptance of which by the U.S. establishment proved its abysmal incompetence.
In short, the Saudis wanted above all to protect Iraq’s formerly ruling Sunni
minority. That is why they lobbied hard and successfully to turn the successful
U.S. invasion of March-April 2003 into the disastrous 2003-2010 U.S.
occupation. Worse, during that occupation, the Saudis were the principal
financiers of the Sunni war against U.S. forces, and the suppliers of most
the war between Saudi Arabia and Iran—effectively between the Muslim world’s
Sunni and Shia blocs, is the great issue in the Middle East.
Saudis rightly fear Iran. Make no mistake: Much as Iran rails against the Great
Satan, (America) and the Little Satan (Israel), Saudi Arabia is its chief
enemy. Whatever faults Iranian forces may have, whatever equipment they lack,
they are still superior to the Saudis. Most important, the Saudis and their
Sunni allies in the Gulf lord it over Shia minorities (in Bahrain they are the
majority) who look to Iran for relief. The Shia in Saudi inhabit the
oil-producing regions. The Saudis know how vulnerable they are. The United
States does not have to convince them to be anti-Iran. Since Iran is far more a
danger to them than to us, they will always be more anti-Iran than we.
do we have to treat them gingerly because they are the principal part of OPEC.
In fact, the world oil price is now set largely by American production. Much as
the Saudis would love to raise the price by cutting production, they know that
maximizing their income requires pumping as much as they can at whatever the
world price happens to be.
short, we owe them nothing.
relationship with Saudi Arabia should flow from our own needs—not theirs—based
on the realities of the region.
John Quincy Adams to whisper in Trump’s ear, he might well say the following:
Just as in 1823, when we premised our dealings with Europe by making clear the
contrast between the republican principles by which we live and those of
monarchical Europe, we should now draw a bright line between our way of life
and that of the likes of Saudi Arabia and Iran. Now as then, this is primarily
for the American people’s benefit. Now as then, we cannot change others, but
must deal with them. We don’t have to like them, and they don’t have to like
us. Good diplomacy does not pretend. We will not lower ourselves to asking the
Saudis to pretend they have become liberals, nor fool ourselves into thinking
that they are on the way to doing so.
have some concurrent interests. Only some. And for our own different reasons.
And the concurrence is conditional.
are certain things we can and should do for the Saudis, mainly by limiting
Iran’s economy. But for us to do that, the price of oil has to be kept in an
acceptable range for a range of allies. Hence we must demand that the Saudis
cooperate. We can and should protect the Saudis against major Iranian military
moves, especially by providing better missile defense. But we are not going to
involve ourselves in trying to put down Shia revolts against Sunni hegemony. In
Syria, we have only two interests: limiting Iran’s reach to Israel and
safeguarding the Kurds. Any Saudi action that we judge non-supportive of these
interests will lead to a reduction of our support in other areas.
all, we realize that Saudi Arabia is even less a permanent fixture of the
international scene than the Soviet Union was. It is even more unstable.
Stabilizing it, saving it from the consequences of its congenital dynastic
wars, is beyond our capacities, as John Quincy Adams might have said. That is
why now, as in 1823, the essence of good American foreign policy is to be very
clear about our very few interests, to commit to those, and to let the rest of
the world fight their own battles.