To better understand the European Union and its likely
prospects for the future, it is important to delve into the relationship
between its two main players: France and Germany. In many ways,
their relationship since the founding of the E.U. has seemed like a happy
marriage. But as in some marriages, there are a number of
irreconcilable difference percolating below the surface that could well
lead to trouble down the road.
The
most significant point of divergence is perhaps how each country views the
meaning of "Europe." The Germans – and not just their
elite, but much of the general public as well – are sold on the idea of a
Europe free of nationalism. Such an attitude is no doubt highly
influenced to the unhappy ending to their WWII experience. According
to Wolfgang
Streeck of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in
Cologne, the concept of "Europe" has a sacred aura to it in Germany
where it connotes "all that is virtuous and pleasant – from peace, human
rights, tolerance, and an openness to international labor marker and convenient
travel across borders."
German
pro-European sentiment is the vehicle whereby Germany intends to lose its
national sovereignty by blending into a Greater Europe and become
respectable. At some subconscious level, this is an escape mechanism
from the country's Nazi past. Such a mood has so affected German
thinking that they view anyone who is less than enthusiastic about a deeper
integration of the E.U. as proof positive of a moral defect. Psychologically
speaking, the Germans are projecting their feelings onto others who do not
necessarily share their views. That can be dangerous.
France's
view of Europe is diametrically different. The French are always
hyper-sensitive to any encroachment on their national
sovereignty. Since the end of WWII, their prime objective has been
to bind Germany's economic power to French interests. The united
Europe that the French espouse is actually an extension of the French national
state, just as the Brussels Commission was conceived as a sub-department of
French technocracy.
Streeck sums of the difference
between the German and French visions of Europe as such:
From
a French perspective, there is no conflict between a 'sovereign France' and a
'sovereign Europe,' as long as Europe is properly constituted on universal,
i.e., French principles and governed out of Paris, as an extension of French
sovereignty. While in Germany a sovereign Europe is the desirable
termination of national, including German, sovereignty, in France it is a
condition, or a contemporary vision, of a sovereign France.
That
being the case, it sounds as though a unified Europe is a French empire by
another name. Observing the situation, Streeck writes:
For
a long time, differences were papered over by the German's happy acquiescence
to the French habit of ritualism, including nuclear testing, and the conjuring
up of their imperial tradition.
But
this can't go on. Adding to the latent instability of the E.U. is the fact that
other countries in the E.U. do not have a desire to submerge their national
identities and sovereignty into a unified Europe, as does Germany, and none
wants to be subjugated to French "universal" values. This
is especially true for the countries in eastern Europe which have only recently
escaped domination under the communist USSR.
The
European Union project has gotten as far as it has for two
reasons. (Actually, there's a third reason: the U.S. covering much
of the defense bill for Europe and allowing unfair trade practices to exist
between America and the E.U. This has been going on for longer than
most people have been alive, and it has allowed Europe to attain a level of
wealth and prosperity that it never could have obtained otherwise. But
for the purposes here, the focus will stay on the internal dynamics within
Europe.)
First,
whenever the "European idea" came up for discussion among the
Europeans, it was always defined in vague and bureaucratically ambiguous
language. This was deliberate, for it allowed all parties to read
whatever they wanted into the pronouncements. And so they
did. This worked as a unifying tactic, but it's hardly a way to
build a solid foundation that can stand the test of time.
And
secondly, upfront money and benefits helped foster the delusion that many
member-states had of what to expect from the E.U. The E.U. was sold
on the idea of peace and prosperity; prosperity would flow to all who signed on
forever and ever. But that promise has already rung hollow in the
Mediterranean area of the E.U. And whether Europeans chose to
acknowledge it or not, the fact is the peace the Continent has enjoyed since
1945 was conditioned on U.S. protection and not so much on wise polices by the
European elite.
The
euro was introduced in 1999 to bring the countries in the E.U. closer
together. But it didn't work out that way. Rather, due to
it, a significant part of southern Europe's industrial base was sucked up into
the German industrial machine. Accordingly, the Germans are the ones
who have reaped the bulk of the advantages from the common euro
currency. This has left countries like Greece, Italy, and others
with high unemployment rates and debts that can never be repaid. And
because of the common currency and the European Central Bank, these laggard
countries are without the monetary means to ease their suffering. To
use the vernacular, such countries are screwed.
To
address the debt and unemployment problem, the Germans first prescribed strong
doses of austerity. Greece is the poster child of this intra-E.U.
abuse. This in turn has led to strong anti-German feelings
throughout the southern part of the E.U. In response, countries
heavily in debt claim that the E.U. should cover their
liabilities. "We're all one family," they
say. This discontent has fueled the rise of populist parties
throughout Europe. To try to counter this trend, Angela Merkel made
certain informal and off-the-record promises to the E.U. elite that Germany
would aid in "structural repairs to the European edifice."
Ambiguity
strikes again. Whatever Merkel might have had in mind when she made
her non-public promises, many interpreted her as saying Germany would be
willing to cover the debt of others one way or another. As Herr
Streeck notes, this is both politically and economically not
possible. Ominously, he adds: "Nothing is so destructive
in international relations as unrealistic expectations."
Another
unrealistic expectation that leaders in the E.U. had is that the United States
would continue to tolerate in Bush-Clinton-Obama-like fashion the intolerable
status quo between us and Europe in terms of defense and
trade. With the ascendancy of Donald Trump, that
bubble has popped.
So
where are we? Any Good Time Charley can tell you that all parties
eventually end. Or as Barack Hussein Obama's longtime spiritual adviser would
put it, the chickens are coming home to roost in the E.U.
