Colonel Baldwin Meets Mr. Lincoln
This essay is Chapter 13 in Mr.
Taylor’s Union
At All Costs: From Confederation to Consolidation(2016).
“I supported President Lincoln. I
believed his war policy would be the only way to save the country, but I see my
mistake. I visited Washington a few weeks ago, and I saw the corruption of the
present administration—and so long as Abraham Lincoln and his Cabinet are
in power, so long will war continue. And for what? For the preservation of the
Constitution and the Union? No, but for the sake of politicians and
government contractors.”[1] J.P. Morgan—American financier and
banker, 1864.
The assertion that
Lincoln genuinely attempted to avoid war has been preached since General
Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. The testimony of a Southern peace
representative who spoke with Lincoln on April 4, 1861, in an effort
to avert war provides keen insight into a side of the issue seldom heard or
taught.[2] Some historians dismiss the
importance of the meeting between Lincoln and Colonel John Brown Baldwin, but
it is beyond dispute the meeting happened and pivotal issues were seriously
discussed. On February 10, 1866, Baldwin testified before the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction in Washington, D.C. His comments appeared in a
pamphlet published in 1866 by the Staunton Speculator and he
provided his account to a fellow Confederate in 1865 just prior to the end
of the war.
Reverend Robert L. Dabney, Chief of
Staff to Stonewall Jackson, met Baldwin in March of 1865 in Petersburg,
Virginia, when the Army of Northern Virginia was under siege. Baldwin told
Dabney, that prior to hostilities, he had been selected by the Virginia
Secession Convention to surreptitiously meet with Lincoln in April
1861 and negotiate a peaceful settlement. This meeting occurred at the time the
Virginia legislature was debating the secession issue.
The citizens of the Southern States were
well aware of the disadvantages they faced. The failure of the Peace Congress,
rejection of the Crittenden Amendment, and the clandestine arming of the
Federal government raised concerns in the South that war may be on the horizon.
There was lingering frustration in the
South resulting from the failed compromise effort of A.B. Roman, Martin
Crawford, and John Forsyth. As sectional hostility continued to fester, further
attempts at peace became critical. Most Virginians were strong Unionists, a
fact mirrored in the make up of the anti-secession Virginia Convention.
Considering the situation dire, representatives from Virginia decided to make
another attempt to diffuse the sectional schism.
William Ballard Preston, an
anti-slavery defense lawyer and prominent member of the
Virginia Convention, summed up the concerns of Virginians about the
direction of the country:
If our voices and votes are to be exerted farther to hold
Virginia in the Union, we must know (emphasis author)
what the nature of the Union is to be. We have valued Union, but we are also
Virginians, and we love the Union only as it is based upon the Constitution. If
the power of the United States is to be perverted to invade the rights of
States and of the people, we would support the Federal Government no farther.
And now that the attitude of that Government was so ominous of usurpation, we
must know whither it is going, or we can go with it no farther.[3]
Preston was disturbed about threats of
coercion through federal overreach and the possibility of destroying the
voluntary relationship of the compact. His view paralleled that of Robert E.
Lee, who refused to participate in the invasion of the seceded States.[4]
Seward sent a messenger, Allen B.
Magruder, to consult with members of the Virginia Convention and request
that they send a representative to Washington to confer with the U.S.
President. Lincoln’s preference was G.W. Summers, a pro-Unionist from the
western part of Virginia. The Virginia group included Mr. John Janney,
Convention President, Mr. John S. Preston, Mr. A.H.H. Stuart, and others. Since
this mission was of a discreet nature, the Convention did not send Summers, but
instead sent a lesser-known representative named John Brown Baldwin. Though
Baldwin lacked the notoriety of other potential candidates, he was
imminently qualified and widely respected. Also, as the brother-in-law of
Stuart, he had strong inside support from a key convention member. Baldwin’s
credentials included graduation from Staunton Academy and the University of
Virginia combined with a reputation as a capable lawyer and man of integrity.
He was also one of Virginia’s strongest Unionists. Though somewhat reluctant,
Baldwin realized the magnitude of this mission and dutifully accepted the role
as Virginia representative.
Dabney summarized Baldwin’s
instructions:
Mr. Magruder stated that he was authorized by Mr.
Seward to say that Fort Sumter would be evacuated on the Friday of
the ensuing week, and that the Pawnee would sail on the following Monday for
Charleston, to effect the evacuation. Mr. Seward said that secrecy was all
important, and while it was extremely desirable that one of them should see Mr.
Lincoln, it was equally important that the public should know nothing of the
interview.[5]
Baldwin and Magruder prepared
for their trip to Washington, choosing to travel the Acquia Creek Route. On
April 4, Baldwin rode with Magruder, in a carriage with raised glasses (for
maximum secrecy), to meet Seward. Seward took Baldwin to the White House,
arriving slightly after 9:00 A.M. The porter immediately admitted him, and,
along with Seward, led Baldwin to “what he (Baldwin) presumed was the
President’s ordinary business room, where he (Baldwin) found him in evidently
anxious consultation with three or four elderly men, who appeared to wear
importance in their aspect.”[6] Though these gentlemen appeared to be
very influential, it does not appear Baldwin knew them, as he did not identify
them when he recounted the meeting.
Seward informed Lincoln of his
guest’s arrival, whereupon, Lincoln immediately excused himself from the
meeting, took Baldwin upstairs to a bedroom and formally greeted his
visitor: “Well, I suppose this is Colonel Baldwin of Virginia? I have hearn
[sic] of you a good deal, and am glad to see you. How d’ye, do sir?”[7]
Baldwin presented his credentials.
Lincoln sat on the bed and occasionally spat on the carpet as he read
through them. Once satisfied with the introduction, Lincoln conveyed that he
was aware of the purpose of the visit.
Lincoln admitted Virginians were
good Unionists, but he did not favor their kind of conditional Unionism.
However, he was willing to listen to Virginian’s proposal for resolution.
Baldwin reaffirmed Virginia’s belief in the Constitution as it was written
and expressed Virginia would not subscribe to a conflict based on the
sectional, free-soil question. He told Lincoln that as much as Virginia opposed
his platform, she would support him as long as he adhered to the Constitution
and the laws of the land. To lessen the acrimony that arose from the election,
Baldwin suggested Lincoln issue a simple proclamation asserting that his
administration would respect the Constitution, the rule of law, and the rights
of the States. This proclamation should include a willingness to clarify the
misunderstandings and motives of each side. Baldwin told Lincoln that Virginia
would assist and stand by him, even to the point of treating him like her
native son, George Washington. Embellishing his point, Baldwin added, “So sure
am I, of this, and of the inevitable ruin which will be precipitated by the
opposite policy, that I would this day freely consent, if you would let me
write those decisive lines, you might cut off my head, were my own life my own,
the hour after you signed them.”[8]
He also suggested that
Lincoln “call a national convention of the people of the United
States and urge upon them to come together and settle this thing.”[9] Furthermore, Lincoln should make it
clear that the seceded States would not be militarily forced to return to the
Union, but rather a course of compromise and conciliation would be pursued to
bring them back in. According to Baldwin, with a simple agreement to this
proposition, Virginia would use all possible influence to keep the Border
States in the Union and convince the already seceded seven States to
rejoin. Baldwin made it clear that Virginia would never support
unconstitutional attempts to coerce the seceded States against the will of the
people of those States.
The fate and direction of the
Constitutional Union sat squarely on Lincoln’s shoulders; he had the power
to diffuse the situation. Baldwin did everything he could to convince
Lincoln the secession movement could be put down, stressing that
Virginia was eager and willing to help.
During the conversation, it became
obvious to Baldwin that the issue of slavery was not Lincoln’s
primary concern. Digesting Lincoln’s comments, Baldwin began to see the issue
as “the attempted overthrow of the Constitution and liberty, by the
usurpation of a power to crush states. The question of free-soil had no such
importance in the eyes of the people of the border States, nor even of the
seceded States, as to become at once a casus belli.” [10]
Lincoln did not like what he heard.
He painted the South as insincere, as people with hollow words backed by no action,
and claimed the resolutions, speeches, and declarations from
Southerners “a game of brag”[11] meant to intimidate the Federal
administration.
Baldwin told
Lincoln repeatedly that Virginia would not fight over the free-soil
issue. As a basic point of fact, only about six percent of
Southerners were slave owners, affecting perhaps twenty-five to thirty
percent of Southern families. Fighting over slavery made little
sense, especially given the fact slavery was already constitutionally legal.
However, Baldwin emphasized that coercion would undoubtedly lead to
further separation and likely war.
Baldwin probed for the primary
sticking point, leading Lincoln to ask, “Well…what about the revenue? What
would I do about the collection of duties.”[12] In response, Baldwin asked how much
import revenue would be lost per year. Lincoln responded “fifty or sixty
millions.”[13]Baldwin answered by saying a total of two
hundred and fifty million dollars in lost revenue (based on an assumed
four-year presidential term) would be trivial compared to the cost of war and
Virginia’s plan was all that was necessary to solve the issue. Lincoln also
briefly mentioned concern about the troops at Fort Sumter being properly
fed. Baldwin responded that the people of Charleston were feeding them and
would continue to do so as long as a resolution was in sight.
Though Lincoln appeared to be
genuinely touched by Baldwin’s plea for peace, he was alarmed at the prospect
of lost revenue; he did not like the idea of the Southern States remaining
out of the Union until a compromise could be reached. His reply
underscored this deep concern: “And open Charleston, etc., as ports of entry,
with their ten per cent tariff. What, then, would become of my tariff?”[14] Though it was Fort Sumter in
Charleston Harbor where things came to a head, lower duties would have
applied and attracted trade to all Southern ports, e.g., Richmond, Savannah,
Wilmington, New Orleans, Mobile, Galveston, etc.
Lincoln’s reply to Baldwin made it
clear slavery was not the central issue. He did not mention slavery but
voiced alarm at the amount of revenue that would be lost if he allowed the
Confederate States to exist as a separate country. Import duties comprised
the vast majority of government revenue at that time.
Baldwin asked Lincoln if he
trusted him as an honest representative of the sentiment of Virginia and
received an affirmative response. After confirming Lincoln’s confidence in him,
Baldwin stated, “I tell you, before God and man, that if there is a gun fired
at Sumter this thing is gone.”[15] He stressed that action should be
taken as soon as possible, stating that if the situation festered two more
weeks, it would likely be too late.
Lincoln awkwardly paced about in
obvious dismay and exclaimed: “I ought to have known this sooner! You are too
late, sir, too late! Why did you not come here four days ago, and tell me all
this?”[16] Another fact not revealed in the
conversation by Lincoln was that he had already authorized reinforcement of
Forts Sumter and Pickens on March 29 and the ships were preparing to sail.
Baldwin replied: “Why, Mr.
President, you did not ask our advice. Besides, as soon as we received permission
to tender it, I came by the first train, as fast as steam could bring me.”[17]
Once more, Lincoln responded: “Yes,
but you are too late, I tell you, too late!”[18] Perhaps this was the point when it
sunk in as to how serious the Southern States viewed the situation.
Lincoln claimed secession was
unconstitutional, though it had been taught at West Point using Rawles’
textbook, that the Union is a voluntary coalition of States and secession
was up to the people of the respective States. Conversely, Lincoln saw nothing
wrong with coercion, which was historically considered unconstitutional in both
North and South. He felt secession automatically signaled war, when it should
have signified the opposite. Concerning the Constitution, “if followed, civil
war—the fight for control over the government—is impossible.”[19]
Lincoln made no promises and
dismissed Baldwin. Later the same day, Baldwin engaged in a lengthy
conversation with Seward. From their conversation, Baldwin surmised that Seward
preferred and desired to work toward peace but felt conflict was very likely.
Baldwin had fulfilled his duty and returned to Virginia with the verdict.
Dabney later speculated from Baldwin’s testimony that Lincoln had
succumbed to the pro-war fanaticism of Stevens and abandoned the more
sensible warnings from Seward about the unconstitutionality of coercion.
Stuart confirmed the accuracy of
Baldwin’s account to Dabney. Indeed, Stuart, along with William B.
Preston and George W. Randolph, spoke with Lincoln on April 12, 1861,
and received virtually the same message as Baldwin. “I remember,” says Mr.
Stuart, “that he used this homely expression: ‘If I do that, what will become
of my revenue? I might as well shut up housekeeping at once.’”[20]
Highlighting Stuart’s meeting was
Lincoln’s insinuation that he was not interested in war; however, the day after
their meeting the very train on which they returned to Richmond carried
the proclamation calling for 75,000 troops to coerce the seceded States.
Another attempt at compromise was
detailed in the April 23, 1861, edition of the Baltimore Exchange and
reprinted in the May 8, 1861, edition of the Memphis Daily Avalanche.
This involved a meeting between a group led by Dr. Richard Fuller, a preacher
from the Seventh Baptist Church in Baltimore, and Lincoln. Fuller was a
South Carolina native and Southern supporter. The article states:
We learned that a delegation from five
of the Young Men’s Christian Associations of Baltimore, consisting of six
members each, yesterday (April 22, 1861) proceeded to Washington for an
interview with the President, the purpose being to intercede with him in behalf
a peaceful policy, and to entreat him not to pass troops through Baltimore or
Maryland.[21]
Fuller acted as the chairman and
conducted the interview. After Fuller’s plea for peace and recognition of the
rights of the Southern States, Lincoln responded, “But what am I to
do?…what shall become of the revenue? I shall have no government? No
resources?”[22]
Former U.S. President John
Tyler was intimately knowledgeable of the situation, and he worked
diligently to avoid war. With the benefit of Tyler’s insight, Lyon Gardiner
Tyler’s account echoes those of the Virginia and
Maryland representatives:
…the deciding factor with him (Lincoln) was the
tariff question. In three separate interviews, he asked what would become
of his revenue if he allowed the government at Montgomery to go on with their
ten percent tariff… Final action was taken when nine governors of high tariff
states waited upon Lincoln and offered him men and supplies.[23]
Lyon Tyler, as President Tyler’s son,
almost certainly had inside information about the three aforementioned meetings
with Lincoln, especially in consideration of his father’s tireless attempts to
achieve a peaceful resolution.
Dabney summed up the circumstances
surrounding the war by identifying Lincoln’s reference to the sectional
tariff as the tipping point. “His single objection, both to the wise
advice of Colonel Baldwin and Mr. Stuart, was: ‘Then what would become of
my tariffs?’”[24] Lincoln saw a free trade policy
in the South as an economic threat to the North that could not be allowed to
stand. Through Colonel Baldwin, Virginia provided a viable option to avoid
war and preserve the Union. Referencing Lincoln’s course of action, Dabney
lamented, “he preferred to destroy the Union and preserve his [redistributive]
tariffs. The war was conceived in duplicity, and brought forth in iniquity.”[25]
Notes
[1] Mildred Lewis Rutherford, A True Estimate
of Abraham Lincoln & Vindication of the South(Wiggins, Mississippi:
Crown Rights Book Company, 1997.), 58-59. This quote appeared on page 11 of the
December 25, 1922, edition of Barron’s. Original source: New
Haven Register; copied in New York World, September 15, 1864.
[2] Dr. Grady McWhiney, former Professor at the
University of Alabama, Texas Christian, etc. said: “What passes as standard
American history is really Yankee history written by New Englanders or their
puppets to glorify Yankee heroes and ideals.” (From The Unforgiven,
11).
[3] Robert L. Dabney, D.D., The Origin &
Real Cause of the War, A Memoir of a Narrative Received of Colonel John B.
Baldwin, Reprinted from Discussions, Volume IV, 2-3.
[4] Lee referenced his West Point teaching from Rawles’
1825 textbook, A View of the Constitution of the United States of
America, that the Union is a voluntary coalition and States have
a legal right to secede. Lee was duty-bound to fight for Virginia; he
understood the meaning of Article III, Section 3. Virginia’s Alexander R.
Boteler, while serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, warned the Lincoln
Administration that Virginia would secede if there was a call to invade the
Southern States.
[9] “Interview Between President Lincoln and Col. John
B. Baldwin, April 4th, 1861, Statements and Evidence,” Staunton
Speculator (Staunton, Virginia: Spectator Job Office, D.E. Strasburg,
Printer, 1866), 12, https://ia800301.us.archive.org/5/items/interviewbetween00bald/interviewbetween00bald.pdf,
(Accessed April 21, 2016).
[12] “Interview Between President Lincoln and Col. John
B. Baldwin, April 4th, 1861, Statements and Evidence,” 12-13,
(Accessed April 21, 2016).
[15] “Interview Between President Lincoln and Col. John
B. Baldwin, April 4th, 1861, Statements and Evidence,” 13,
(Accessed April 21, 2016).
[21] Bruce Gourley, “Baptists and the American Civil
War: April 23, 1861,” In Their Own Words, April 23,
2011, http://www.civilwarbaptists.com/thisdayinhistory/1861-april-23/,
(As reprinted in the Memphis Daily Avalanche, May 8, 1861, p. 1,
col. 4), (Accessed April 21, 2016).
[23] Lyon Gardiner Tyler, The Gray Book: A
Confederate Catechism, (Wiggins, Mississippi: Crown Rights Book Company—The
Liberty Reprint Series, 1997), 5. Originally printed in Tyler’s
Quarterlyin Volume 33, October and January issues, 1935.
About
John M. Taylor
John M. Taylor, from Alexander
City, Alabama, worked for over thirty years at Russell Corporation
(subsequently Fruit of the Loom), primarily in transportation and logistics. In
his second career, Taylor is presently Assistant Director at Adelia M. Russell
Library in Alexander City. He holds a B.S. Degree in Transportation from Auburn
University and has completed nine MLIS Courses at the University of Alabama.
Taylor is married with two sons and two grandchildren. Inspired by his late
Mother, who dearly loved the South and knew one of his Confederate ancestors,
Taylor has been a member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans since 1989, where
he edited both local and State newsletters; this includes eleven years as
Editor of Alabama Confederate. He has also supported the Ludwig von Miss
Institute since 1993. Taylor’s book, Union At All Costs: From
Confederation to Consolidation (Booklocker Publishing), was first
released in January 2017. More from John M. Taylor
