The Russian stance
The Saker considers Russia's options
in Syria:
The key thing to
understand in the Russian stance in this, and other, recent conflicts with
the USA is that Russia is still much weaker than the USA and that she therefore
does not want war. That does not, however, mean that she is not actively preparing
for war. In fact, she very much and actively does. All this means is that
should a conflict occur, Russia you try, as best can be, to keep it as limited
as possible.
In theory, these are, very roughly, the possible levels of confrontation:
1) A military standoff à la Berlin in 1961. One could argue that this is what is already taking place right now, albeit in a more long-distance and less visible way.
2) A single military incident, such as what happened recently when Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 and Russia chose not to retaliate.
3) A series of localized clashes similar to what is currently happening between India and Pakistan.
4) A conflict limited to the Syrian theater of war (say like the war between the UK and Argentina over the Malvinas Islands)
5) A regional or global military confrontation between the USA and Russia
6) A full scale thermonuclear war between the USA and Russia
During my years as a student of military strategy I have participated in many exercises on escalation and de-escalation and I can attest that while it is very easy to come up with escalatory scenarios, I have yet to see a credible scenario for de-escalation. What is possible, however, is the so-called “horizontal escalation” or “asymmetrical escalation” in which one side choses not to up the ante or directly escalate, but instead choses a different target for retaliation, not necessarily a more valuable one, just a different one on the same level of conceptual importance (in the USA Joshua M. Epstein and Spencer D. Bakich did most of the groundbreaking work on this topic).
The main reason why we can expect the Kremlin to try to find asymmetrical options to respond to a US attack is that in the Syrian context Russia is hopelessly outgunned by the US/NATO, at least in quantitative terms. The logical solutions for the Russians is to use their qualitative advantage or to seek “horizontal targets” as possible retaliatory options. This week, something very interesting and highly uncharacteristic happened: Major General Igor Konashenkov, the Chief of the Directorate of Media service and Information of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, openly mentioned one such option. Here is what he said:
“As for Kirby’s threats about possible Russian aircraft losses and the sending of Russian servicemen back to Russia in body bags, I would say that we know exactly where and how many “unofficial specialists” operate in Syria and in the Aleppo province and we know that they are involved in the operational planning and that they supervise the operations of the militants.
In theory, these are, very roughly, the possible levels of confrontation:
1) A military standoff à la Berlin in 1961. One could argue that this is what is already taking place right now, albeit in a more long-distance and less visible way.
2) A single military incident, such as what happened recently when Turkey shot down a Russian SU-24 and Russia chose not to retaliate.
3) A series of localized clashes similar to what is currently happening between India and Pakistan.
4) A conflict limited to the Syrian theater of war (say like the war between the UK and Argentina over the Malvinas Islands)
5) A regional or global military confrontation between the USA and Russia
6) A full scale thermonuclear war between the USA and Russia
During my years as a student of military strategy I have participated in many exercises on escalation and de-escalation and I can attest that while it is very easy to come up with escalatory scenarios, I have yet to see a credible scenario for de-escalation. What is possible, however, is the so-called “horizontal escalation” or “asymmetrical escalation” in which one side choses not to up the ante or directly escalate, but instead choses a different target for retaliation, not necessarily a more valuable one, just a different one on the same level of conceptual importance (in the USA Joshua M. Epstein and Spencer D. Bakich did most of the groundbreaking work on this topic).
The main reason why we can expect the Kremlin to try to find asymmetrical options to respond to a US attack is that in the Syrian context Russia is hopelessly outgunned by the US/NATO, at least in quantitative terms. The logical solutions for the Russians is to use their qualitative advantage or to seek “horizontal targets” as possible retaliatory options. This week, something very interesting and highly uncharacteristic happened: Major General Igor Konashenkov, the Chief of the Directorate of Media service and Information of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, openly mentioned one such option. Here is what he said:
“As for Kirby’s threats about possible Russian aircraft losses and the sending of Russian servicemen back to Russia in body bags, I would say that we know exactly where and how many “unofficial specialists” operate in Syria and in the Aleppo province and we know that they are involved in the operational planning and that they supervise the operations of the militants.
Translation: shoot down
our planes and bomb our troops and we and our allies go after your
"military advisors".
There isn't any doubt that the USA can beat Russia in Syria. The question is if they are willing to pay the price both there, and potentially, in Ukraine and the Baltics.
That this is all absolutely stupid and utterly unnecessary doesn't mean it won't happen. In the meantime, we should really all focus on what is truly important: did you know that Donald Trump was once ungallant in speaking about women?
Anyhow, I had been extremely skeptical about the reports that Russian missiles had taken out a command center of US and Israeli advisers, but the sudden increase in US bellicosity makes me wonder if there might have actually been some substance to it.
There isn't any doubt that the USA can beat Russia in Syria. The question is if they are willing to pay the price both there, and potentially, in Ukraine and the Baltics.
That this is all absolutely stupid and utterly unnecessary doesn't mean it won't happen. In the meantime, we should really all focus on what is truly important: did you know that Donald Trump was once ungallant in speaking about women?
Anyhow, I had been extremely skeptical about the reports that Russian missiles had taken out a command center of US and Israeli advisers, but the sudden increase in US bellicosity makes me wonder if there might have actually been some substance to it.
